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This book provides a very unorthodox treatment of the Arab Spring by
looking into the association between interpersonal trust and terrorism.
Shamaileh develops a novel theory that explains how the state of social
capital at the individual level might have shaped the differential outcomes
of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and beyond. The theoretical
and empirical analysis presented in this timely book is a fine example of
social scientific inquiry at its best. The author brings a wealth of evidence
ranging from in-depth analysis of cases to large-N quantitative analysis to
test the rich theoretical propositions. Trust and Terror will be a valuable
resource for students of comparative politics and Middle Eastern studies
as well as to policymakers.
Sabri Ciftci, Michael W. Suleiman Chair in Arab and
Arab-American Studies, Kansas State University
To illustrate the critical interaction between general levels of interpersonal
trust and the options to which individuals resort when addressing grie-
vances, Shamaileh shows the depth of his analytical range, adeptly bring-
ing together formal modeling, case studies, interviews, statistical analysis,
and even Foucauldian interpretative analysis of satirical comic caricatures
of Assad and popular comedy skits. Throughout the work, the author’s logic
drives home the mechanisms behind the inevitable outcome of the Syrian
protests and the relationship between the cultivated lack of trust in
Syrian society and the recourse to terrorism as the means to counter the
state.
Michael Wuthrich, Academic Director of Global & International Studies
Programs, University of Kansas
Shamaileh offers a novel and persuasive argument about the effects of
trust and interpersonal ties on individuals’ choices to pursue non-violent
versus violent means of resistance. The book makes a major contribution
to growing research on how the characteristics of societies and relations
between militants and communities affect the trajectory of violent move-
ments. It provides a fascinating lens through which to analyze variation in
the protest movements that emerged in the Arab Spring – and beyond.
Risa A. Brooks, Allis Chalmers Associate Professor,
Marquette University
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individuals choose to join. Utilizing the examples of the Arab Spring
uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, a novel theoretical model that links
the literature on social capital and interpersonal trust to violent collective
action is developed and extended. Beyond simply bringing together two
lines of literature, this theoretical model can serve as a prism through
which the decision to join terrorist organizations or violent movements
may be analyzed. The implications of the theory are then examined more
closely through an in-depth look at the behavior of members of political
movements at the outset of the Arab Spring, as well as statistical tests of
the relationship between interpersonal trust and terrorism in the Middle
East and globally.
Trust and Terror will be of interest to scholars of Comparative Politics
and International Relations.
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Preface
Writing this book brought me no joy and no comfort. It is the offspring of
my experiences in Syria, a theoretical model that predicted non-violent
protests could not be sustained in Damascus, and an empirical reality that
corroborated my hypothesis. While I was not raised in Damascus, I
spent most of my childhood and adolescent summers there doing what
normal children do, and experiencing what normal Syrians experience. I
visited pools, drank apple soda, ate shawarma, laughed with friends and
family, and engaged in mischief when the opportunity availed itself. I also
was slapped by police, hid from security officials, discussed politics in
secret with friends, believed that anybody could be a secret agent in Syria
(even my own family members), and learned to hate and fear Hafez Al
Assad like most of those who surrounded me. While I was always shielded
by my United States passport from the most heinous of acts the regime
was known for, and comforted by the fact that I could always go home if I
experienced too much discomfort, these experiences provided me with
fleeting glimpses of what growing up in Syria in the 1990s was like. These
glimpses were the difference between feeling sympathy for those who
sought regime change and feeling empathy.
I wanted to see hundreds of thousands of Damascenes take to the
streets and call for Bashar Al Assad to step down. I wanted to witness a
transition to democracy take place in Syria; a democracy created by Syr-
ians on their own terms and aimed at restoring the vibrant political atmo-
sphere that, if the historians are to be believed, once inhabited Damascus.
Of course, I wanted all of this to occur without the chaos and assassina-
tions that had accompanied that vibrant political atmosphere in Damas-
cus prior to Hafez Al Assad’s reign. I wanted all of this well before the
Arab Spring. The problem was that I long had a sneaking suspicion that it
could not occur in Syria given the political and social climate in a post-
Hama Massacre, Assad-ruled Syria. This book is the development of that
sneaking suspicion into something slightly more tangible and accessible to
those existing outside of my mind.
When Tunisians overthrew Ben Ali, I began to hope for change, but that
sneaking suspicion did not go away. When Egyptians gathered in Tahrir
Square, I had yet more hope, but I still believed Syria was different. When
protests broke out in Daraa, I began to believe regime change might be
possible, but I remembered that Daraa was different. When protests sub-
sequently gathered steam in Homs and Hama, my pessimism began to
wane, but I knew Damascus was different. Unfortunately, Damascus did
turn out to be different, and this book serves as no consolation for the
implications associated with that fact.
Preface xv
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1 Introduction
One young man from a small rural town in Tunisia, angered by the
actions of a low-level government official, and frustrated by the perceived
grievances he faced from a political system stacked against him, hastily
decided that he had had enough. After attempting to go through institu-
tional channels to remedy his situation, he opted to seek redress through
other means. The status quo was no longer acceptable to him, and he was
willing, at least at that moment, to take extraordinary measures in order
to be heard. He could have continued to petition the government through
more formal means. He could have held a sign in front of a government
building, or tried to organize a protest. More importantly, he could have
reacted violently and attacked the officials or government office that
offended him. Instead, Mohammed Bouazizi chose to stand in front of the
government building that housed the offending officials, douse himself in
gasoline, and light himself on fire.
While it is unlikely that he understood the precise implications of his
actions, his actions were the product of a choice, a choice that is often, but
not always, neglected by the scholarly literature on violent and non-violent
resistance. The actions that this one man took led to an explosion of pro-
test activity in Tunisia, and brought about the sudden fall of President
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Moreover, his actions, as well as the success of
the protest movement in Tunisia, led to increased political activity, protest,
and calls for reform throughout the Arab world. Just like Mohammed
Bouazizi, those who sought change after his self-immolation faced choices
with regard to how they would seek change. Would they seek redress
through non-violent protest or more costly and dangerous means?
In particular, this project seeks to examine the choice of terrorism over
other, less costly, options for political resistance. Given the level of poli-
tical instability that characterized many of the Arab states that experi-
enced the political rumblings of the Arab Spring, why did movements so
often rely on peaceful means? Why did Tunisians not turn to violence in
the aftermath of Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation? Why were the
Egyptian protesters of 2011 able to maintain a largely peaceful and cohe-
sive demeanor? Given the success of the peaceful Egyptian protests, why
was the means of protest organized in Libya largely violent? More
importantly, why did some in Syria turn to terrorism in their attempt to
remove the Assad regime from power?
It is my contention that the choice of mechanism or tool of political
resistance that an individual or group of individuals ultimately turn to in
order to achieve their goals is driven to a large extent by the variables that
influence the organization of social order. Moreover, among these vari-
ables, interpersonal trust, and, more broadly, social capital, play a sig-
nificant role in shaping how resistance ends up being organized, and what
type of tools are used for resistance. In particular, this exploration is
driven by a desire to understand why individuals and groups at times uti-
lize terrorism rather than other modes of political resistance, especially
when there is a ground-swell of support for resistance among many within
society.
The idea that individuals face a choice with regard to collective action is
by no means a new one; however, much of the literature has focused on
when individuals will collectively act rather than how they will collectively
act. Mancur Olson’s path-breaking book The Logic of Collective Action
set into motion a long line of literature focusing on the application and
extension of the collective action problem and the solutions that Olson
offers (Olson 1965). Along with other lines of literature, the scholarly
work on violent political conflict picked up on the importance of the col-
lective action problem, and the critical role the collective action problem
plays in understanding how groups mobilize rebellions (Popkin 1988;
Lichbach 1994; Lichbach 1998; Mason 2004). Perhaps most relevant
among these works, Mark Lichbach’s The Rebel’s Dilemma, offers a thor-
ough analysis of the potential solutions to the modified collective action
problem facing rebels presented in his book, finding that there are a sig-
nificant number of rational solutions to the problem, but many obstacles
to producing fair outcomes (Lichbach 1998). While Lichbach’s seminal
work provides a robust analysis of the collective action problem within
different contexts, it served as a crucial starting point for many potential
research agendas rather than the end of the study of the rebel’s dilemma
(Lichbach 1998).1 Although The Rebel’s Dilemma explicitly discusses how
various solutions to the rebel’s dilemma influence the tactics that may be
used, much of the literature on political violence and terrorism has not
theoretically explored the motivations for participating in such collective
endeavors as a choice to be weighed against other options.2
Some scholars, however, have framed the issue of when individuals turn
to terrorism rather than other means of political dissent as a choice. A
long line of literature on participation in, and support for, terrorism has
established a link between the availability of political channels for
opposition and decreased terrorist activity (Crenshaw 2000; Krueger and
Maleckova 2003; Krueger and Laitin 2008). Yet, even in the most
authoritarian contexts, there remain a number of tools of resistance
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available to those wishing to remove a regime or alter the dominant
paradigm (Lichbach 1998). Moreover, civil resistance is, in and of itself, a
choice to actively dissent through means other than those institutionalized
by the state, whether violent or non-violent (Schock 2004). Both non-
violent protest and violent protest have been used as means to institute
large-scale paradigm shifts, and not just to influence shifts in policy. Given
the grave costs generally associated with forms of violent protest like
terrorism, whether formal political avenues for change exist or not, why
would individuals choose to support the use of terrorism over non-violent
protest or other means of resistance?
This book seeks to extend the literature on the relationship between political
opportunities and participation in forms of violent political protest, such as
terrorism. While credible institutional channels may provide alternative
pathways for change, the absence of these formal institutional channels does
not necessarily mean the absence of choice (see Bakker, Hill andMoore 2016).
An individual or group that carries out terrorist attacks is not doing so in
light of the absence of any other options outside of those explicitly provided
by the state. It is also not the case that political violence is always, nor
usually, a more efficient way to bring about change (Chenoweth and Stephan
2011). Thus, the option to protest non-violently, or through some other form
of violence, is available to individuals and groups who choose terrorism.
Just as the demand for resistance through terrorism may dampen when
formal political channels are present, the viability of non-violent resistance
makes terrorism comparatively unappealing. However, in order for a non-
violent protest movement to be viable, it must be able to attract a significant
amount of support from throughout society. This not only requires some
unity of purpose and preferences among a wide range of individuals, but a
belief that individuals who would support change will participate in bring-
ing it about (Olson 1965; Lichbach 1998). This further requires those who
support resistance to, en masse, contribute to the costs of resistance and
share in the risk related to it. Terrorism, on the other hand, can be executed
by a relatively small group to produce the desired results. When an individual
desires a paradigm shift, but does not believe that others are willing to join a
non-violent movement or other movements that require mass participation,
participating in terrorism may appear relatively appealing.
It is through interpersonal trust’s relationship to the perceived viability
of various forms of resistance that it conditions the choice of broad strat-
egy adopted by individuals and groups within society. When individuals
generally trust that others are willing to bear the costs of protest, they are
more willing to join, form, or participate in movements that require vast
participation. When individuals do not trust others, and they, themselves,
are willing to take on the cost of protest, they will seek to effect change
through those whom they do trust, a subset of the population that cannot
bring about change through traditional means of non-violent protest. Just
as interpersonal trust and, more broadly, social capital condition
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economic behavior, institutional performance, and social interactions,
they shape the type of resistance that individuals will join and that char-
acterize a society (Arrow 1972; Ciftci 2010; Knack and Keefer 1997;
Putnam 1993; Rothstein 2000; Coleman 1988; Benson and Rochon 2004).
The connection between interpersonal trust and a belief in others’ will-
ingness to bear the costs of protest is tied together through a con-
ceptualization of trust that borrows from the behavioral economics
literature on reciprocity. The scholarly literature on reciprocity, trust, and
other-regarding behavior is well-developed, thorough, and provides sig-
nificant theoretical insights into the other-regarding motivations of indivi-
duals that are supported by empirical evidence gathered mainly in
laboratory settings (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Gachter 2000; Fehr
et al. 2003; Andreoni and Miller 1993; Panchanathan and Boyd 2004,
Nowak and Sigmund 2005). Trust is conceptualized as the belief that
others are concerned with fairness and are not simply self-interested (Fehr
and Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Gachter 2000). It is this concern with fairness
that drives individuals to contribute to the cost of collective action. Where
an individual believes that others in society are not likely to be other-
regarding or willing to help her address her grievances, she will turn to
those whom she knows and trusts to help her address these grievances.
Perhaps one of the most persistent criticisms of theoretical models that
seek to address the motivations for joining violent dissident movements
through the prism of the traditional collective action framework is the
reliance of such work on the assumption of rationality at the level of the
individual or strategic models (Tilly 1978; Abrahms 2008). While other
scholars have addressed these criticisms head-on, and have provided ample
theoretical and empirical support for the assumption that dissidents and
terrorists behave rationally, the heart of the criticism of rational models
of terrorism is that they generally fail to account for the social dimensions
of dissident and terrorist behavior (Abrahms 2008; see Moore 1995; see
Kalyvas 2006). For Charles Tilly, rationality is a reasonable assumption at
the group level, but not at the individual level (Tilly 1978; Lichbach 1998).
Max Abrahms, on the other hand, summarized his criticism of the strategic,
or rational, model of terrorism as follows:
None of the common tendencies of terrorist organizations advances
their official political agendas, but all of them help to ensure the sur-
vival of the social unit. Together, they reveal the operating decision
rules of terrorist members. Whereas the strategic model locates the
motives of terrorists in the official goals of the terrorist organization,
the trade-offs it makes provides direct insight into its members’
incentive structure. Just as economists measure utility functions through




Both Tilly and Abrahms reject the assumption of individual strategic
behavior, but with very different underlying arguments. For Tilly, ration-
ality operates at the group-level, while Abrahms believes that terrorist
groups in particular have motivations beyond their stated aims that relate
to social cohesion. Tilly essentially sidesteps individual rationality, perhaps
due to a widely held belief that a benefits and costs analysis cannot explain
individual participation in mass movements and a preference for psycho-
logical or collective behavioral explanations (Tilly 1978; Olson 1965;
Gamson 1990; Gurr 1970). Abrahms takes a drastically different approach,
and attempts to attack rational models of participation in terrorism head-on
(Abrahms 2008). While Chenoweth, Miller, and McClellan (2009) make a
particularly strong counter-argument to Abrahms that is rooted in the
empirical literature, perhaps the most relevant criticism of his argument
lies in how he relates rationality to the stated aims of the group. Ration-
ality merely requires that individuals have transitive and complete pre-
ferences, and not a manifesto that clearly outlines the preferences of
groups or individuals, nor that the preferences of a group or individual
actually mirror their stated preferences. Although Abrahms acknowledges
rationality in some sense, he rejects arguments that root that rationality in
a preference for accomplishing strategic aims beyond group cohesion. A
preference for social cohesion, or group longevity in addition to policy
preferences, may indeed exist within a strategic rational choice framework.
Moreover, a rational model that ignores strategic considerations and relies
fundamentally on a preference for social cohesion cannot explain why
resources and lives are expended on terrorism rather than other bond-
forming activities. If the end goal of the members of terrorist organiza-
tions is social solidarity, what is preventing them from establishing that
solidarity without taking on extreme costs? Thus, Abrahms’ criticism of
rationality appears to primarily relate to rationality as it has been conceived
by some scholars utilizing the strategic model, and not the underlying
assumption of rationality or strategic behavior. It should be noted that
recent work by Abrahms indicates that he has revised his opinion on the
usefulness of strategic explanations for the behavior of terrorist organizations
(Abrahms and Conrad 2016).
Nevertheless, while these criticisms of rational choice models as applied
to potential terrorists and dissidents are not particularly damning, they do
highlight the need for more theoretical modeling that integrates the social,
psychological, and behavioral motivations of those who participate in
rebellion, whether through mass movements or smaller groups. By incor-
porating both the interpersonal trust dynamics within a society, as well as
other-regarding preferences, the theoretical model presented in this book
seeks to address these valid concerns. All forms of collective action, whe-
ther conducted in a small group or a large group, are inherently social
endeavors and not all of an individual’s preferences relate to narrow self-
interest or maximizing a direct payoff. Yet, while social, psychological,
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and behavioral forces should factor into our analysis of the motivations
for participating in collective action movements and terrorist groups, none
of this prevents us from viewing the problem through a strategic or
rational lens.
The following chapter, Chapter 2, will present a broad overview of the
uprisings that occurred in Egypt, Libya, and Syria in the aftermath of
Tunisia’s 2011 revolution, and how dissent in each state was organized.
The Arab Spring offers us a unique opportunity to examine how different
uprisings inspired by the same event can take divergent turns. While some
scholars have taken a top-down approach to study how different states
experienced the Arab Spring, this examination seeks to look at how col-
lective action was organized in each of these three states at the outset of
the uprisings (Brownlee et al. 2014). The primary implication that can be
drawn from this analysis is that citizens organized around those who they
had grown accustomed to cooperating with prior to the revolution. In
Egypt, where cross-community civil society flourished, citizens organized
mass demonstrations that eventually led to the overthrow of the Mubarak
regime. Qaddafi’s Libya, on the other hand, managed to quash civil
society, but reinforced tribal and regional identities through both the
institutionalization of these identities and through the manner in which
institutional power was allocated. When the Libyans organized after the
Tunisian Revolution, they quickly formed militias that mirrored the tribal
and regional divisions that Qaddafi had reinforced, and loosely coalesced
under a national banner of resistance with the aid of foreign intervention.
Finally, in Syria, where the Assad regime had systematically destroyed civil
society and actively promoted mistrust among citizens, the country experi-
enced a more fractured uprising. This, in turn, led to smaller, less capable
groups organizing around less efficient strategies, including terrorism.
The intuitions gleaned from the analysis in Chapter 2 are discussed
more thoroughly, and subsequently formalized, in Chapter 3. The chapter
begins by defining and conceptualizing interpersonal trust and social
capital, and relating them to both reciprocity and cooperative behavior.
The chapter then subsequently analyzes the existent literature, and identi-
fies how the literature on social capital, interpersonal trust, and reciprocity
may provide insights into why individuals may join terrorist organizations.
The connection between interpersonal trust, other-regarding preferences,
and the choice of terrorism over other means of resistance is presented
formally, and extended by relaxing a number of different assumptions.
This theoretic examination produces a number of implications that are
potentially testable, chief among which is that when all other variables are
held constant, and terrorism is a viable option, individuals who seek
retribution for the grievances they have suffered will turn to terrorism
when they possess relatively low levels of generalized trust.
Chapter 4 analyzes three cases of Salafist political mobilization in
Egypt, Libya, and Syria during the Arab Spring, and demonstrates how
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the social order influenced the manner in which they mobilized and the
tools of resistance that they used. Salafist movements, while ranging from
jihadist groups characterized by the use of terrorism to quietist groups that
disavow the fomenting of any political unrest, have largely been discussed
as ideologically static and rigid by nature. The Arab Spring, however,
revealed the extent to which Salafist movements were willing to adjust to
changing conditions in ways that contradicted their previously stated reli-
gious positions. Such shifts illustrate both their willingness to behave stra-
tegically at the expense of their stated religious preferences and how the
connections that characterize society influence the behavior of political
elites and those who follow them.
Throughout the book, Syria is discussed as an exceptional case in terms
of the interpersonal trust and social dynamics within the state, and Chapter 5
provides an interpretive analysis that explores interpersonal trust, as well
as how a paucity of trust in Syria produced an inefficient and ineffective
non-violent movement in Damascus. It begins with an analysis of the
state’s response to dissident portrayals of the regime, and I find that it is
portrayals of the regime’s relative coercive capacity as weak, rather than
depictions of grievances perpetuated by the regime, that Assad and his
allies have attempted to stifle. The ties between the regime’s relative coer-
cive capacity and interpersonal trust are than presented through the
representative analysis of an episode of a Syrian sitcom that presents a
relatively typical depiction of both the trustworthiness of others, and how
this lack of trustworthiness enhances the regime’s coercive capacity. Rely-
ing on data drawn from my own field notes from Syria immediately prior
to the Arab spring, unstructured interviews, conversations, and interac-
tions with Syrian protesters during the early stages of the revolution, and
semi-structured interviews conducted in 2016, I present an analysis of how
a lack of generalized trust in Damascus decreased the effectiveness of even
active protesters.
Implications drawn from my theory are subsequently tested on individual-
level data drawn from the first wave of the Arab Barometer in Chapter 6. I
find significant evidence to support the contention that there is a negative
correlation between generalized trust and support for terrorism. Moreover,
I also find significant evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a positive
correlation between particularized trust and support for terrorism in the
Middle East and North Africa. The predicted probabilities analysis that
follows presents a significantly large gap in predicted support for terrorism
between generalized trusters and particularized trusters.
Chapter 7 then tests the relationship between generalized trust and the
amount of domestic terrorism produced within a state at the country level.
This analysis finds a strong and significant correlation between generalized
trust and the amount of domestic terrorism produced within a state. Given
the potential for endogeneity in this analysis, a two-stage model is utilized
to produce the results of the central analysis of this chapter. In addition,
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this analysis provides an interesting empirical picture regarding the relation-
ship between economic and government performance and the amount of
domestic terrorism a state experiences.
The final chapter of the book, Chapter 8, concludes by returning to the
motivational examples presented in Chapter 2, and relating these examples
to the theoretical and empirical results discussed in the chapters that
follow while simultaneously summarizing my results. This chapter then
examines the policy implications of this study with regard to preventing,
predicting, and combating domestic or localized terrorism (see Sánchez-
Cuenca and De la Calle 2009). The book concludes with a brief discussion
of potential avenues of research that may flow from this project, and
focuses on the potential benefits of studying how social networks may
influence the tools of resistance used within a society.
The relationship between interpersonal trust, collective action, retribu-
tion, and terrorism is undoubtedly a complex one. The goals of this par-
ticular book are not to provide the final word on this issue, but, rather, to
start a conversation regarding the relationship between these variables and
provide a framework for future analysis. Nevertheless, the findings of this
book should lay an empirical and theoretical foundation that provides
convincing evidence of the existence of a relationship between generalized
interpersonal trust, particularized interpersonal trust, and support for
terrorism in the Middle East and beyond.
Notes
1 It should be noted that, although this book explores a more specific phenom-
enon and is concerned with other-regarding behavior, Mark Lichbach’s exemp-
lary framing of the rebel’s dilemma significantly influenced the way the decision
to participate in terrorism was framed in this book.
2 As Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan note in their bookWhy Civil Resistance
Works, this may be due, in part, to the, perhaps dubious, assumption made by
some scholars that violent political resistance is more effective or can achieve
results more quickly than non-violent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan
2011).
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2 Trust, Terror, and The Arab Spring
Egypt, Libya, and Syria
2.1 Introduction
On December 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, a young man from a rural
town in Tunisia, frustrated after being publicly humiliated by a police
officer and ignored by a public official, doused himself in gasoline in the
middle of an intersection outside of a government building, and lit himself
on fire. His frustration and humiliation mirrored the sentiments of many
in the Middle East and North Africa, and his self-immolation was
received as a call for political action throughout the Arab world. As pro-
tests pushed President Zine Ben Ali out of office in Tunisia, they swelled in
other Arab states, threatening once seemingly stable dictatorships. Soon
after President Ben Ali’s ouster, Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year reign in Egypt
would come to an end as protesters cheered in Tahrir Square, and people
around the world discussed the prospects of democracy in a region that
months prior appeared to be content with authoritarian rule.
While popular uprisings brought about the sudden fall of dictatorial
regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, political opposition took on a more violent
nature in Libya and Syria. Libyan protest movements evolved into mili-
tias that soon began cooperating under the direction of the National
Liberation Army and the authority of the National Transitional Coun-
cil. This united, yet decentralized, front presented by the Libyan rebels
soon provided an opportunity for international intervention, and, in turn,
led to the death of President Muammar Al-Qaddafi and the downfall of
his regime. The Syrian opposition also turned to violence, yet has been
unable to unite the various militias in a manner that would allow for
cooperation and coordination within the movement (Weiss 2012). As
the Libyans relied to a greater extent on more conventional violent
operations against combatants, the fractured Syrian insurgency has uti-
lized less effective modes of violent opposition and turned to terrorism at
times. Why did Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation spark non-violent
protests in some countries and violent uprisings in others? Moreover, why
did the Syrian uprising take on a more sinister nature than the uprising in
Libya?
2.2 The Uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria
Although Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the subsequent
removal from office of Tunisia’s President Ben Ali sparked political upris-
ings, or at least increased calls for regime change, throughout the Middle
East, the nature of the political uprisings or turmoil that occurred varied
greatly by state. The analysis in this chapter will focus on the uprisings in
Egypt, Libya, and Syria. In Egypt, large-scale political protests in the
immediate aftermath of Tunisia’s revolution led to the swift removal of
Hosni Mubarak from office, ending his 30-year reign over the country.
Muammar Al-Qaddafi’s end in Libya came about more slowly and violently,
as militias loosely organized under the National Transitional Council, with
the support of foreign governments and transnational actors, took over
Libya and ended Qaddafi’s life. In Syria, as of the date of this book’s
submission, over five years since the uprising began, the Syrian Civil War
still rages, and has been characterized by a fractured opposition, elements
of which have often resorted to acts of terrorism in their fight to end
President Bashar Al Assad’s authoritarian regime.
It is my contention that one of the fundamental reasons for the diver-
gent reactions observed in these three states in response to the 2011 Tuni-
sian Revolution are the differing levels of generalized interpersonal trust,
or social capital, observed in each state. Each of the three states were
controlled by long-standing dictatorial regimes, are culturally pre-
dominantly Arab, violently repressed opposition movements, and wit-
nessed wide-scale corruption throughout the tenures of their respective
leaders. One of the essential differences between these three states is in the
prevalence of private civic organizations within them, and the actions
taken by the dictatorial regimes that influenced both levels of generalized
interpersonal trust within society as well as whom individuals trusted.
These differences influenced how dissident citizens organized to bring
about political change.
2.2.1 Egypt: Civil Societies and Political Change
While the Egyptian government throughout Hosni Mubarak’s tenure was
characterized by militaristic dictatorial rule, corruption, and repressive
politics, it allowed for a greater degree of freedom of organization than
many of its Arab neighbors (Al-Sayyid 1993, Norton 1993). Perhaps due
to the sheer size of the nation and its population, and the government’s
inability to control or replace the services and assistance provided by non-
governmental organizations, charities, and other groups that arose, civil
associations gained a prominent place in Egyptian society prior to the
Arab Spring to an extent greater than many other Arab states. According
to estimates, between roughly 16,000 and 19,000 non-governmental orga-
nizations existed in Egypt around the turn of the century (Cook 2011).
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Although the Egyptian government attempted to control and restrict the
ability of these organizations to operate effectively or efficiently, non-
governmental organizations and civil societies continued to play a prominent
role in Egypt (Official Gazette 2002).
Perhaps the most notable and well-known Egyptian civil associations is
the Muslim Brotherhood, a relatively moderate Islamic organization, and
its affiliates. Having adopted a non-violent strategy to achieving their poli-
tical and policy-related goals, in the early 1970s and beyond it had set out
to provide services and resources to places and people whom the govern-
ment could not or would not reach, and achieved substantial amounts of
success doing so (Leiken and Brooke 2007; Berman 2003). The Muslim
Brotherhood’s university organizations and members soon played a pro-
minent role on campuses throughout Egypt, providing transportation and
clothing to students in need, and often winning student association elec-
tions (Berman 2003). Later on, Muslim Brotherhood members would
begin entering and winning elections in professional associations across
various disciplines, and use those organizations to increase their influence
over Egyptian society. The Muslim Brotherhood developed a wide net-
work of grassroots organizations that encouraged engagement among
citizens throughout Egypt, bringing together individuals from different
socio-economic strata and encouraging individuals to work together
toward common goals (Berman 2003).
While conservative Islamic groups, both those associated with the
Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist clerics, dominated the realm of civil
society in Egypt prior to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, they were not the
only members of civil society operating in Egypt, nor the groups that
played the most significant role in the earliest stages of the revolution. One of
the most prominent non-Islamic organizations that arose prior to the
revolution was the April 6 Youth Movement, an organization whose active
and passive Facebook membership numbered approximately 70,000 in
2009 (Shapiro 2009). While the April 6 Youth Movement did not afford
the social services that its Islamist counterparts provided, it created a
mechanism to organize and gather individuals to support causes that were
often not directly related to their own immediate grievances. In fact, the
organization’s leaders and members, who were predominantly well edu-
cated and hailed from middle-class backgrounds, were initially organized
to support a labor strike in a community that was as distant to most of
them socially and economically as it was physically. They, along with
other organizations, both Islamist and non-Islamist, allowed individuals to
gather to support causes both directly related to their wants and needs,
and those of other communities in Egypt.
At the time of Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the begin-
ning of the subsequent Tunisian uprising, Egypt’s GDP per capita (in
current United States dollars) was $2,804, and its economic growth had
stagnated due to the global economic downturn (World Bank 2013).
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Among the three states being examined in this section, Egypt possessed
the lowest literacy rate at 72 percent in 2010 (World Bank 2013). Corrup-
tion, or at least perceptions of government corruption in 2010 as measured
in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by Transparency
International, was a pervasive problem, as it was in much of the Arab
world (Transparency International 2010). More importantly, brutality by
government agents and the use of torture by police was commonplace, and
had been increasing in recent years (Abdel-Aziz 2007). The economic
problems, rampant corruption, and human rights abuses victimizing Egypt
were characteristic traits of most of the non–Gulf Cooperation Council
Arab states at the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011.
The 2011 Egyptian Revolution began in earnest on January 25, 2011,
Egypt’s official National Police Day, a holiday founded by Mubarak in
2009 to commemorate the service of police officers. For those who
opposed the military dictatorship of Mubarak, National Police Day was
the optimal time to protest the abuses of the Ministry of Interior and the
police for their human rights violations and use of torture (Al-Masry Al-
Youm 2011). Leftist and Islamist groups organized and provided ancillary
support to begin and sustain protests in Tahrir Square and around Egypt.
The government responded to these protests repressively and forcefully, as
approximately 846 individuals were killed during a revolution that lasted
under three weeks (Haaretz 2011). Yet the citizens of Egypt continued to
protest, reaching approximately 2 million protesters in Tahrir Square alone
at one point in time. Egypt’s police force and intelligence officers loyal to
the Mubarak regime who had been charged with handling the protests
were eventually replaced with the military, which showed greater restraint
as the protests continued (Hauslohner 2011). During the evening of Feb-
ruary 11, 2011, less than three weeks after the revolution began, Hosni
Mubarak resigned, and effectively abdicated control of Egypt to the
Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces. On February 13, 2011,
the Egyptian Parliament was dissolved by the Supreme Council, which
announced that it would maintain power until elections could be held.
2.2.2 Libya: Tribes Become Militias
Libya lacked the sophisticated and widespread civil societies and grass-
roots movements present in Egypt prior to the Arab Spring (Anderson
2011). Under the rule of Muammar Al-Qaddafi, Libya’s citizens, lacking
dependable government institutions or civil associations to turn to for their
needs, had relied on their tribes for support, which produced intra-tribal
cooperation at the expense of the development of entities within the state
to facilitate cooperation among different segments of society (Anderson
2011). Qaddafi, rather than attempting to establish centralized authority
under his control in Libya and/or take actions aimed at unifying the
nation and developing a national identity, reinforced tribal structures in
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order to decrease cooperation and collusion among the different political
and social cleavages within Libya (Hweio 2012). Moreover, Qaddafi uti-
lized the institutions of the state to afford greater power to his own tribe
and key tribes in Libya to ensure that they were well positioned in a frac-
tured Libya, and these actions served to further reinforce tribalism within
the country (Hweio 2012). The lack of a strong central authority or
national identity, deficiencies in the quantity, quality, and organization of
both Islamic and secular civil associations, and the deeply entrenched
tribal cleavages contributed to the fractionalization of Libya.
The institutionalization of tribalism in Libya did not begin with Qad-
dafi, yet Qaddafi’s understanding of how tribal cleavages could be exploited
was one of the keys to his longevity as the leader of Libya. The post-
colonial government of King Idris laid the foundation for the fusion of
government institutions and informal tribal institutions in the politics of
Libya’s modern nation-state. Given the instability and institutional under-
development inherent to state formation brought about exogenously, a
reliance on tribal institutions to maintain order may have been an inevi-
table outcome (Anderson 1990).1 By formalizing King Idris’ position and
a line of succession that flows down to his nearest male heir, Libya’s post-
colonial constitution entrenched his tribe at the top of the hierarchy of
Libya (Anderson 1990; 1951 Libyan Constitution). The banning of poli-
tical parties led to the organization of political interests along tribal lines,
which the King brought under his control through the strategic allocation
of government positions based on tribal loyalties, and informally blended
a hierarchal system of patronage that relied on tribal nobility (First 1974;
Anderson 1990). Moreover, the weakness of Libya’s central state led to the
significant delegation of authority at the local level to regionally powerful
tribes (Anderson 1990).
While Muammar Al-Qaddafi and his cadre of officers took power in a
bloodless coup d’état, he framed his coup as a revolution that was meant,
in part, to cure the injustices associated with the tribal nepotism of King
Idris’ regime (El-Katiri 2012; Anderson 1990; Huesken 2012). Among the
notable reforms instituted by Qaddafi that were aimed at reducing tribal
authority within Libya, the “revolutionary” government redrew adminis-
trative lines so that they did not mirror tribal lines, and sacked local gov-
ernment officials who had predominantly been drawn from tribal nobility
(Anderson 1990; El Fathaly and Palmer 1980). Qaddafi’s initial attempt to
break down the existing tribal order by redrawing administrative lines and
allocating government positions absent regard for tribal authority, how-
ever, did not last long (Hweio 2012; Vandewalle 1991; Anderson 1990).
Perhaps due to the lack of a coherent ideology that could unite a faction
of supporters, within a decade, Qaddafi had begun to lean on his own
family, tribe, and tribal allies to maintain a network of support (Al-Gaddafi
1976; Hweio 2012; Paoletti 2011; Anderson 1990). The allocation of key
security and government positions under Qaddafi soon became decided
Trust, Terror, and the Arab Spring 13
primarily on the basis of lineage and tribal affiliation (Hweio 2012;
Paoletti 2011; Anderson 1990).
The integration of tribalism into Libya’s government under Qaddafi
went well beyond merely favoring those closest to the leader and his tribe.
More relevant to this book’s inquiry is the manner in which authority was
delegated to tribes and tribal leaders under Qaddafi. The allocation of
administrative positions within the regime was not statically determined
on the basis of a set hierarchy of tribes, but, rather, fluctuated on the basis
of the actions of tribal leaders and their perceived loyalty to Qaddafi
(Hweio 2012). Thus, Qaddafi engaged in a form of collective retribution
and reward at the tribal level, which reinforced tribal ties. Moreover,
through people’s congresses, as well as the delegation of authority at the
local level, tribal leaders were able to exert a modicum of power, and
reestablish their roles as integral players in the provision of services
(Anderson 1990; Hweio 2012).
The incorporation of tribal elements into the institutions of the state
reinforced tribalism, but it was the weakness of the institutions themselves
that led to the pervasive reliance on tribal ties and norms throughout the
state (Hweio 2012). Individuals, in essentially all contexts, are not just
governed by the formal institutions of the state, but also by informal or
cultural institutions that create norms that shape human interactions
(North 1990). Where the formal institutions of the state fail to govern
adequately, reliance on these informal institutions should be significantly
greater. These informal institutions, however, are often more likely to be
sustained within smaller groups that are capable of enforcing reciprocal
norms (Olson 1965; North 1990; Axelrod 1984).
In Qaddafi’s Libya, the institutions of the state could not be relied upon
by its citizens (Hweio 2012). In part due to the weakness of the institutions
the regime inherited from King Idris, as well as Qaddafi’s capricious use of
institutions within the state, individuals could not turn to the state and
expect them to resolve disputes or develop sustainable remedies to the
problems that they faced (Anderson 1990; Hweio 2012). With a long his-
tory of cooperation occurring at the tribal level, an informal institutional
framework was present for individuals to rely on in the shadow of inef-
fectual government institutions. Rather than turning to the government for
assistance with regard to economic and social dilemmas and dispute reso-
lution, people within Libya increasingly sought the assistance of their
tribal orders instead (Hweio 2012). Thus, the Qaddafi regime, perhaps
purposefully, fostered an environment that nurtured the deepening of
tribal ties and the growth of tribal institutions.
Libya’s economy at the time of the Arab Spring, while not particularly
robust, was stronger than that of Egypt and Syria due, at least in large
part, to the country’s oil wealth. In 2009, Libya’s GDP per capita (in
current United States dollars) was $10,456, substantially larger than those
of Egypt and Syria (World Bank 2013). In addition, Libya’s literacy rate
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was significantly higher than both that of Egypt and that of Syria (World
Bank 2013). The Libyan government, however, according to its CPI, was
perceived to be more corrupt than those of both Syria and Egypt (Trans-
parency International 2013). Under the rule of Qaddafi, much of the cri-
ticism within Libya of government corruption was related to tribal
nepotism. Moreover, the Qaddafi regime was notoriously brutal and
repressive, much like the Assad regime in Syria.
Small protests and acts of civil disobedience took place in Eastern
Libya, far from the capital, on the heels of the Tunisian Revolution in
January 2011. These small protests turned into larger protests in February,
as Eastern Libya quickly slipped out of the regime’s control. Protests soon
arose around Libya, but these protests lacked the cohesion and organiza-
tion of Egypt’s protests and failed to reach a critical mass in Tripoli in the
early stages of the uprising. Soon, a National Transition Council would be
formed to organize and manage the opposition, yet the National Transi-
tion Council largely allowed the various militias that were organized on
the basis of tribal and regional affiliations to operate independently
(Lacher 2011). International support for the uprising and the National
Transition Council provided the resources and assistance needed for the
disparate militias to overtake forces loyal to Qaddafi, and by May 2011
the opposition forces had begun to overpower Qaddafi’s loyalists. In
August 2011, Tripoli fell to the opposition forces, effectively removing
Qaddafi’s regime from power; and in October 2011, Qaddafi’s hometown
of Sirte was taken over and Libya’s longstanding dictator was violently
killed.
2.2.3 Syria: Can You Trust Your Brother?
While Egypt was awash with civil associations, both Islamic and non-
Islamic, and Libyans turned to their tribes for support, the Assad regime
in Syria had effectively destroyed and prevented the formation of non-
governmental entities and structures that would allow for Syrian citizens
to organize outside of the careful watch of the Ba’ath party and Assad
loyalists. Unlike Mubarak and Qaddafi, Syria’s ruling Assad family
belongs to a religious minority, the Alawites, who were historically mar-
ginalized in the region prior to the rise of the Ba’ath party in Syria. The
rise of Assad’s Alawite dynasty came on the heels of successive coupes in a
politically tumultuous Syria where Alawites had slowly gained strength
from within the country’s military institutions (Faksh 1984). After an
uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood challenged the authority of the
late President Hafez Al Assad in the early 1980s, the Syrian regime
responded with brutal force, which included a massacre in Hama in 1982
that lasted 27 days and caused at least 10,000 fatalities (Fisk 2007). After
the Muslim Brotherhood’s uprising, the Assad regime under Hafez Al
Assad cracked down not just on political dissent, but on civil associations
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that were unaffiliated with the regime, and on political discourse that did
not conform to the cult of personality and narrow confines of permissible
discourse in Syria (Wedeen 1998, 1999).
Hafez Al Assad’s reign from 1982 until his death was characterized by a
cult of personality that transcended yet lived parallel to reality, and tou-
ched upon every aspect of Syrian life (Wedeen 1999). Syrians were forced
not only to refrain from speech that challenged the authority of the regime,
but to actively participate in fortifying the regime’s narrative through abid-
ing by the restrictive realm of permissible language and communicating in
the manner approved by the regime. Even dissidents, who attempted to
undermine the authority of the regime through sarcasm and artistically
rendered criticisms of social and political phenomena, reinforced the
regime’s status by failing to directly offer their criticisms, which signaled
their obedience to others and fostered an atmosphere of mistrust (Wedeen
1999). The regime further spread rumors of the extent to which it was
observing the behavior and discourse of its citizens, and more importantly,
who was watching them. Syrians were told that they could not trust their
brothers or family members, since they may secretly be government agents
ready and willing to report their opinions to the regime (Wedeen 1999).
While the regime under Hafez Al Assad did allow for a modicum of eco-
nomic liberalization to occur during the 1990s, such economic liberalization
did not spur any significant growth in the quantity or ability of civil asso-
ciations (Hinnebusch 1993). Moreover, the military was organized in a
manner such that Alawites of lower rank acted as both spies and de facto
leaders of brigades that were ostensibly under the command of non-Alawites
(Wedeen 1999). The Assad regime strictly enforced and monitored com-
munication between military units such that any communication would
flow up to trusted regime insiders prior to flowing back down to the rele-
vant unit, and placed units that were directly commanded by Alawites in
more strategically important locations (Wedeen 1999, Faksh 1984).
With Hafez Al Assad’s death came hope that his son, Bashar Al Assad,
given his youth and exposure to the West, would embark on a course of
political liberalization and modernization. Any hopes for drastic change
were dashed when what has been referred to as the Damascus Spring came
to a screeching halt as forums and associations dedicated to social and
political discourse and advocacy were shut down, organizers of the forums
and associations were imprisoned, and Syria’s nascent free press was
forced to cease operations (Houry 2009). The cult of personality sur-
rounding Hafez Al Assad was extended and altered to surround Bashar Al
Assad. Although civil societies were present under Hafez Al Assad and
grew under Bashar Al Assad, these civil societies were inextricably linked to
loyalists, the government, and the Ba’ath Party. Syria’s relatively closed
economy had opened up under Bashar Al Assad, but in a manner that
was strictly controlled and where the primary beneficiaries of the economic
liberalization were regime insiders.
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Syria’s GDP per capita (in current United States dollars) in 2010 was
roughly equal to that of Egypt’s, and stood at $2,747 (World Bank 2013).
The country’s literacy rate was 84 percent, placing it below Libya but well
above Egypt. The level of corruption in Syria according to its CPI in 2010
also placed it in between Libya and Egypt; however, Syria was sig-
nificantly closer to Libya’s relatively high level of corruption (Transpar-
ency International 2013). Economic liberalization, rather than quelling
concerns regarding corruption exacerbated them, as regime insiders and
relatives, such as Rami Makhlouf, became the primary beneficiaries of
Syria’s limited economic reforms while amassing large sums of wealth and
becoming the new face of corruption and nepotism within Syria.
While Tunis, Eastern Libya, and Cairo exploded with political activity
at the outset of the Arabic Spring, Damascus laid dormant, as Syria
experienced only a few minor protests. Despite the many legitimate and
perceived grievances of Syria’s residents, it entered the Arab Spring late, as
eyes throughout the country witnessed the toppling of two longstanding
Arab authoritarian regimes. Tranquility did not last in Syria. On March
15, 2011, protests broke out in the Daraa province in response to the
brutal torturing of children who had sprayed anti-regime graffiti on walls
by government officials.2 These protests soon reverberated throughout
Syria, yet failed to reach significant proportions in the major urban cen-
ters of Damascus and Aleppo despite calls for mass protests receiving a
large amount of attention from regional and international media outlets.
As the regime responded with repressive and brutal force, and protests
failed to swell to numbers capable of bringing down the regime, the Syrian
armed forces began witnessing defections, and soon civilians began raising
up arms as well. The Free Syrian Army was subsequently formed, but
lacked, and continues to lack, central authority over the armed opposition.
The opposition was poorly organized, poorly equipped, and deeply frac-
tured, much more so than their Libyan counterparts who had been able to
organize along tribal and regional lines (Tabler 2013). Soon elements
within the opposition and the uprising began to be characterized not just
by the use of violence, but by the use of terrorism in order to achieve the
opposition’s goals. While terrorist acts within Syria have often been
attributed to the influx of foreign fighters into the country, the use of sui-
cide bombers and other forms of terroristic means, such as car bombs, by
the opposition preceded the large-scale migration of fighters from Iraq and
other countries. It is also important to note that from among the fractured
opposition, it is those groups that have utilized terrorism that have
achieved the most success fighting Assad and his loyalists.
2.3 Discussion
The Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria illustrate three key
points:
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1 Dissidents will generally prefer less costly, non-violent or less violent
uprisings than more violent uprisings;
2 A highly organized and developed Islamic political organization is not
necessarily more likely to increase violence or violence toward civi-
lians in an uprising, and may actually contribute to a less violent
uprising; and
3 The type of uprising that springs from a set of grievances is highly
dependent upon whom individuals trust and the tools and resources
available to the dissidents.
In all three countries, citizens faced economic challenges, government
corruption, and brutality from government officials. Moreover, in all three
countries, those who protested were subjected to extreme repression during
their uprisings. The country with the lowest literacy rate, Egypt, was the
only one where dissidents successfully brought about regime change
through non-violent protests. Neither the economic conditions, the level of
brutality utilized by the government, or the level of education of the citi-
zens appear to account for the variation observed in the uprisings that
occurred.
All three uprisings began with unarmed protests, yet two of the three
uprisings turned violent after protests failed to reach the critical masses
necessary to produce regime change. In Egypt, the protest movement
quickly gained steam, and resulted in the overthrow of the Mubarak
regime, despite facing high levels of brutality from the Egyptian police
force and intelligence agencies. In Libya, the uprising also began with
unarmed protests, but turned into an armed insurrection when protests
failed to reach substantial levels in Tripoli and other Western Libyan
cities. Syria entered the Arab Spring late, but dissidents in the country
began protest movements that reached substantial levels in Homs, Hama,
and Daraa, but failed to produce many notable protests in Aleppo or
Damascus, the country’s two largest cities. The protest movement turned
to violence when calls for unarmed protests in Damascus and Aleppo did not
produce the desired results. Elements within the deeply fractured opposi-
tion began utilizing suicide bombers and car bombs after the Free Syrian
Army was unable to adequately unify the opposition, even within a
decentralized structure. The manner in which these three uprisings evolved
indicates a preference for less violent protest than more violent protest. It
was only after non-violent protests failed to produce the desired outcome
that violent insurrections arose in Libya and Syria; and, terrorism became
a viable tool for elements within the opposition in Syriawhen the opposition
failed to unify its efforts.
Moreover, the presence of well-organized Islamic political movements
not only failed to lead to more violence in the respective uprisings, their
presence appeared to lead to a less violent result. Egypt, the country with
the most developed Islamic organizations, produced the most successful
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non-violent movement. While this may be credited by some to the Muslim
Brotherhood of Egypt’s moderate political and religious stances, many
members of the extremist Salafist movements within Egypt also partici-
pated in and supported the uprising through peaceful means. In addition,
the initial protests were organized by more liberal or secular movements,
and the Islamic organizations, both Salafist and moderate, joined in the
revolution peacefully and cooperated with the non-Islamic movements.
Perhaps one of the fundamental differences between Syria and the other
two countries discussed in this chapter is that it is ruled by a religious min-
ority group. There is evidence to support the contention that countries
ruled by minority groups may be more likely to experience civil wars
(Gellner 1983; Fearon et al. 2007).3 While much of the attention regarding
the effect of minority-rule on civil war onset has focused on the resentment
such rule may foster among the majority or plurality within a state, little
attention has been paid to how minority rule affects the cohesiveness of
society and how the cohesiveness of a state may affect the probability of
minority-rule. As Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin (2007) note, “minorities may
be more likely to hold power where ‘background’ levels of ethnic nation-
alist sentiment are lower.” Thus, where societal cohesiveness is strong,
minority-rule may be less likely to occur. It would logically follow then
that it would be in the interest of minority-held regimes to both increase
the cohesiveness of their group while decreasing the overall cohesiveness
of the rest of society. In Syria, Assad seized and subsequently maintained
power in a politically unstable and divided country. Minority-rule in Syria
reinforced the strong ties that had been developed by the previously mar-
ginalized Alawites and increased inter-Alawite cooperation in maintaining
the regime’s position. The Assad regime further instituted policies that
would prevent the organization of groups that would foster cooperation
among other segments of society, leaving the Alawites in the strongest
position in a fractured state.
This brings us to the final point listed at the outset of this section, and
the primary contention presented in this chapter: The level and nature of
interpersonal trust within a state appears to have affected the amount of
violence utilized and the nature of the uprisings that were produced. While
this book refers more often to generalized interpersonal trust than parti-
cularized interpersonal trust or other potential forms of trust, it does so
for the purpose of maintaining the simplicity of the theoretical framework
presented. Based on the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, it appears as
though not only generalized interpersonal trust, but also how wide the
network of individuals you trust, matters. In Egypt, the presence of viable
civil associations, both Islamic and non-Islamic, allowed for citizens from
various socio-economic strata to cooperate with each other to achieve
their common goals and produced higher levels of trust that others were
willing to bear the costs associated with protests. In Libya, tribalism and
regionalism led to intra-tribal and intra-regional cooperation, which
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subsequently led to the formation of tribal and regional militias loosely
organized under the National Transition Council, which received sub-
stantial assistance from the international community that helped it hold
together the substantially decentralized Libyan armed opposition. In
Syria, the systematic breakdown of trust and prevention of genuinely pri-
vate civil associations from arising led to an even more fractured opposi-
tion than that of Libya’s. While similar calls for protest were made in
Syria as were made in Egypt and Libya, political entrepreneurs largely
failed to convince residents of Syria in Damascus and Aleppo to join in
the protests. Although many individuals eventually joined the armed
Syrian insurrection, the opposition failed to unify the various dissident
groups in a manner capable of bringing about regime change as quickly as
in Libya. Not only was the Free Syrian Army unable to bring Islamist and
other elements of the opposition in under its umbrella, they failed to
effectively organize the many brigades that claimed to be a part of the
Free Syrian Army. I contend that the Free Syrian Army has, thus far,
failed to unify the opposition for two primary reasons:
1 The Free Syrian Army lacks the resources necessary to convince many
of the elements in the opposition that they have the ability to produce
regime change; and
2 The lack of trust among the dissidents has resulted in a deeply frac-
tured opposition characterized by small armed units that have been
unable to effectively cooperate under the banner of the Free Syrian Army.
As a result, some of these small groups of armed insurgents, unable to
effectively strike the regime through traditional means and unwilling to
cooperate with the various other groups in an organized manner, have
resorted to the use of terrorism.
Notes
1 This, however, does not mean that various groups did not attempt to bring
about institutional development prior to Libya’s independence. As Lisa Ander-
son (1990) notes, “The earlier efforts at state building – on the part of the
Ottomans, the Sanusiyya, the Tripoli Republic, and even the Italians – to construct
and maintain more elaborate administrations were all short-lived experiments
that had ended in horrifying failure.”
2 It is important to note that while the Assad regime generally managed to reduce
inter-tribal and intra-tribal communication and cooperation, Daraa is a border
province sharing significant cultural similarities to its Jordanian neighbors and
its residents had significant business and personal relationships with Jordanians.
As a result, Daraa maintained some of the tribal customs and institutions rarely
observed among those in Damascus and many other major cities within Syria.
3 It should be noted that Fearon et al. (2007) find that the evidence to support
this claim is weak and uncertain.
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3 Theory
The Relationship between Trust
and Terror
3.1 Introduction
What is the relationship between interpersonal trust and domestic terror-
ism? While much scholarly attention has been paid to the determinants of
participation in terrorism and of the prevalence of terrorist activities
within societies, little work has been conducted regarding the relationship
between how people connect with others and their likelihood of partici-
pating in terrorist activities; and less, if any, scholarly research has
attempted to establish a relationship between generalized interpersonal
trust or, more broadly, social capital and participation in terrorism. The
theory presented in this chapter is premised upon the notion that an indi-
vidual’s willingness to trust those outside of their immediate community
affects the nature of the political endeavors, if any, that an individual ends
up pursuing. Rooted in Robert Putnam’s seminal work, Making Democ-
racy Work, my theory draws from the literature on social capital and
interpersonal trust’s relationship to democratic performance and political
activity, and applies their concepts to study participation in domestic
terrorism (Putnam 1993).
3.2 Trust and Social Capital
What is social capital? According to Knack and Keefer, “Trust, coopera-
tive norms, and associations within groups each fall within the elastic
definitions that most scholars have applied to the term social capital,” and
this is a position widely supported by the literature (Knack and Keefer
1997; Coleman 1990; Jamal 2007; Uslaner and Conley 2003). While
Putnam defines social capital broadly, and in a manner that invokes
notions of reciprocity and civic norms within a society, the concept of
generalized interpersonal trust among a citizenry lays at the heart of Put-
nam’s conceptualization of social capital since it is the trust-building cap-
ability of associational life that leads to a greater adherence to civic norms
under his theoretical framework (Putnam 1993; Jamal 2007). Indeed, the
connection between generalized interpersonal trust and social capital is so
theoretically and empirically strong that social capital has itself been
defined and operationalized as generalized interpersonal trust by some
scholars (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).
While generalized interpersonal trust may be inextricably linked to
social capital, not all forms of interpersonal trust generate social capital. I
define trust herein as the belief that if an individual were to take some risk
in relation to another person, that individual would reciprocate (Ostrom
and Walker 2003). The literature within political science has generally
discussed two forms of interpersonal trust relevant to this project: gen-
eralized interpersonal trust and particularized interpersonal trust (Uslaner
and Conley 2003). Generalized interpersonal trust is the belief that stran-
gers or outsiders can be trusted and often share common values (Benson
and Rochon 2004; Uslaner and Conley 2003; Uslaner 1998). Particular-
ized interpersonal trust, on the other hand, only extends to those whom an
individual considers to be a part of her group (Uslaner and Conley 2003;
Uslaner 2002). Individuals who are particularized trusters tend to form
strong bonds within their communities, but they will often shy away from
interacting with individuals who are from outside of their group (Uslaner
and Conley 2003; Yamigishi and Yamagishi 1994). It is the generalized
trusters within societies who tend to create the social ties between mem-
bers of different communities that produce social capital (Uslaner and
Conley 2003; Benson and Rochon 2004).
3.2.1 Conceptualizing Social Capital
Although it is easy to provide a broad, sweeping conceptualization of
social capital, establishing precisely what the term of art means has proven
difficult. As noted by Knack and Keefer (1997) in the quote cited above,
different scholars have defined the term social capital in different ways.
While these meanings often overlap along certain dimensions, there is no
uniform definition that has been applied consistently by a large subset of scho-
lars. Thus, clearly establishing what social capital is, and what relationship
it shares to trust, is crucial within the context of this project.
James Coleman, the progenitor of essentially all modern, scholarly
conceptualizations of social capital, clearly placed interpersonal trust at
the center of his analysis of the term (Coleman 1988: S101). In his
seminal article, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” he
states that:
Just as physical capital and human capital facilitate productive activ-
ity, social capital does as well. For example, a group within which
there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish
much more than a comparable group without that trustworthiness and
trust.
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While it is clear that trust plays a crucial role in Coleman’s con-
ceptualization of social capital, he does not simply define social capital as
the aggregate level of trust and trustworthiness within society. To Cole-
man, social capital can be broken down into three general types: recipro-
city, information exchange, and norms and effective sanctions. Each of
these types of social capital may be characterized by a different phenomenon,
but all of them require some form of trust in order to provide benefits to
society.
Although Coleman’s categorization of social capital into three different
types is reasonable, at its core, social capital is simply about reciprocity
and the belief that others will behave reciprocally (Coleman 1988). In the
case of information exchange, the capital that is provided by social chan-
nels is the product of the costly acquisition of information by each indivi-
dual, and reliable transfer of such information to others. Contributions of
information can be viewed as akin to contributions of wealth in the tra-
ditional public goods game, whereby holding private information may
provide an individual with some advantage, but at a cost to the group as a
whole. More importantly, norms and effective sanctions are essentially
simply robust behavioral responses that revolve around reciprocal beha-
vior. If we were to define social capital by the norms produced within a
group, we would ultimately be aggregating behavior across a group with
regard to reciprocity exhibited along a specific dimension, and then com-
bining those dimensions. While norms of selfishness may be established by
a set of individuals, it is clear that the social capital literature discusses
norms in relation to behavior that is beneficial to the group or other indi-
viduals within society (Putnam 1993; Coleman 1988; Knack and Keefer
1997).
It is for these reasons that interpersonal trust has been the focal point of
much of the research on social capital’s relationship to political, economic,
and cultural phenomena (Rothstein 2000; Rothstein and Stolle 2008;
Knack and Keefer 1997). If trust is the belief others will reciprocate when
an individual takes on some cost in relation to herself (Ostrom and Walker
2003), social capital can be defined as the capacity for reciprocity and the
belief that others will behave reciprocally among a group of individuals.
Thus, trust and trustworthiness are the foundational elements of social
capital.
While the definitions I have chosen for social capital and trust certainly
relate both concepts to reciprocity, an analysis of the relationship between
trust and reciprocity may better serve to illustrate how the two concepts
relate to one another, and how they shape interactions among groups. In
order to do so, we can take a cursory look at how other-regarding pre-
ferences and trust affect behavior in the classic, one-shot prisoner’s
dilemma game (Rapoport and Chammah 1965). The prisoner’s dilemma is
traditionally formulated as a choice facing two prisoners regarding coop-
erating with one another or turning in the other person, but, for our
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purposes, it may be better framed as a decision between business partners.
Let us imagine that two individuals, Brenda and Carey, have decided to
open up a business with one another. Each of them has a decision to
make; they can choose C, cooperate, and not steal from the business; or D,
defect, and steal from the business’ resources. The payoffs for each of these
actions is listed in Figure 3.1.
The only Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game is for both players to
defect and steal from the business if they are purely self-interested. This
prediction, however, does not necessarily match the results of experimental
tests on gameplay in a laboratory setting (Andreoni and Miller 1993; Fehr
and Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Gächter 2000). Whether looking at behavior
in the prisoner’s dilemma, the dictator and ultimatum games, or other eco-
nomic games played in the laboratory, scholars have often found some
degree of other-regarding behavior exhibited by individuals (Andreoni and
Miller 1993; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Gächter 2000). While a more
thorough discussion of other-regarding behavior follows in Section 4.4, let
us assume that players are averse to inequality and concerned with fair-
ness. If the utility derived from playing this game for a self-interested
player is defined as zi, we can assign an inequality-averse player the utility
function zi – |zi – zj|, where j represents the payoff to the other player (Fehr
and Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Gächter 2000). Thus, for example, whereas a
self-interested player receives a payoff of 4 for defecting when the other
player cooperates, an inequality-averse player receives a payoff of 4 – |4–0|,
or 0. A full list of payoffs associated with the game when played by
inequality-averse players is presented in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma (Self-Interested)
Figure 3.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma (Other-Regarding)











Whereas cooperation was never in equilibrium when the game was
played by self-interested players, cooperation by both players is one of the
equilibria of the one-shot, normal form game. Essentially, the game shifts
from the prisoner’s dilemma to a coordination game. If we analyze the
game as an extensive-form game, the only pure-strategy subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium ends with both players choosing to cooperate. For the
game with selfish players, the only pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium ends with both players defecting. While this ties reciprocity to
cooperative behavior, where does trust fit into all of this?
Previously, we defined trust as the belief that others would reciprocate if
an individual took on a risk or cost in relation to them (Ostrom and
Walker 2003). Our discussion has presented two types of individuals – one
that is selfish, and another that is other-regarding. This other-regarding
individual may be viewed as willing to reciprocate if an individual takes a
costly risk in relation to her. Thus, the inequality-averse type may be
viewed as trustworthy, and trust can be conceptualized as the belief that
an individual is of the other-regarding type.
We can incorporate this into the extensive form game by assigning a
probability, p, that an individual is of the other-regarding type, and 1-p
that an individual is selfish. Let us assume that Brenda is of the other-
regarding type. In order for her to choose to cooperate in the first round of
the game, she must believe that the probability that Carey is trustworthy is
above some critical threshold p*. Given the values associated with the game,
Brenda will only cooperate with Carey if she believes that Carey is suffi-
ciently likely to be trustworthy, p* ≥ 5/7. Even if both Brenda and Carey
are of the other-regarding type, both of them will choose to defect unless
Brenda trusts that Carey is of the other-regarding type. Moreover, even if
Brenda is of the selfish type, her belief that Carey is of the other-regarding
type can induce her to cooperate since she can potentially receive a higher
payoff through cooperation. In fact, for this specific game and these spe-
cific payoff values, a selfish individual only requires a p* ≥ 1/3 to choose to
cooperate, a substantially lower threshold than an individual who is unsel-
fish. In order for a cooperative pure-strategy equilibrium to exist, some level
of trust must exist, and, thus, interpersonal trust plays a fundamental role in
bringing about cooperation between individuals.
Interpersonal trust, however, does not just play a role in shaping how
individuals interact with one another; it shapes whom individuals are
willing to interact with as well. To illustrate this, we can build upon the
extensive form prisoner’s dilemma game so that Brenda now first chooses
whom to play the game with, and add another player, Drew, who we will
assume to be from outside of Brenda’s community. In this game, the
payoff gained from cooperating with Drew is higher than the payoff asso-
ciated with cooperating with Carey when the other player reciprocates.
Thus, Brenda stands to benefit from working with Drew rather than
Carey. The game is presented in Figure 3.3.
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Each of the players may be concerned with either only her own payoff,
or may also be concerned with fairness in addition to her payoff. Thus,
each player can either have a utility function of zi or zi – |zi – zj|, where j
only represents the other person in the transaction. Let us assume that
Carey is drawn from Brenda’s own community, and Drew is a stranger or
outsider. We can assume that the level of trust Brenda places in Carey is
higher than that placed in Drew; and, without loss of generality, we can
simply assume that Brenda completely trusts Carey, and places a prob-
ability p on Drew being trustworthy. While this is done to simplify our
definitional exploration, it is reasonable to assume some maximal level of
trust being placed in some group an individual identifies herself to be a part of,
whether that group is the person’s own family, friends, local community,
tribe, or ethnic group.
Whom should Brenda choose to do business with? As you would expect,
whether Brenda would prefer to do business with Drew depends on how
much Brenda trusts others, or, in other words, how much generalized trust
Figure 3.3 Cooperating with Outsiders











Brenda possesses since Drew is from outside of the community. Since
Brenda knows that Carey is trustworthy, she will always prefer to coop-
erate with Carey than to not cooperate when that node is reached. Thus,
any pure strategy used by Brenda where she chooses to work with Drew
will require that the expected utility be greater than 3, the payoff achieved
from cooperation with Carey. Since both selfish and unselfish players
would choose to defect when the other player defects, the only viable
option left for Brenda in equalibrium is to cooperate with Drew if she
reaches that node. Brenda will only choose to cooperate with Drew rather
than Carey when p* ≥ 1/2 if Brenda is selfish, and p* ≥ 11/14 if Brenda is
unselfish. If we were to explicitly incorporate particularized trust into this
analysis, so that Brenda only trusts Carey to some extent greater than
Drew, then the level of generalized trust needed to sustain cooperation
with Drew would decrease as the level of particularized trust decreases.
Interpersonal trust does not simply affect how we interact with others, it
influences whom we interact with as well. Cooperation between Brenda and
Drew would not only have produced the optimal result capable in equilibrium
for Brenda, it would have produced the greatest total payoff to society. Where
Brenda does not generally trust others, and, therefore, cannot trust Drew, her
options are limited. She can only expect cooperation to be reciprocated by
Carey, and will, therefore, choose to work with Carey despite the potential
advantages associatedwith working with Drew. While the immediate example
discussed economic considerations, the same logic can be applied to relation-
ships between individuals taking on other political, charitable, or social
activities where some risk or cost is being taken in relation to another person.
In the aggregate, a society or group characterized by inefficient actions
should produce unsatisfactory results. It is in this manner that social
capital and interpersonal trust dynamics shape, condition, and influence
important political, economic, and social outcomes. A society character-
ized by a lack of trust or trustworthiness will also be characterized by an
economic landscape with fewer partners, institutional inefficiency, and a
less robust civil society. It is my contention that just as social capital
influences both how and whom an individual interacts with others eco-
nomically, it influences both how and with whom an individual protests in
response to grievances perpetuated by a government.
3.2.2 Social Capital and Political Behavior
How can social capital affect political institutions and mobilization within
societies? Putnam’s Making Democracy Work explores the relationship
between social capital and the performance of democratic institutions
through analyzing the differences in civic associational membership
between Northern and Southern Italy (Putnam 1993). His treatise con-
tends that civic associations have the ability to build trust between citizens,
which, in turn, should enhance institutional performance within
Relationship between Trust and Terror 27
democracies. He finds significant evidence of a causal link between the
prevalence of civic associations in Northern Italy and its higher level of
democratic performance relative to Southern Italy. Subsequent scholarship
has provided support for the existence of a relationship between social ties
and voter turnout (Grosser and Schram 2006). However, while civic asso-
ciations may increase trust and democratic performance in democratic
environments, they may have the opposite effect in undemocratic settings
(Jamal 2007; Putnam 1993). In addition, where individuals form insular
civic organizations and stronger ties with their own groups, they may become
less willing to interact with members from their society who do not belong to
their group (Uslaner and Conley 2003). But can interpersonal trust affect the
types of associations and organizations that arise? More specifically, can an
individual’s level of generalized interpersonal trust affect whether or not
that individual joins a domestic terrorist organization?
This attempt to uncover the relationship between interpersonal trust and
participation in terrorist activities is guided by the work of Michelle
Benson and Thomas Rochon (2004), who found that high levels of gen-
eralized interpersonal trust are positively correlated with protest activity.
They argue that individuals who trust others are more likely to protest
since they assign a higher probability of others joining in their cause, and,
thus, assume that the costs of protesting are low. But why do some indi-
viduals choose to participate in inherently very costly political opposition?
More specifically, why do some individuals choose terrorism over other,
less costly, channels for political opposition; and, why do some societies
produce more terrorists than others? It is my contention that interpersonal
trust does not merely affect whether people protest or do not, but also
affects the type of opposition movements individuals join, and the nature
of political mobilization within different societies.
3.3 Why Do Individuals Become Terrorists?
While there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, in order for an
attack to be characterized as an act of terrorism, most definitions require
that there be aggression against non-combatants, and that the aggression
not be meant to directly achieve the primary political objective of the
perpetrator, but rather, to alter the behavior of the target audience (Badey
1998; Lacquer 1999; Victoroff 2005). Although terrorist groups have at
times succeeded in achieving their primary objectives over time, terrorism
is generally an inefficient tool of weak groups whose ultimate goals are at
times unintelligible or unrealistic (Crenshaw 2000; Brannan et al. 2001;
Sandler and Enders 2004). Given the relative inefficiency of terrorism, why
then do some individuals choose terrorism over other forms of political
mobilization that aim to achieve their objectives more directly?
The literature on the motivations of individual terrorists shows great
variation in the underlying reasons individuals choose to join terrorist
28 Relationship between Trust and Terror
groups. There is little evidence that psychological or developmental pro-
blems lead individuals on a path toward terrorism, although there is evi-
dence to suggest that suicide bombers are more likely to be suicidal and
loners (Sageman 2004; Merari 2004; Merari 1998). Moreover, there is
evidence, drawn from a pool of failed Palestinian suicide bombers, that
terrorists are not generally motivated by religious fervor (Merari 2010).
One underlying theme that can be found in the literature on the motiva-
tions for terrorism is that terrorists often cite grievances, real or perceived,
as their reason for joining terrorist groups. Some of the grievances that
have been reported in studies are of a direct and personal nature, such as
the loss of a family member or abuse suffered at the hands of an enemy of
the terrorist group (Hassan 2001; Atran 2003; Atran 2006). Other studies
cite oppression by governments of a more general nature as a common
explanation for why individuals chose to join terrorist organizations
(Crenshaw 1981; Crenshaw 1986; Taylor and Quayle 1994). Such oppres-
sion may lead to feelings of humiliation and a desire for retribution by
individuals who then turn to terrorist groups to help them exact their
revenge (Juergensmeyer 2003). While this may explain why some indivi-
duals are willing to bear the high costs of participating in terrorism, it
does not explain why they choose terrorism over avenues of mobilization
that are less costly and may be more effective, particularly when the
target of the terrorist group is unpopular and the terrorist group’s policy
preferences closely resemble that of its constituency.
Much of the literature on participation in terrorism has focused on the
economic condition of states and individuals. At the macro-level, eco-
nomic development has been shown to reduce participation in terrorism
(Blomberg et al. 2004a, 2004b; Burgoon 2006; Blomberg and Hess 2008a,
2008b). More recent evidence has appeared to uncover a nonlinear rela-
tionship between per capita gross domestic product and terrorism, with
terrorism tending to be concentrated in middle-income countries and sen-
sitive to evolving conditions over time (Enders, Hoover and Sandler 2016).
At the micro-level, however, individual income has appeared to be uncor-
related with participation in terrorist activities (Sageman 2004), and may
even increase the probability that an individual participates in terrorism
(Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Berrebi 2003). Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
(2005) argues that counter-terrorism operations conducted by states
weaken their economies, potentially producing a larger pool of highly skil-
led, newly unemployed individuals. Since terrorist groups prefer to recruit
highly skilled employees, their pool of potential recruits grows as a result
of the reduced economic performance of the state, which in turn leads to
an increase in the quality of terrorism in the state. There is evidence to
support Bueno de Mesquita’s theory, as at least one study has found a
positive correlation between the interaction of education and poverty and
participation in terrorism (Kavanaugh 2011). While the selection-effect
that Bueno de Mesquita proposes may indeed exist, his theory does not
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explain why terrorism is chosen over more effective forms of political
mobilization.
Other lines of inquiry explore the availability of institutionalized political
channels, and the effects of a government’s repression of dissent on parti-
cipation in terrorism. Some have argued that participation in terrorism is
more attractive to individuals when political opportunities are limited
(Crenshaw 2000). A government’s repression of civil and political rights
appears to significantly increase the amount of participation in terrorism
produced by a state (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Krueger 2007). Fur-
thermore, the presence of strong political institutions appears to decrease
terrorist activity (Krueger and Laitin 2008). While a consensus has devel-
oped surrounding the importance of institutional structures and regime
type on the production of terrorism, the relationship is nuanced and con-
tested. The liberties and rights afforded to individuals in democracies may
dampen the demand for terrorism, but it may also make democracies more
attractive targets of transnational terrorists (Eubank and Weinberg 1994;
Eubank and Weinberg 2001; Krueger 2007). While democracies may make
more attractive targets, democratic participation may reduce terrorism,
and empirical evidence supports the contention that it is constraints on the
executive that increase terrorism in democracies (Li 2005). Moreover,
autocracies that are sensitive to audience costs may also make more
appealing targets (Conrad, Conrad and Young 2014). Finally, domestic
terrorism appears to be positively correlated with state repression, and
above a certain threshold, democracy may reduce state repression (Piazza
2015; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). This suggests that potential ter-
rorists consider other channels through which they may be able achieve
their goals, and are less likely to choose terrorism when other viable
options are available. It does not, however, explain why terrorism is chosen
over other forms of mobilization such as the organization of mass non-
violent protest or armed insurgency aimed at combatants, options that are
open even when direct political channels are closed.
This project seeks to extend the literature by examining how interpersonal
trust affects an individual’s decision to join a terrorist organization, and how
social capital within a state affects the amount of terrorism producedwithin it.
As noted earlier, participation in terrorism is often motivated by perceived
grievances that an individual seeks to remedy. These grievances may cause
some to be willing to bear a high cost in order to exact retribution against the
group or entity that they perceive to have hurt them. While these individuals
may be willing to bear a high cost to exact retribution, they would prefer to
incur a lower cost if the same amount of retribution can be achieved. Thus,
although terrorists may be motivated by objectives that do not result in
material or political gain for themselves, they are nevertheless often strategic
actors who rationally pursue their goals and weigh the costs and benefits
of their actions (Moore 1995; Kalyvas 1999).
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Terrorism is generally less efficient than other forms of political mobili-
zation. Other viable forms of political mobilization, however, require
higher levels of participation from individuals within a society. When the
target of an individual’s angst is the government, the cost of participating
in a popular revolution or a military insurgency may be significantly less
than that of joining a terrorist organization, but joining a terrorist orga-
nization requires lower levels of participation throughout society in order
for an individual to succeed in achieving some level of retribution against
the government. Those willing to bear a high cost in pursuit of retribution
will weigh the probability of other modes of retribution succeeding before
choosing a highly costly and inefficient form of mobilization, such as ter-
rorism. Individuals with high levels of generalized interpersonal trust will
seek out less costly forms of retribution since they assign a higher prob-
ability to the success of such forms of mobilization than those with low
levels of generalized interpersonal trust.
Where a state is characterized by low levels of generalized interpersonal
trust, individuals will turn to others with whom they have developed a
form of particularized trust when seeking retribution rather than utilize
mechanisms that require the cooperation of strangers (see Hardin 1992: 154).
As Eric Uslaner (2002) has noted, certain groups may have the tendency
to reinforce particularized trust among group members rather than increase
generalized interpersonal trust. I argue that low initial levels of generalized
interpersonal trust will lead to a greater reliance on groups with whom an indi-
vidual has developed particularized trust when seeking collective action (see
Jamal 2007). Presuming that the perceived oppressor is a citizenry’s govern-
ment, this would lead to more fractured opposition movements that are less
efficient and require members to bear higher costs. The more fractured
and weak the opposition movement is, the more likely it is that the
sub-groups that make up the opposition will utilize terrorism as a tool.
The following section presents a simple formal model that incorporates
interpersonal trust into an individual’s decision-making process when
choosing if, and with whom, to seek retribution for perceived grievances
caused by a government. By formalizing the theory discussed above, it is
my hope to more clearly identify its premises, and how they lead to the
hypotheses I present. The formal model produces propositions from which
implications that will be tested in subsequent chapters will be derived.
3.4 The Model
In this section, I develop a simple model that illustrates the paths an
individual who has suffered some grievance at the hands of the government
can take, and how generalized interpersonal trust affects the path that is
chosen. This model demonstrates the relationship between generalized
interpersonal trust and whether an aggrieved individual resorts to terror-
ism or delegates authority to a political entrepreneur seeking large-scale
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collective action against the government. While the model offers a simple
framework from which to analyze the relationship between trust and an
individual’s choice regarding seeking retribution against a government, it
produces interesting equilibria, and the implications of the core finding of
this chapter will be subsequently tested.
Assume that there are three players, labeled i = B, E, and G. Player B is
a citizen aggrieved by the government, G, and E is a political entrepreneur
from outside the citizen’s community who is trying to organize large-scale
collective action against the government. All three players possess an
initial normalized wealth of 1. The game has three stages. In stage 1,
player B has some portion of his wealth, x, where 0 < x < 1, stolen from
him by the government, so that after the theft, player B’s wealth is equal
to 1 – x and G’s wealth is equal to 1 + x. In stage 2, player B can choose
among three actions, b 2 {0, 1, d}, where the player can choose to do
nothing and maintain the status quo (b = 0), seek costly retribution
through a terrorist group whom the player trusts to seek out retribution
(b = 1), or delegate the duty to punish by transferring resources to a
political entrepreneur (b = d). If player B decides to delegate the duty to
punish, then in stage 3 player E can choose to either use the resources
given to her by B to punish the government (e = 1), or may keep the
resources for herself (e = 0).
Punishment is costly, whether executed by B (i.e., b = 1) or E (i.e., e = 1);
however, E can more efficiently punish the government than the terrorist group.
Player B is able to reduce the government’s wealth by lB, where lB equals the
cost, c, multiplied by the ability, aB, of player B to punish the government,
where lB = aBc, 1 < aB, with 0 < c < 1 – x. The political entrepreneur can
punish the government more effectively, and thus, lE = aEc, where 1 < aB <
aE. If the entrepreneur chooses not to punish the government after being
delegated the duty, she keeps c (i.e., the resources transferred to her by B).
The payoff structure of the one-shot game is presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Two-Player Game Payoffs
Strategy B (Aggrieved Citizen) G (Government) E (Entrepreneur)
b = 0 (status quo) 1 – x
[1–3x]
1 + x 1 [1–2x]
b = 1 (retribution
by B)
1 – x – c
[1 – x – c – |aBc – 2x – c|]
1 + x – pB 1
[1 – |aBc – 2x – c|]
b = d, e = 1
(delegation,
retribution by E)
1 – x – c
[1 – x – c – |aEc – 2x – c|]
1 + x – pG 1
[1 + c – |aEc – 2x – c|]
b = d, e = 0
(delegate, no
retribution by E)
1 – x – c
[1–3x – 2c]
1 + x 1 + c
[1–2x]
Note: Payoffs zi and zi – |zB – zG| (in brackets) are for players who are of the selfish and
unselfish (or inequality-averse type), respectively, and are derived using expressions (1) and (2).
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If all players were narrowly self-interested, in the one-shot game, an
aggrieved citizen would always choose to maintain the status quo in equili-
brium, anticipating that the self-interested entrepreneur will keep c and hence
not punish the government. Individuals, however, have been shown to often be
motivated by inequality aversion, and this motivation has been used to explain
why individuals seek retribution and are concerned with fairness (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Gächter 2000). This model presumes that players
can vary in type, and that players are uncertain as to the type of other
players. In order to formulate a simple model, players can only be one of two
types, selfish or unselfish. Selfish types are only interested in their own outcome,
zi; while unselfish types are also interested in fairness. I abstract away from
the government’s behavior, and thus treat x as exogenous and assume that
0 < x < 1 since the focus of this book is on the behavior of the aggrieved
individual. For i = B, E, we have the following utility functions:
Uselfish(z) = zi (1)
Uunselfish(z) = zi – |zB – zG| (2)
Notice that while both unselfish B and E are motivated by concerns
with fairness, I assume that B is motivated by inequality aversion between
himself and the government, and E is motivated to maintain equality
between B and the government, but is unconcerned with inequality
between herself and B or the government. There is substantial evidence in
the literature that individuals do seek indirect retribution when they wit-
ness harms committed against others, and that such forms of retribution
play a role in establishing and maintaining cooperation (Panchanathan
and Boyd 2004; Nowak and Sigmund 2005). The citizen relies on indirect
negative reciprocity from the entrepreneur when delegating the duty to
punish to her. This reflects an unselfish entrepreneur’s desire to ensure that
a fair result is achieved, and inequality aversion between E and others is
left out in order to maintain the simplicity of the model. Moreover, since
E likely suffers from similar grievances as B, such indirect reciprocity is
likely to be observed. Player B trusts that player E is unselfish with
probability p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and selfish with probability 1 – p.
In the interest of simplicity, both the basic model and the extensions to the
model rely on a standard conceptualization of trust that is rooted in the defini-
tion of trust outlined by Ostrom and Walker (2003) and applied uniformly
across all strangers in society. Thus, the likelihood that an individual believes
that the political entrepreneur, political entrepreneurs in general, and stran-
gers within society are other-regarding is the same. The political entrepreneur,
however, in the basic model acts as a representative of society-at-large. The
extensions to the model in the following section distinguish between the poli-
tical entrepreneur and society-at-large, and illustrate how trust in others in
general affects an entrepreneur’s actions, and how the citizen’s level of trust in
both the entrepreneur and others within society affects her decision, yet
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both utilize a common variable for trust. Since there is a substantially
high likelihood that both trust in a political entrepreneur from outside
an individual’s community and trust in others of a more general nature
are highly correlated, utilizing a common variable for trust should not
be problematic.
Introducing inequality aversion between E and B, or E and G, should not
change the qualitative predictions of the model. Moreover, providing a more
nuanced payoff structure for the players would unduly complicate the model
while shedding little, if any, light on the subject explored in this book. The
model in this chapter provides a very simple illustration of the relationship
between trust and the mechanism of political action an individual ulti-
mately chooses. The structure of the game is presented in Figure 3.4 and
Figure 3.5.
The analysis of the model will utilize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(“PBE”) concept. Where an unselfish player B is indifferent between two
or more actions, it will be presumed that the player will choose the action
that is less costly in absolute terms when her play is optimal. Thus, if the
optimal amount allocated for c when strategy d is played is less than the opti-
mal amount allocated when strategy 1 is played, player B will choose
strategy d. Only the one-shot game will be analyzed in this project. Proofs
for the propositions are provided in Appendix A.
Prior to moving on to the analyses related to an unselfish player B, I
will briefly note the only viable equilibrium strategy for the aggrieved
citizen if he is of the selfish type. Since retribution, whether delegated or
not, is costly and provides no direct benefit to the player, a selfish
aggrieved citizen will always choose to maintain the status quo.
PROPOSITION 1: In order to seek costly retribution, an individual
must be other-regarding and not purely self-interested. A retributive
strategy, delegated or otherwise, is only played by an unselfish aggrieved
citizen in the one-shot game. A selfish citizen will always choose strategy
b = 0, no matter how trustworthy he believes the political entrepreneur
to be.
In the one-shot game, a selfish citizen will always prefer to not seek
retribution. Retribution is costly and provides no benefit to the selfish
citizen since the selfish citizen is not other-regarding. The unselfish
citizen is averse to inequality, and, thus, may have an interest in seeking
retribution if the ability of the terrorist organization, or that of the entre-
preneur, is large enough to justify the cost of seeking retribution. Moreover,
if retribution is sought by a citizen, it derives from that individual’s aversion
to inequality. As such, a concern with fairness is a necessary, but insuffi-
cient, condition for seeking retribution, whether through working with
the political entrepreneur or seeking retribution through the terrorist
organization.1
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PROPOSITION 2: Where both the terrorist group and the political
entrepreneur are capable of punishing the government at a rate that
reduces inequality to a sufficient extent, an unselfish aggrieved citizen
will always choose to punish the government. When neither the terrorist
group nor the political entrepreneur can efficiently punish the govern-
ment, the aggrieved individual will take no action. In equilibrium,
maintaining the status quo is never an optimal strategy for an unselfish
citizen when aB > 2, and is always the optimal strategy for a citizen
when aE < 2.
Figure 3.4 Delegated Retribution (Self-Interested)
Figure 3.5 Delegated Retribution (Other-Regarding)




















































While being other-regarding is a necessary condition for an individual to
choose either of the retributive strategies in equilibrium, it is not a suffi-
cient condition. A selfish player will always choose to not seek retribution,
but an unselfish player may also choose not to seek retribution when no
viable options exist. When retribution reduces inequality to a large enough
degree to justify the cost, player B prefers to seek retribution. If, however,
neither the entrepreneur nor the terrorists can exact retribution efficiently
enough, player B will always prefer the status quo over seeking retribution
through either mechanism. Thus, even if an aggrieved citizen would prefer
retribution, whether through terrorism or through large-scale collective
action, that citizen requires the sufficient capacity, or trust in an entrepre-
neur with the sufficient capacity, to effectively punish the government.
More importantly, a citizen who eventually chooses retribution through
terrorism weighs other options prior to choosing terrorism.
PROPOSITION 3:
a A selfish political entrepreneur will always choose to steal the
resources allocated to her by the aggrieved citizen, and an unselfish
entrepreneur will always choose to punish the government. More
formally, with regard to the entrepreneur:
1 A selfish entrepreneur’s best response to strategy d is always to
not punish in equilibrium.
2 When aE > 2, an unselfish entrepreneur’s best response to
strategy d is to punish in equilibrium. When aE ≤ 2,
2 an
unselfish entrepreneur’s best response to strategy d is to
not punish in equilibrium.
b In order for an aggrieved citizen to delegate the duty to punish the
government to the entrepreneur when no viable terrorist group exists,
the probability that the entrepreneur is unselfish must be relatively high,
but that threshold is decreasing in the ability of the entrepreneur. More
formally, when aB < 2 and aE > 2, an unselfish citizen:
1 Will prefer to delegate the duty to punish to the entrepreneur
over all other options when p > 2/aE in equilibrium; and
2 Will prefer to maintain the status quo over all other options
when p ≤ 2/aE in equilibrium.
c If both the terrorist group and the political entrepreneur are capable
of punishing the government efficiently, the probability that the entre-
preneur is trustworthy must be relatively high, but the necessary
threshold is decreasing in the ability of the entrepreneur and increasing
in the ability of the terrorist group. More formally, when aB > 2, an
unselfish citizen:
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1 Will prefer to delegate the duty to punish to the entrepreneur
when p ≥ aB/aE in equilibrium.
2 Will prefer to punish through terrorism when p < aB/aE in
equilibrium.
So long as an entrepreneur is capable of punishing the government effi-
ciently enough to reduce inequality, an unselfish entrepreneur will always
prefer to use the resources allocated to it by the aggrieved citizen to punish
the government than to keep the resources afforded to it. A selfish entre-
preneur always prefers to keep the resources given to it by the citizen since
it does not value reducing inequality and punishment is costly.
This book centers around Proposition 3(c). Where trust is high enough,
individuals will choose to delegate the duty of retribution to an entrepre-
neur who can punish the government more efficiently than the terrorist
organization. In order for d to be played in equilibrium by player B when
aB > 2, the following inequality must be satisfied:
p(1 – x – c – |1 – x – c – (1 + x – aEc)|)+ (1 – p)(1 – x – c – |1 – x – c –
(1 + x)|) ≥ 1 – x – c – |1 – x – c – (1 + x – aBc)|
This inequality is satisfied when p ≥ aB/aE. The amount of trust necessary
for an individual to delegate punishment to the entrepreneur depends on the
ability of the entrepreneur to punish the government. This would suggest that
the weaker an entrepreneur is, the higher the level of trust must be in order
to maintain an equilibrium strategy where the citizen delegates retribution.
PROPOSITION 4:
a An unselfish citizen will always allocate an amount to punish the
government that brings the two closest to parity. More formally, in
any PBE, an unselfish citizen will prefer to allocate c = 2x/(a – 1)
when 2x/(a – 1) < 1 – x, and c = 1 – x when 2x/(a – 1) ≥ 1 – x.
b Since the terrorist group is less capable than the political entrepre-
neur, the amount that is allocated towards punishing the govern-
ment when done through the terrorist group is always more than the
amount allocated to the political entrepreneur. More formally,
given that aB < aE, in response to any x, an unselfish citizen will be
willing to allocate an equal or higher cost to punishing through
terrorism than she would delegate to the entrepreneur, cB ≥ cE,
and cB > cE if 2x/(aE – 1) < 1 – x.
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Given the parameters of the model, an unselfish citizen’s utility is max-
imized when inequality is reduced to 0. Whether an unselfish citizen
chooses to delegate punishment to the entrepreneur, or chooses to seek
retribution through the terrorist group, he will allocate the maximum
amount necessary to minimize the inequality between himself and the
government, but no more than that (see Appendix A). Therefore, the
amount allocated will need to satisfy the following condition:
2x acþ c ¼ 0 , c ¼ 2x
a 1
The amount of retribution sought, c, is increasing in the amount that
was taken by the government (i.e., grievance), and decreasing in the ability
of B or E to punish the government (see Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.6 The Cost of Retribution
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More importantly, assuming that Proposition 4(b) is true, the cost that
an unselfish citizen allocates toward retribution via terrorism is equal to
or greater than the cost that an unselfish citizen will delegate to the
entrepreneur in response to the same action by the government.
3.5 Extending the Model
While the model presented above provides a basic representation of the
fundamental concepts studied in this book, I apply a simple extension to
the model above that provides a closer approximation to reality and allows
us to explore the implications of alternative model specifications more
readily. This section not only ties the model to reality more thoroughly,
but also acts as a robustness check of the model and the crucial proposi-
tions derived from it. Moreover, this exploration will also yield important
theoretical hypotheses and predictions related to the relationship between
interpersonal trust and the choice between the forms of collective action
that an individual participates in.
In the basic model, it was presumed that if player E chose to punish the
government, such punishment would be successful. Now presume that if E
chooses strategy e = 1, there is a probability q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, that the pun-
ishment will be successful. Also presume that q is a function that is
increasing in p (Benson and Rochon 2004). In other words, the likelihood
of the entrepreneur succeeding in punishing the government is larger when
individuals within the society are generally trustworthy, or averse to inequal-
ity, than when they are not generally trustworthy. In this scenario, we
presume that players E and B share common perceptions of the probability
of individuals within society being trustworthy and of the probability of
E successfully punishing G when choosing strategy e = 1.
The addition of element q to the model does not affect the probability
of a selfish player E choosing to punish the government since the player
does not derive utility from other-regarding behavior. The addition of
element q to the model, however, does introduce a condition under which
an unselfish player E will prefer not to punish G, even when aE > 2.
PROPOSITION 5:
a A selfish entrepreneur will always choose to steal any resources
allocated to her. For all values of q, a selfish player E will always
choose e = 0 in response to b = d over all other strategies in
equilibrium.
b An unselfish entrepreneur will choose to use the resources to punish
the government when the probability of success is relatively high.
More formally, an unselfish player E will choose strategy e = 1
when q > 2xþ2caEc , and will choose strategy e = 0 when q  2xþ2caEc , in
equilibrium.
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Although the section below will further modify the assumptions of the
model to incorporate a selfish player E’s motivations for punishing the
government, the model has not yet incorporated those motivations, and a
selfish entrepreneur’s best strategy under all conditions remains to not
punish the government. An unselfish entrepreneur, however, no longer always
chooses to punish the government when sufficiently capable of doing so.
Where the probability of successfully punishing the government is suffi-
ciently low, an unselfish entrepreneur will prefer to keep the allocation
afforded to him by the citizen.
Proposition 5(b) suggests that even a political entrepreneur who is
other-regarding may be coopted by the government or utilize the political
capital of the citizens who back them for their own purposes when the
probability of successful political resistance is low. This holds true even
when the political entrepreneur is strong and possesses significant ability.
Since this analysis is primarily concerned with trust, the relationship
between a and q was not noted. We could further presume, however, that
element q is increasing in a without qualitatively altering the predictions of
the model. Another important implication of this proposition is that the
requisite probability of successful political resistance in order for the entre-
preneur to choose resistance is decreasing in the amount that the citizen
provides to the entrepreneur when aE > 2. Proposition 2 notes that an
unselfish citizen will not choose a retributive strategy when aE < 2. This
implies that the greater the costs that a citizen is willing to bear for
resistance, the more likely an unselfish entrepreneur is to choose to punish
the government when all other variables are held constant.
The addition of q to the model also alters the behavior of an unselfish
citizen. Once again, a selfish citizen will always choose to maintain the
status quo. With the addition of q, an unselfish citizen’s likelihood of
choosing to delegate retribution is less than that of the basic model for all
values of q lower than 1.
PROPOSITION 6:
a A selfish aggrieved citizen will always choose to not allocate any
resources towards punishing the government. For all values of q and
aE, a selfish citizen will always choose to maintain the status quo in
equilibrium.
b When both the terrorist group and the political entrepreneur can
efficiently punish the government, an unselfish aggrieved citizen will
only delegate the duty to punish to the political entrepreneur when
both the probability that the entrepreneur is trustworthy and the
probability of success are relatively high. Otherwise, the aggrieved
citizen will punish the government via terrorism. More formally,
when aE > aB > 2, an unselfish citizen will choose:
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1 To delegate retribution over all other strategies when p  aBqaE
AND q > 2xþ2caEc in equilibrium; and
2 To seek retribution through the terrorist organization over all
other strategies when either p < aBqaE OR q  2xþ2caEc in
equilibrium.
c When only the political entrepreneur can efficiently punish the
government, an unselfish aggrieved citizen will only delegate the
duty to punish to the political entrepreneur when both the prob-
ability that the entrepreneur is trustworthy and the probability of
success are relatively high. Otherwise, the aggrieved citizen will
choose to not punish the government. More formally, when aE > 2
≥ aB, an unselfish citizen will choose:
1 To delegate retribution over all other strategies when p > 2qaE
AND q > 2xþ2caEc in equilibrium; and
2 To maintain the status quo over all other strategies when
p < 2qaE. OR q  2xþ2caEc in equilibrium.
d When neither the government nor the terrorist group can efficiently
punish the government, the aggrieved citizen will do nothing. When
2 ≥ aE, an unselfish citizen will always choose to maintain the
status quo in equilibrium.
While Proposition 6 does not introduce new predictions with respect to
the behavior of a selfish citizen, or an unselfish citizen when aE ≤ 2, it
narrows the parameters under which an unselfish citizen will choose to
delegate power to an entrepreneur when the entrepreneur is strong enough
to efficiently punish the government. In addition, trust affects both the
likelihood that the citizen ascribes to the entrepreneur being interested in
punishing the government, as well as the likelihood of the entrepreneur
succeeding in punishing the government. Moreover, since the probability
of the government being successfully punished by the entrepreneur is
increasing in trust (p), trust also indirectly affects the citizen’s decision to
delegate punishment to the entrepreneur via q, the probability of the
entrepreneur succeeding. It may be argued, however, that political entre-
preneurs are often motivated by self-interest rather than a concern for
others. Ascribing element p to the political entrepreneur served to simplify
the model and how trust is incorporated within the model. Having intro-
duced element q, we can now explore how trust affects a self-interested
entrepreneur’s behavior, and, in turn, the behavior of the aggrieved citizen.
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3.5.1 Self-Interested Entrepreneurs Desiring Power
In order to simplify this analysis, presume that the political entrepreneur is
self-interested. Also presume that the leader is motivated by a desire to
take power away from the government, and that taking power away from
the government can only be achieved by successfully punishing the gov-
ernment and reducing the government’s payoff such that it is less than the
entrepreneur’s payoff.3 To avoid introducing a new variable at this stage of
the analysis, the benefit derived by the entrepreneur for achieving power is
presumed to be 1. In order for the entrepreneur to choose to punish the
government, the probability of success must be high enough for the entre-
preneur to forego utilizing the costs allocated to her by the aggrieved
citizen.
PROPOSITION 7:A selfish political entrepreneur will only choose to
punish the government when the probability of success is relatively high.
When an interest in achieving power is incorporated into the model, a
selfish player E will only choose e = 1 in equilibrium when q > c AND
when x < aEc. A selfish player E will choose e = 0 in equilibrium
whenever the inequalities above are not satisfied.
In order for the entrepreneur to choose to punish the government, the
probability of the punishment being executed and the entrepreneur taking
power must be greater than the amount allocated to the entrepreneur by
the aggrieved citizen. While the specific value at which this condition is
met is dependent upon the value of achieving power being 1, for all posi-
tive values attributed to taking power, the entrepreneur’s threshold level
for q with regards to utilizing e = 1 is increasing in c. Since q, by defini-
tion, is increasing in p, an increase in p when all other variables are con-
stant should increase the probability that the entrepreneur punishes the
government. In addition, in order for the entrepreneur to choose to punish
the government, the entrepreneur’s ability and the costs allocated to the
entrepreneur by the aggrieved citizen must be capable of reducing the
strength of the government enough for the entrepreneur to take power. As
a result, the unselfish aggrieved citizen’s strategy profiles in equilibrium are
altered.
PROPOSITION 8:
a A selfish aggrieved citizen will always choose to not punish the
government. For all values of q and aE, a selfish citizen will always
choose to maintain the status quo in equilibrium.
b Where both the terrorist group and the political entrepreneur are
viable options for retribution, an unselfish aggrieved citizen will
only choose to delegate the duty to punish to the entrepreneur when
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the likelihood of successful punishment is relatively high and the
grievances suffered are relatively low. Otherwise, an unselfish
aggrieved citizen will choose to punish the government through the
terrorist group. More formally, when aE > aB > 2, an unselfish
citizen will choose:
1 To delegate retribution over all other strategies when q  aBaE
AND q  c AND when x < qaEc in equilibrium; and
2 To seek retribution through the terrorist organization over all other
strategies when either q < aBaE OR q < c OR when x  qaEc
in equilibrium.
c Where only the political entrepreneur is a viable option for retri-
bution, an unselfish aggrieved citizen will only choose to delegate
the duty to punish to the entrepreneur when the likelihood of suc-
cessful punishment is relatively high and the grievances suffered are
relatively low. Otherwise, an unselfish aggrieved citizen will choose
to do nothing. More formally, when aE > 2 ≥ aB, an unselfish
citizen will choose:
1 To delegate retribution over all other strategies when q  2aE
AND q  c AND when x < qaEc in equilibrium; and
2 To maintain the status quo over all other strategies when
q < 2aE OR q < c OR when x  qaEc in equilibrium.
d When 2 ≥ aE, an unselfish citizen will always choose to maintain
the status quo in equilibrium.
Under the parameters of the model presented in this section, an unselfish
aggrieved citizen will choose to delegate the duty to punish the government to
a selfish entrepreneur when the entrepreneur’s interests favor punishing the
government, the entrepreneur has the means to punish the government, and
the probability of successfully punishing the government is high enough.
As noted earlier, the probability of success is increasing in the trust-
worthiness of others, and thus, when all other variables are held constant,
an increase in trust should decrease the probability that a citizen chooses
to participate in terrorist activities. While the basic model simplified the
exploration of trust’s relationship to the decision to delegate authority to
outsiders, the introduction of element q and the desire of an entrepreneur
to attain power allowed us to more precisely model the dynamics involved.
3.5.2 Relative Trust and Terror
While the basic model, and extensions of the model above, do not account
for levels of particularized trust afforded by the aggrieved citizen to the
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constituents and leaders of the terrorist organization, in essence, the model
presumes that trust in the terrorist group to seek retribution against the
government is absolute, which is a simplification of the underlying
dynamics that are at play. Although the basic model does not explicitly
discuss particularized trust, one of the crucial underlying premises of the
model and this project is that terrorism is chosen over larger-scale collec-
tive action when the level of trust the individual places in outsiders is low
relative to the level of trust the individual places in the terrorist
organization.
A brief examination of the implications of explicitly exploring the
addition of particularized trust to the model may help provide a somewhat
more realistic picture of the dynamics at play. If we expand the definition
of q such that it may be applied to the terrorist group’s probability of
successfully punishing the government, and assume that qB is a function
that is increasing in pB, analyzing the unselfish citizen’s decision in equili-
brium when both the terrorist group and the political entrepreneur are
capable of punishing the government, aE > aB > 2, is fairly straightforward.
In order for the citizen to choose delegating authority to the political
entrepreneur, the following inequality must be satisfied:
qEpEaE  qBaB !yields pE  qBaB
qEaE
The level of trust necessary for the citizen to delegate authority to the
political entrepreneur, pE, is increasing in the probability of success of the
terrorist group, qB, which is a function that is increasing in trust, pB. Thus,
when all other variables are held constant, as particularized trust increases,
the requisite level of generalized interpersonal trust necessary to delegate
authority to the political entrepreneur also increases.
3.6 Discussion
An inequality-averse individual who has perceived some grievance chooses
to operate through more efficient, but less trustworthy, channels only when
levels of trust are high enough. For example, an individual whose brother has
been killed in a government operation may desire to seek retribution. If he
trusts others in society, he will be more likely to join a political movement
organizing large-scale protests to oust the government.Where his level of trust
in others is low, seeking out a terrorist organization within his community and
volunteering to be a suicide bomber may be more appealing.
As mentioned earlier, this book centers around Proposition 3(c), which
deals with how trust affects an unselfish aggrieved citizen’s decision to seek
retribution through a terrorist organization or delegate the duty to an
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entrepreneur who utilizes more efficient mechanisms for retribution. While
the model does not directly incorporate how collective action affects the
probability of an entrepreneur’s strategy succeeding, the model demon-
strates that when aggrieved individuals who are willing to bear the cost of
retribution do not trust outsiders, they will seek out less efficient, yet more
reliable, outlets for retribution. Where a society is characterized by low
levels of generalized interpersonal trust, individuals should seek out retri-
bution against the government through those whom they trust, and shun
utilizing a strategy that requires them to delegate power to outsiders. In
such societies, levels of terrorism should be higher when all other variables
are held constant since individuals are unwilling to delegate authority to
those operating outside of their networks. Given that most terrorists are
recruited by family members and friends, and are seeking redress for grie-
vances, the model provides a simple framework through which we can
analyze an individual’s choice between terrorism and other means of
seeking retribution (or reducing inequality).
In Chapter 2, this book broadly explored the Arab Spring uprisings in
Egypt, Libya, and Syria in order to shed light on why the citizens of some
states turn to terrorism when seeking to oust a government. While the
model presented in this chapter does not directly discuss collective action
within a state, it presents an explanation of why, on average, a citizen of
each of the states may be more or less likely to participate in non-violent
protest, large-scale and conventional resistance, or terrorism. In Egypt,
where the prevalence of civil societies allowed for greater levels of trust among
its citizens, a citizen who was capable of and willing to join the resistance
was more likely to trust that other citizens who supported the removal of
the Mubarak regime would be willing to incur the costs of joining a large-
scale non-violent movement. In Libya, the Qaddafi regime’s reinforcement
of tribal and regional conflict reduced trust enough to prevent many indi-
viduals from joining protest movements, yet enough individuals trusted
that others would join in the resistance that large-scale violent protest was
possible. In Syria, where Assad’s Ba’ath regime systematically attempted
to reduce interpersonal trust among its citizens, an individual seeking
regime change was significantly more likely to turn to terrorism within
small networks of individuals whom the aggrieved citizen trusted. Some
significant proportion of citizens of each of these countries desired poli-
tical retribution and regime change, yet each uprising became character-
ized by radically different methods of resistance. The model presented in
this chapter, in part, explains why citizens of Egypt, Libya, and Syria who
resisted the government behaved differently.
3.7 Conclusion
What is the relationship between interpersonal trust and an individual’s
likelihood of participating in terrorism? This chapter attempts to answer this
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question by presenting a simple formal model that illustrates how trust
affects the decision making of a potential terrorist. In this model, whether
or not an individual chooses terrorism over taking no action or joining a more
conventional political movement is influenced by the following factors:
1 Inequality aversion;
2 Perceived grievances;
3 The strength of the terrorist organization;
4 The strength of the more conventional political movement; and
5 Interpersonal trust (both generalized and particularized).
While it is unlikely that these five variables, or any five variables, can
completely capture what motivates or influences individuals to participate
in terrorism, the model presented in this chapter provides a representation
of how generalized interpersonal trust affects participation in terrorism
that is consistent with previous findings on terrorism and individual poli-
tical and economic behavior. Moreover, the model utilizes premises based
upon a long line of literature regarding social capital as a foundation to
explore participation in terrorism.
The remainder of this book will test the predictions and the implications
of the predictions of the model related to generalized interpersonal trust
and what I define as relative interpersonal trust. This exploration of the
relationship between interpersonal trust and terrorism will be analyzed
empirically via individual-level survey data and through cross-sectional,
country-level data. While the relationship between interpersonal trust and
participation in terrorism is likely to be more nuanced than that presented
in this book, it is important to note that the focus of this book is on gen-
eralized and particularized interpersonal trust as independent variables.
This project is an initial examination of the relationship between trust and
how it affects an individual’s choice of terrorism over other avenues of
political action, and further research will likely be necessary in order to
more fully capture this relationship. A more nuanced analysis of network
structures, interpersonal trust, and responses to government repression
that result in participation in terrorism may be particularly fruitful (Siegel
2011).
Notes
1 It is important to note that the model is meant to examine why and how indi-
viduals choose to participate in inherently costly political activity when there
are no tangible benefits. As such, this model does not incorporate selective
incentives associated with participation. While incorporating selective incentives
would create a range under which selfish individuals would participate in some
form of collective political action, it would not qualitatively alter the funda-
mental predictions of the model. Moreover, since this analysis is meant to
explore the actions of individuals who join movements rather than the leaders
46 Relationship between Trust and Terror
who may stand to benefit financially or politically from organizing such move-
ments, the assumption is fairly reasonable. Ultimately, many individuals join
political organizations or movements in the absence of selective incentives, and
this model seeks to explore their behavior and why some might join terrorist
organizations rather than groups adopting less costly strategies.
2 Without loss of generality, I assume that an indifferent entrepreneur chooses not to
punish, and similar assumptions will be made in other cases for the entrepreneur
and citizen, below.
3 For simplicity, I assume that the entrepreneur must utilize all or none of the
resources allocated to her by the aggrieved citizen, and that she may not utilize
her own resources within this model.
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4 Islamist Political Mobilization in
Egypt, Libya, and Syria
4.1 Introduction
Salafists, Islamic extremists, and Islamic fundamentalists are all labels that
have long served as placeholders and catch-all designations for a subset
from within the Islamic world that is believed to be both pious and
uncompromising when it comes to the acceptance of democratic princi-
ples. Where Islamic organizations have voiced support for democratic
institutions, they often face significant skepticism or increased scrutiny as
to their conceptualization of democracy. Moreover, that skepticism has
clouded perceptions of the willingness of Islamists to commit to the use of
non-violent means to achieve their social and political objectives (Wolf
and Lefevre 2012). While skepticism with regard to their motivations and
commitment to non-violent means of political activity may be healthy, the
Orientalist or Islamophobic premises upon which this skepticism is often
founded is not. Focusing on the ideological foundations of Islamist orga-
nization may provide some insight into the means and tools of change that
such an organization may use, but this analysis must come from within a
framework that accounts for the variables that influence political activity
more broadly. In short, the focal point of any criticism of the commitment
that an Islamist organization has to utilizing non-violent means should be
its interest in increasing its political, social orcoercive capacity rather than
its particular policy preferences.1
Lost in a narrative that has conflated Islamism with terrorism and
undemocratic principles is the diversity of the tools for political and social
change that have been utilized by Islamists. Both secular and religious
organizations have historically proven to be capable and willing to utilize
terrorism and other violent means, as well as non-violent means, to
achieve their political objectives in the Arab world and beyond. Even a
cursory and narrow-sighted view of political mobilization in the Middle
East and North Africa reveals that an Islamic identity is neither a neces-
sary nor sufficient condition for a political organization to utilize terror-
ism. In Lebanon, during its long and bloody civil war, violent atrocities
were committed against civilians or with an apparent disregard for the loss
of civilian life by organizations that were implicitly or explicitly associated
with various Christian faiths, Shia Islam, Sunni Islam, and secularism,
such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.2 The use of terrorism as a
tactic by the Palestinian resistance against Israel has largely been asso-
ciated with Hamas and other Islamic organizations in recent years, but the
secular Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has historically served as one of the
most successful purveyors of terrorism in this struggle (Frisch 2005).
Hamas, deriving from the same ideology as the Muslim Brotherhood, may
have incorporated terrorism into its tactical arsenal, but its ideological and
territorial neighbors in Egypt, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, have
largely bound themselves to non-violent tactics in their pursuit of political
and social change in recent years (Abed-Kotob 1995). The commitment of
Hizb Ut-Tahrir to non-violent means of political change alongside an
ideology that must be categorized as both extremist and fundamentalist (if
the terms Islamic fundamentalist and Islamic extremist are to retain any
meaning that is not endogenous to Islamic political violence) further
challenges the notion that an organization’s espousal of an extremist Isla-
mic ideology is a sufficient condition for that organization to utilize ter-
rorism (Karagiannis and McCauley 2006). The use of terrorism and
violence by Islamist organizations appears to be a tactical or strategic
decision based upon the perceptions of these organizations of the political
tools that are likely to succeed in a given context.
Nevertheless, skepticism with regards to the commitment of any parti-
cular Islamist organization in the Arab world to non-violence or restrain-
ing the violent tactics that it uses is justified. This is not due to the Islamic
nature of such an organization, but, rather, due to their nature as political
entities. Whether secular or Islamist, a shifting strategic landscape will
alter the tactics utilized by a particular political entity.3 More importantly,
organizations that bear similar ideologies may behave very differently
when organizing political activity in different atmospheres (see Bakker,
Hill and Moore 2016). Thus, drawing inferences about the likelihood of an
Islamist organization acting in some manner based simply on similarities
between its ideological and religious proclivities and preferences and that
of another Islamist organization may not be particularly appropriate.
The onset of the Arab Spring set off a flurry of discussions regarding the
role that Islamist organizations will play in the newly destabilized secular
and authoritarian Arab states that experienced marked increases in poli-
tical activity. Yet while these premature discussions focused on the com-
patibility of Islam with democracy, most failed to note the wide array of
behaviors that Islamists and Islamist organizations exhibited during the
onset and rise of collective action movements throughout the Middle East.
The Islamists in Egypt did not organize in the same manner as those in
Syria or Libya, and did not utilize the same tools of dissent. The mobili-
zation of Islamists in each of these three states was shaped by the political
dynamics and conditions within their states rather than an ideological or
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religious commitment to a particular mechanism for bringing about
change. Thus, the effects that interpersonal trust had on the type of resis-
tance an individual chose, played a significant role in shaping the strategic
decisions made by Islamists as well.
A series of brief analytic narratives that build upon the theoretical frame-
work presented in Chapter 3 will be presented in the following section.
These narratives will explore the decisions made by the Salafists in Egypt,
Jabhat Al Nusra in Syria, and the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change,
the rebranded and reconstituted Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Each of
these organizations exhibited a keen awareness of the social and political
dynamics within their states, and the behavior of each group indicates a
greater fundamental interest in adapting their strategies to successfully
position themselves within their respective states than maintaining a
strategy that aligns with a particular religious preference. Moreover,
between these organizations, as well as within the organizations, we see a
wide range of political activity, from encouraging an apolitical stance to
encouraging mass collective action to utilizing terrorism to achieve their
aims. Not only did each of these organizations utilize a different set of
strategies, their own strategies seemed to evolve based on the evolving
nature of their own political struggle.
4.2 Salafist Political Mobilization in Egypt, Libya, and Syria
4.2.1 Egypt’s Salafists: A Call to Inaction and Mass Action
While significant attention has been paid to the relatively late entry the
Muslim Brotherhood made into the revolutionary foray that arose out of
the January 25, 2011 protests, it is the actions of the organization’s ideo-
logically more extreme counterparts, the broad coalition of Salafists inha-
biting Egypt, that are particularly puzzling (Shehata 2011). Considering
the tense relationship between the Mubarak regime and many of the reli-
gious elites who represent various Salafist social and religious movements,
the vast differences between their own policy preferences and those of the
regime, and the history of torture experienced by many of their notable
clerics, the expectation might be that the Salafist elite would have been
early investors in the uprising against Mubarak (Al-Anani and Malik 2013;
Gauvain 2011). In fact, despite efforts on the part of pro-government news-
paper outlets to paint the protests as being driven by Salafists, the clerics
and movements labeled as Salafist largely took a more neutral, and at
times hostile, stance toward the protesters (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012;
Stein 2011; Gauvain 2011). Why would the Salafists not immediately seize
the opportunity to exert their own influence to topple a secular regime?
Moreover, given the purported causal link between extremist Islamic
ideologies and political violence, why would the Salafists choose to not
encourage armed resistance amid the chaos engulfing Egypt?
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The answer lies not in any particular ideological configuration of the
Salafists of Egypt, but in the rational interests of the movements. Their
political maneuvering during the tumultuous period that followed the
January 25 protests and the fall of Mubarak demonstrates a shrewd
understanding of both the social and political climate surrounding the
revolution, as well as a keen awareness of the range of possible outcomes
that could occur in a restructured political paradigm. The behavior of the
organizations that comprise the umbrella of dominant Salafist groups was
characterized by an appreciation of the likelihood of collective action
succeeding, and what role they could play in shaping outcomes both
before and after the revolution. Both their inaction prior to Mubarak’s
removal from office and their collective action in the aftermath of the
January 25 Revolution appear to be strategic rather than motivated by
rigid ideological and religious preferences.
There is no one unified organization that broadly represented the Salafists
of Egypt prior to the protests that removed Mubarak, nor did the Salafists
always or often speak with one voice. Nevertheless, the adjective “apoli-
tical” has often been affixed to descriptions of the Salafist stance toward
political engagement in Egypt during the Mubarak era (Utvik 2014;
Høigilt and Nome 2014; Roy 2012; Brown 2011). To a large extent, this is
due to the statements and dictates offered by Salafist scholars themselves,
which, on their face, often appear to support this narrative.4 When juxta-
posed against a conflicting narrative that depicts Salafists as political par-
iahs seeking the immediate and absolute institutionalization of Islamic
doctrines through force, a seemingly paradoxical ideology is presented
(Wolf and Lefevre 2012). This paradox has traditionally been resolved by
scholars and policy analysts by classifying the heterogeneous mix of Sal-
afist beliefs into quietist, activist, and jihadist groupings, or other similar
classifications (Mamdani 2005; Olidort 2015, Roex 2014; Wagemakers
2011).
The post-revolutionary political activity of the supposedly quietist Sal-
afists of Egypt, however, defied this conceptualization of Salafists as con-
fined to a narrow and particular position on political activity. Salafists, like
other social and political actors, respond to the political context in which
they are placed, and the vast majority are far more politically flexible than
they have been portrayed (Høiglit and Nome 2014). For the vast majority
of Salafist clerics in Egypt, the decision to remain apolitical was an
inherently political decision dictated by the social and political forces
which they found themselves struggling against. Their quietist positions, as
well as the quietist positions of many Salafists elsewhere, were the product
of political calculations and a long-term strategic outlook. Even an ana-
lysis that takes the statements of non-Madkhali Salafists that have been
presumed to be quietist as completely truthful and accurate reveals that
the quietist strategy is an ephemeral one, based upon the belief that the
development of the appropriate social conditions within the state must
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precede the political framework that they seek. Their commitment to pri-
marily focusing on educational, religious, and social endeavors over the
course of the last 20 years of Mubarak’s rule may have been derived from
this strategic perspective, if not the political conditions within the state.
Thus, the decision on the part of Egypt’s most well-organized and influ-
ential Salafists to commit to an apolitical stance was itself the product of
strategic political considerations.
When the January 25 protests began, the most prominent Salafist
preachers in Egypt voiced opinions that ranged from passionate dis-
approval of the potentially destabilizing protest movement to tepid endor-
sements of the goals of the protesters. The prominent Salafist Sheikh
Muhammad Hassan delivered a sermon that clearly promoted stability
and was moderately supportive of the protests in Tahrir Square that
turned it into a global symbol for non-violent protest and democratic
transitions (Hassan, February 1, 2011). While Sheikh Hassan later framed
his position as one of pride in the undertaking that had been achieved, he
remained steadfast in his resolve to maintain order and support the
Egyptian army (Hassan, February 11, 2011).5 His position has often been
interpreted as being resolutely against the protests initially and then shift-
ing toward support later, but I find little evidence of a drastic shift.6
Sheikh Yasser Borhami of the Salafist Call clearly stood in opposition to
the protests initially, but fell short of condemning them as sinful (Ahram
Online 2011). Most opinions relayed by Salafist clerics in Egypt fell
somewhere near the positions of those presented by Sheikhs Hassan and
Borhami.
While the Salafist reaction to the protests may be interpreted as the
product of a belief that the protest movement did not have a substantial
likelihood of succeeding, which could be the product of a belief that indi-
viduals were not willing to contribute to collective action, it is not clear
how the Salafist clerics and organizations could have benefited from sup-
porting the revolution. The regime, through state-sponsored and semi-
official media, had actively attempted to frame the protest movement as
one dominated and led by Salafists in a bid to dampen support for the
movement (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012). If the government was painting
the protests as inspired by Salafists, it would be a fair assumption that the
protests being associated with Salafists would have been perceived
negatively by many potential and active protesters. Why would the Salaf-
ists join a protest movement that it hoped would succeed if their involve-
ment would reduce the probability of it succeeding? Moreover, this
presumes that the Salafists wanted the protests to succeed, which may have
not been the case given that they were relatively poorly positioned com-
pared to their ideological competitors, the more moderate Muslim
Brotherhood (El-Sherif 2015).
A strategy rooted in supporting the Egyptian protests would have been
strictly dominated for the Salafists. Salafist involvement at the level of its
52 Islamist Political Mobilization
leaders would have likely dampened support for the protests from the liberal
protesters who initiated the movement. It is unlikely that their ambiguity
and hedging would have drastically altered their electoral competitiveness in
Egypt post-Mubarak. Had the protests not succeeded, the clerics who had
actively supported the protests would have likely faced the wrath of the
Mubarak regime. Thus, the middle-of-the-road path that the Salafist clerics
largely took, encouraging stability without voicing opposition to the mili-
tary or to the ultimate goals of the protesters, left them in the best possible
position for the future, whether the protests succeeded or not.
Moreover, had the Salafist clerics and organizations decided to utilize
violence to further their position in Egypt, such a strategy would have
been counterproductive. In an atmosphere where non-violent protests
could succeed, like that of Egypt in 2011, their use of violence would have
undermined the protests and encouraged violent repression of the Salafist
movement by the security apparatus and the military. The use of violence
would only have been a viable strategy had they anticipated that the pro-
test movement would fail and armed militias would begin to challenge the
regime. In such a situation, the arming of the Salafists would have provided
them with means to use their violence-producing capabilities to exert their
authority. In an environment where individuals are likely to protest and
believe that others are likely to protest non-violently, turning violent would
not have increased their clout. Their decision to refrain from violence
indicates a belief that citizens were willing to bear the costs of protest, and
that the protest movement could succeed in removing the regime.
The post-Mubarak political mobilization of the Salafists indicates a
belief that their base of support would be willing to contribute to their
efforts. In the aftermath of Mubarak’s fall from power, the supposedly
quietist Salafists of Egypt immediately inserted themselves into the poli-
tical realm. They did this in a number of ways, including cooperating with
the army, forming the Al Nour Party, and organizing protests to flex their
strength (Tadros 2011; El-Sherif 2015). While each of these activities
indicates that the party was not committed to remaining completely apo-
litical, its organization and participation in non-violent protests is of par-
ticular relevance to this inquiry. The willingness of individuals to bear the
costs of protest in order to defend their positions regarding the imposition
of Islamic law and the transition away from military rule in Egypt led the
Salafists to choose to mobilize collective action to assert their authority
(Chick 2011; Awad 2011; Wedeman 2012). Had the requisite belief
regarding the willingness of others to contribute to collective action not
been present, such avenues for organizing collective action would not have
been viable.
The influential Salafists of Egypt were faced with a number of options
before, during, and after the protests that removed Mubarak from power,
and, at each juncture, they appeared to behave both strategically and in
the interest of furthering their own political clout. Prior to the protests,
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their political interests led them to adopt a quietist stance. When the Jan-
uary 25 protests began, their ambivalent stance toward the protests was
likely the product of their belief that such a movement could succeed
rather than an indication that they did not believe that the protests were
viable. After Mubarak’s fall, the Salafist clerics of note immediately tran-
sitioned away from an apolitical stance, and attempted to exert their author-
ity via the mass mobilization of their supporters. At each turn, rather than
exhibiting a rigid preference for one dogmatic ideological prescription, the
Salafists of Egypt displayed both ideological dexterity and strategic
acumen in their actions and statements leading up to, during, and after the
2011 revolution.
4.2.2 Libya’s Salafists: Repackaging a Militant Movement
The behavior of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and its core
members also challenges the notion that the political strategies and tactics
adopted by Salafists are rooted in religious dogma rather than rational
self-interest. The LIFG, while ostensibly created for the purpose of pur-
suing regime change in Libya, had been initially composed primarily of
veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, and con-
tinued to recruit from Libyan veterans of foreign jihadist endeavors
(Lacher 2011). Its connection to anti-Western forces in Afghanistan and
Iraq, along with its use of violence and adoption of a Salafist belief
system, had generated for the group significant suspicion that it was an Al
Qaeda affiliate (Farrall 2011; Steinberg and Werenfels 2007). Nevertheless,
by the time the Libyan uprising of February 17 had begun, the former
members of the group found themselves rebranded as moderates and
working with the other militias loosely organized under the banner of the
National Transitional Council. In the aftermath of the successful over-
throw of Mubarak, the former Emir of the LIFG, Abdelhakim Belhadj,
suddenly was thrust into the spotlight as a voice of Islamist moderation in
post-Qaddafi Libya (Asharq Al-Awsat 2011).7
In the years leading up to the Libyan uprising of 2011, the former
members of the LIFG had renounced violence, cooperated with the regime
through Muammar Al-Qaddafi’s son, Saif Al-Islam Al-Qaddafi, and
adopted a non-violent approach to politics (Al Jazeera 2008; Asharq Al-
Awsat 2011; Ashour 2011). This approach, which verged on quietist in the
domestic context, had earned these former regime opponents praise from Saif
Al-Islam Al-Qaddafi and the release of many of the LIFG-held prisoners
by the regime. In what was meant to be a demonstrative turn of the Sal-
afists away from their past association with violent domestic and interna-
tional resistance, they collectively published the Corrective Studies in
Understandings of Jihad, Enforcement of Morality, and Judgment of People,
a treatise disavowing their previous conceptualization of jihad and takfir,
or the pronouncement that an individual is an infidel (Sadiki 2014).
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Just as the prominent Salafists of Egypt had adopted a quietist
approach during the pre-revolutionary period due to political considera-
tions, so too did the Salafists of Libya who had attempted to overthrow
Qaddafi in the past take on an ideology that was accommodating to the
regime. Their relative weakness placed them in no position to challenge
Qaddafi, and they were left with either the option to remain in prison and
actively repressed by the regime, or to adopt an ideology that validates
Qaddafi’s rule (Sadiki 2014). They chose to survive rather than to maintain
their previous ideological positions.
Despite their professed adoption of a quietist Salafist approach, it did
not take long for the former members of the LIFG to enter the revolu-
tionary fray. Within six months of the publication of the newer, less radical
religious ideology, the former leaders of the LIFG had shifted back
toward a violent stance with regards to the regime (Sadiki 2014). This shift
did not, however, appear to have occurred through premeditation or
internal pressures within the organization. The Arab Spring had altered
the political landscape in Libya, creating avenues of opportunity for the
former militants to press their claims through the use of violence.
In a matter of months, the former members of the LIFG had shifted
from a position that supported tacit obedience to the regime to a fighting
force organized to help bring about the collapse of the regime as a part of
a broad coalition (Nordland 2011). Their professed change of heart had
been the product of political opportunism, and that political opportunism
would influence their decision to disband the LIFG in order to form the
Libyan Islamic Movement for Change and enter the civil war alongside
other militias seeking regime change.8 Rather than their agreement with
Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi acting as a barrier to them being accepted by the
mainstream opposition, that agreement strengthened their position in the
aftermath of the events of February 17. They were able to successfully
use that agreement as proof that they had become more moderate, and
claim that it was the regime’s brutality that forced them to use violence.
This particularly paid dividends to the former leadership of the LIFG who
carried with them experience organizing and participating in armed
combat, and were able to take on leadership positions in the National
Transitional Council due to their recent espousal of a more moderate
stance.
While Salafists were willing to join a broad coalition, and that decen-
tralized coalition was willing to accept them, like other rebels in Libya,
they joined as armed insurgents with a clear local orientation (Lacher
2011). The remnants of the LIFG were largely recruited into brigades
located in Northeast Libya, in Benghazi and the towns of Baida and
Darnah (Lacher 2011). The organization of the Salafists in Libya mirrored
that of the rest of the nation, despite proponents of the movement
espousing a set of ideological beliefs meant to cross tribal and local
boundaries. Rather than organizing a unified movement, the socially
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structured constraints and boundaries forced them to join the opposition
movement as disparate groups loosely organized under the same banner as
others who joined the mainstream opposition.
Had they not taken up arms, their interests would not be represented in
a post-Qaddafi Libya made up of tribal and local militias that had the
capacity to use violent means against their competitors and coerce obedi-
ence from citizens in the locations they controlled. A strategy rooted in
non-violence would have prevented them from leveraging their strength
into roles in the government that would follow. Moreover, had they not
joined the mainstream opposition, any success they had on the battlefield
would have likely contributed to the mainstream opposition gaining
power, at least tentatively, without affording them a proportional share of
that power in the aftermath of Qaddafi’s fall. In order to position them-
selves best, the former leaders and members of the LIFG tentatively
accepted a more moderate stance to join the National Transitional Coun-
cil, and found themselves divided along similar lines as others who had
joined the coalition.
4.2.3 Syria’s Salafists: The Syrian-ification of Al Qaeda
In Syria, Salafist involvement in the uprising was characterized from the
outset by violence and terrorism of the nature often associated with
“extremist” Islam. This case can be viewed as, perhaps, the simplest case;
a jihadist Salafist organization maintains a jihadist Salafist disposition
throughout. Such a characterization, however, would not provide an
accurate portrayal of the significant amount of political maneuvering and
ideological concessions made by an organization that was affiliated with
Al Qaeda. Jabhat Al Nusra’s focus on the removal of Assad from power,
its overtures towards pluralism, choice of name, and willingness to, at
times, cooperate with more moderate elements of the opposition all indi-
cate that the organization possessed political savvy and a willingness to
compromise to further its ambitions. Rather than behaving as a caricature
of a jihadist organization zealously pursuing its religious objectives absent
concern for strategic imperatives, they adroitly navigated a difficult terrain
and rose to prominence in the Syrian uprising prior to their civil war with
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IS).
Jabhat Al Nusra’s brand of political violence, while both utilizing ter-
rorism and means of violence commonly attributed with terrorism and
guerrilla warfare, took on a more restrained nature than that later adopted
by IS (Stern and Berger 2015). From the outset of their entry into the
conflict, the group has exhibited a keen sensitivity to how it is perceived
(Abouzeid 2012). At least outwardly, it has depicted itself as being native
to the Syrian conflict and not the offspring of global jihadism, concerned
with limiting civilian casualties to some extent, and as part of a larger
opposition open to some degree of pluralism. While its affiliation with Al
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Qaeda proved to be an obstacle to gaining legitimacy from outside of
Syria, it did briefly receive some support for its activities from both civi-
lians in Syria and other opposition groups.9 This support was due to the
combination of its willingness to selectively cooperate with others, as well
as the success it was having in combating the Assad regime (Jones 2013).
Nevertheless, in a fractured society, where both interpersonal trust and
social capital were low and fear of the security apparatus ran high, ter-
rorism offered the most efficient pathway to challenging the regime’s
monopoly on coercion.10 While the Free Syrian Army was often presented
as a major force in the early stages of the armed Syrian uprising, it, at
best, represented a franchise adopted by various militias to signal their
preferences rather than a cohesive coalition with a central command
(Lynch 2016). Syria was not an environment ripe for the fostering of a
cooperative revolutionary or military endeavor of the scope and magni-
tude necessary to bring about regime change. This, along with the sig-
nificant support the regime was receiving from its benefactors in Iran and
Russia, made more conventional means of challenging the regime’s
authority less likely to succeed in bringing about regime change or effec-
tively challenging the regime. Jabhat Al Nusra’s flexible network structure,
willingness to use suicide tactics in urban settings, and experience with
utilizing the tools of terrorism made it particularly effective when con-
trasted with other groups in Syria fighting at the time. The group’s dra-
matic rise can be attributed to its efficient use of terrorism and suicide
bombings in a political environment characterized by the inefficiency of
the opposition. As suicide bombings inflicted wounds to the regime in
Damascus, Aleppo, and elsewhere, Jabhat Al Nusra’s standing in Syria
rose (Jones 2013).
While their initial entry into the uprising does not resemble that of the
Salafists in Egypt and Libya, their strategic maneuvering and initial suc-
cess relative to their counterparts betrays an ideological or religious com-
mitment to a particular mode of organization or resistance. They have
strategically framed their goals in nationalistic terms rather than global or
purely religious terms, and have focused on regime change. Moreover,
their coordinated, yet decentralized and flexible network structure has
allowed them to utilize a number of different strategies when conducting
operations against the regime, including working with moderate elements
of the opposition. They have voiced hope for an Islamic, yet vaguely
pluralistic outcome in Syria, despite, later on, contributing to the frag-
mentation of Syria along sectarian lines (Mousa 2016). Although their use
of terrorism was predictable, it was also a rational decision based on
strategic calculations that took into account the local conditions in Syria.
The entry of IS directly into the Syrian conflict complicates the picture,
but Jabhat Al Nusra’s largely Syrian nature makes it the more cogent
example in this case. The civil war that ensued between Jabhat Al Nusra
and IS led to the waning influence of Jabhat Al Nusra as the powerful IS
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swallowed up the resources, manpower, and territory that had once belon-
ged to it. This does not, however, negate the success that Jabhat Al Nusra
had in the early stages of the uprising. Moreover, the success of both IS and
Jabhat Al Nusra in Syria demonstrates that the use of terrorism in a frac-
tured environment that is not conducive to large-scale cooperation may be
relatively efficient when compared to other means of resistance.
4.3 Discussion
The Salafists of Egypt, Libya, and Syria faced choices with regard to the
strategies and tactics they would use to compete for power in their newly
destabilized environments. Scholars have recently begun to categorize Salaf-
ists into groups based upon the political role that citizens should play within
the scope of their ideology. This conceptualization may provide more nuance
than those that depict Salafists through one-dimensional jihadist or quietist
lenses, yet provides a fixed and predetermined course of action to groups that
fall into a certain category. Within such a conceptualization, Salafist groups,
elites, and common adherents simply react to situations based upon a reli-
gious script without having the freedom to choose between the options avail-
able to others. Quietists remain quiet; jihadists continue to wage war; and the
ideologies of these groups remain static. The Arab Spring challenged this
line of thought by revealing the strategic and ideological flexibility of the
supposedly homogeneous group of rigid belief systems categorized as Sal-
afist. Rather than simply reacting according to their previous statements
regarding political participation, they appeared to weigh their options and
were willing to make decisions that clearly contradicted their previously
stated positions. Their strategic behavior indicates that a rational choice
framework is appropriate for an analysis of their behavior.
Each of the three groups showed a willingness to adjust to the condi-
tions with which they were faced. The preachers who had urged stability
and a focus on educating the Egyptian people rather than organizing
political movements found themselves forming a successful party that
competed nationally and leading massive protests throughout Egypt. In
Libya, global jihadists who had settled back down in Libya to try to bring
down the Qaddafi regime in the 1990s renounced their violent, takfiri past,
and immediately reverted back to a militant position when the uprising in
Libya began. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Al Nusra, utilized ter-
rorism, but did so while presenting a more moderate image than its bene-
factors or its neighbors in Iraq, and in a context where terrorism clearly
produced successful results for the group. When necessary, all three groups
showed a willingness to make ideological sacrifices in order to achieve
their objectives, and chose the tool of resistance that appeared to be the
most appropriate given the conditions of their state.
The Salafists in Egypt, Libya, and Syria were faced with similar choices
in very different environments with regard to their entry into the opposition
58 Islamist Political Mobilization
movements in their respective countries. In Egypt, where bridge-building
civil society had flourished under Mubarak, the expectation that a non-
violent movement could oust Mubarak was high, and the Salafists
behaved accordingly. Rather than entering the revolutionary movement,
where their presence would have possibly undermined the protests, they
generally maintained an ambivalent stance, and then furiously organized
in the aftermath to position themselves well in post-Mubarak Egypt. The
Libyan Salafists of the LIFG chose to enter the revolutionary fold as
militants fighting under the banner of the National Transitional Council
despite renouncing violence months prior to the uprising. Their organiza-
tion mirrored the organization of other members of the opposition in that
they were locally oriented, and highly independent of the other militias
involved. Jabhat Al Nusra entered the Syrian uprising as an independent
and highly secretive organization amenable to the use of terrorism, yet also
actively attempted to package itself as more moderate than its affiliation
would indicate. The pairing of a more moderate tone with the use of ter-
rorism and urban guerrilla tactics in a fractured Syria that found its
mainstream opposition unable to coalesce under the command of a central
authority allowed Jabhat Al Nusra to rise quickly to the top of the violent
opposition’s hierarchy. The social dynamics of each state conditioned the
behavior of these groups by altering the cost-benefit analysis associated
with the relevant tools of protest that were available to them.
4.4 Conclusion
While the choices facing ideologically extreme organizations are often
ignored, the Arab Spring and its aftermath have highlighted the interac-
tion between ideology and strategy. They are not pre-programmed entities,
destined to behave according to their inflexible ideologies, but, rather,
competitors in the market for political clout with other groups, organiza-
tions, and individuals. The belief systems labeled as Salafist include groups
with a wide range of opinions on a number of different matters, including
political involvement. One of their defining features has been their rigid
adherence to a set of religious ideals, yet even they deviated from these
principles when presented new opportunities and challenges.
Just as interpersonal trust dynamics conditioned the organization and
evolution of movements in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, they influenced the
decisions made by these ideologically extreme groups. Where the social
order was fractured, political mobilization was fractured and terrorism
was a more appropriate tool than others to influence the political situa-
tion. When generalized trust was low, but there existed broad local or
tribal networks to organize around, forming militias based upon these
affiliations offered the most effective means of bringing about their desired
objectives. Where generalized trust is high, organizing large-scale collec-
tive action may be the most appropriate way to achieve political objectives
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if the participation of the group in such a movement does not undermine
it. These conditions influence the behavior of virtually all political actors, and
not just those with more moderate stances.
Notes
1 This does not imply that an organization’s policy preferences and ideological
proclivities do not matter. They may serve to increase or decrease the potential
pool of supporters that they are able to attract, which may significantly alter
the tools of political change that are available to them.
2 Amal’s shift from a non-violent pluralist political organization to an organiza-
tion that supported a powerful militia when the Lebanese Civil War began also
highlights how political environments shape the nature of the contestation that
an organization uses.
3 This shift could be either toward a greater or lesser reliance on terrorism and
the use of political violence, depending on how the strategic landscape has
changed.
4 In particular, the Madkhali-Salafist religious framework offers a rigid and
extreme interpretation of the concept of Khurooj ‘an al-hakim, or rebellion
against a ruler, that lays the foundation for a quietist approach to politics (El
Gomati 2014; Olidort 2015). The Madkhalis, however, are an exceptional case,
and by no means the predominant voice in the Salafist world.
5 Later, Sheikh Hassan would be called upon by the Egyptian army to help
resolve disputes related to a church burning, and the discontent this caused
within the Coptic community (Tadros 2011).
6 This may be due to a YouTube video that falsely dates a sermon of his as
taking place on January 25, 2011 when it relates to labor strikes that occurred
in 2008.
7 See Abdelhakim Belhadj’s interview with EuroNews as one example of the
rebranded Belhadj (EuroNews 2015)
8 In actuality, the former members of the LIFG broke down into a more com-
plicated subset of militias, with former members joining militias primarily
rooted in Libya’s Northeast (Lacher 2011).
9 At the time of the drafting of this book, Jabhat Al Nusra had rebranded itself
Jabhat Fateh Al Sham, and disassociated itself from Al Qaeda with the
approval of Al Qaeda’s leadership (Al Raya 2016).
10 While the focus of this analysis is on the opposition movements, it is also
notable that the Assad regime largely relied on Shabiha and local militias
loosely organized as the National Defense Forces to protect its interests, man
checkpoints and support the regime’s military. This has been necessary despite
the significant amount of financial and military support the regime has
received from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Thus, not only was the resistance to
the regime highly decentralized, the regime was also forced to allow pockets of
the citizenry to seize power locally, often utilizing such power for their own
purposes.
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5 The Syrian Protester’s Dilemma
What makes Syria so different from the other Arab countries that experi-
enced an increased level of political activity in the aftermath of Tunisia’s
successful revolution? While, ultimately, a confluence of factors influenced
how resistance to the Assad regime progressed in Syria, the protests that
arose in Syria occurred under the control of a regime that appears to
have long been acutely aware of the role that interpersonal trust
dynamics play in organizing resistance. Beyond preventing the rise of
non-governmental civil society and groups capable of fostering coopera-
tion within Syria, the regime actively promoted an atmosphere of mistrust
that pervaded Syria’s urban centers. When the exogenous shock of the
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions hit Syria, the low-cost tools that the
government used to manipulate trust and beliefs regarding the inevitability
of Assad rule throughout the areas that threatened them the most paid
dividends. Individuals who wished to organize and join movements of
resistance did so judiciously and deliberately, weighing the likelihood that
spies may be in their midst. Others who disapproved of the regime chose
to remain silent.
Although the model presented in Chapter 3 explains why an other-
regarding individual who has suffered grievances might choose not to
protest, it does not explain how the actions of those who protest non-
violently may be constrained by their belief that others are likely to be
trustworthy. This chapter explores the actions, strategies, beliefs, and per-
ceptions of a group of individuals who chose to protest in Syria at the
outset of the Arab Spring, and the environment that this protest move-
ment arose in. The crucial insight gleaned from this analysis is that inter-
personal trust shapes the methods and tactics used by non-violent
protesters, which, in turn, affects the probability of such a movement suc-
ceeding. In Syria, where the government’s domination and control over
discourse fostered an atmosphere of mistrust among citizens, particularly
among those in Damascus and Aleppo, the fruits born from their efforts
can most tangibly be seen by examining the behavior of those who
attempted to bring about regime change in the immediate aftermath of the
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions.
The next two sections of this chapter build upon Lisa Wedeen’s seminal
Foucauldian analysis of the Assad regime’s battle for hegemony over dis-
course in Syria (Foucault 1977; Foucault et al. 1991; Wedeen 1998, 1999,
2002, 2013). Beyond developing a robust cult of personality, the Assad
regime under the rule of Hafez shaped and competed within a restricted
domain for the expression of political beliefs where individuals were not
only expected to refrain from criticizing the regime, but also to actively
make obviously fallacious statements that perpetuated the cult of Assad
(Wedeen 1998, 1999). The death of Hafez Al Assad in 2000 ushered in the
rule of Bashar Al Assad, Hafez’s young and seemingly cosmopolitan son
who was thrust into the role as his father’s successor after his brother,
Bassel, died in a car accident in 1994. While Bashar Al Assad’s rule did
bring about a modicum of economic and political liberalization, his
regime did not bring about a paradigm shift.1 The cloaked language,
symbolic requirements, and cult of personality remained in place despite early
attempts by some to push the government into opening up a space within
Syria for freer political expression.
Bashar Al Assad’s regime was particularly sensitive to the idea that it
could possibly be displaced. The regime’s sensitivity to the notion that a
Syria without Assad could exist is particularly evident in the regime’s
response to Ali Farzat’s cartoons during the Arab Spring. As leaders were
removed from power, Farzat’s depiction of a Bashar Al Assad destined to
experience the same fate as Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Qaddafi drew the ire
of Bashar Al Assad’s allies. While some of his caricatures had been pro-
hibited or disapproved of in the past, Farzat’s depictions of Assad on his
way out led to the brutal and near fatal beating of perhaps Syria’s most
well-known cartoonist. As Farzat’s cartoons shifted away from broad cri-
ticism of the regime to insinuating that the regime’s end might be immi-
nent, Farzat transitioned from being a nuisance to the regime to a threat
to its existence. A native Syrian voice expressing discontent with the status
quo may have been acceptable within certain limits, but expressing the
belief that the Assad regime could be replaced was not. The next section
of this chapter will examine the regime’s response to Ali Farzat’s cartoons
to illustrate the Syrian government’s sensitivity to the notion that it, like
other governments, could be replaced.
What role does trust and trustworthiness play in shaping the perceptions
of the regime’s ability to maintain control of Syria? I explore this rela-
tionship through the analysis of an illustrative example drawn from one of
the historically most popular satirical comedic television shows in Syria,
Yasser Al Azmeh’s Maraya (“Mirrors”). The particular episode that is the
focus of this analysis presents a poignant portrait of the relationship
between the Syrian government and its citizens. In particular, it delves into
the willingness of individuals to turn on one another when called upon to
do so by an agent of the government, and the reliance of the government
on citizens to turn on one another to maintain control. Rather than
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presenting the government as omnipotent and supremely powerful, it
depicts a mindless government agent who does not know why he is doing
what he is doing, and a manager who does not have the information he
needs. In order to obtain the information, he relies on citizens to willingly
discuss the details of another individual’s life simply because he has
requested those details. To the agent’s astonishment, each person ques-
tioned reveals all that they know or think about the person in excruciating
detail. The regime’s ability to gather information does not lie in its own
innate strength, but the willingness of individuals to offer up all that they
know to the regime and turn on one another.
The final section of this chapter will explore the Syrian protest move-
ment through the eyes of Damascus-area protesters who participated in
non-violent resistance. Semi-structured interviews with individuals
involved in the protests were conducted in 2016, and this data is paired
with data from the product of my fieldwork in 2010–2011 in Syria and
notes from discussions with protesters during the protests. The portrait
these protesters paint is of a movement trapped between a desire to seek
change through large-scale revolution and an inability to create the inter-
personal connections necessary to bring about change in the manner that
they seek. In particular, this section focuses on their motivations for seek-
ing change, the effect that the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia had on
their actions, why they chose the strategies and tactics that they chose, and
why they ultimately gave up on the movement that they sacrificed so much
for at the outset of the Arab Spring.
The analysis within this chapter can broadly be construed as Fou-
cauldian in nature (Foucault 1971, 1982). This is not due to a strict
adherence to the methodological underpinnings born of Foucault’s semi-
nal analytic framework, but, rather, due to the applicability of the tools
utilized by Foucauldian analysts in the context of Syria (Hook 2007). The
cloaked nature of political discourse in Syria throughout the duration of
the Assad regime requires the application of interpretive tools of analysis
to derive meaning from such discourse (Wedeen 1998). The political mes-
sages and signals sent by writers, producers, artists, and other residents of
Syria are virtually all veiled in symbolic and sarcastic rhetoric due to the
political landscape and repressive institutions of the Syrian regime.2
5.1 Caricature of a Dictator
In the early stages of the Syrian uprising, while images of protesters in
Homs, Hama, and Daraa spread across television screens throughout the
world, Damascus heated to a near boil but never crossed that critical
threshold at which the rumblings would have transitioned into a revolu-
tion. Despite the paucity of protest activity in the capital, the atmosphere
in the capital had changed. The fear of the Assad regime that had cloaked
Damascus prior to the Arab Spring had drastically dissipated. More
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people were willing to express political discontent directly rather than
through coded messages. Political discussions took on a frank and earnest
tone, and even many supporters of the regime were willing to discuss
political qualms in a manner that acknowledged the existence of legitimate
grievances, albeit while absolving Bashar Al Assad of responsibility for
those grievances. It was in this atmosphere that the notoriously sarcastic
and metaphorical nature of artistic political expression in Damascus
began to take on a darker and more direct form, and Ali Farzat decided to
take a risk he had avoided throughout his long and celebrated career: He
drew Assad’s face.
Through both the closed, socialist reign of Hafez and the neoliberal
autocracy of Bashar, Ali Farzat’s cartoons provided comedic relief from
the latent angst experienced by many dissatisfied by the regime in
Damascus (Wedeen 1998, 2013). Touching upon the pervasiveness of the
security apparatus, corruption, military inefficiencies, and political over-
reach, many of Farzat’s cartoons are unmistakably critical of the Syrian
regime and the political elite, yet many of them were permitted to be
published in government-affiliated outlets. Lisa Wedeen’s analysis of Far-
zat’s cartoon submissions to the government newspaper, Tishrin, provides
an interesting look at the fuzzy and ambiguous line between what was
deemed acceptable and what was not by the regime under Hafez’s rule
(Wedeen 1999). Although none of the caricatures dissected by Lisa
Wedeen presented direct criticisms of Hafez Al Assad, let alone portrayals
of the man himself, and each of the cartoons is critical of the government
and society, those deemed acceptable by government agents refrained from
challenging the strength of the coercive apparatus of the regime. Those
that were rejected by government agents very clearly presented portrayals
of the regime that could be interpreted as highlighting its weaknesses.
But why allow any of these critical cartoons to be published in government-
affiliated newspapers? What possible benefit can accrue from expending
government resources on the dissemination of information that is critical
of the regime? Some have argued that allowing for such artistic repre-
sentations diffuses political tension, while others have argued that
allowing for such discourse provides a mechanism for the regime to elicit
signals from citizens regarding their level of support for the regime (Guha
1983; Wedeen 1999). Lisa Wedeen broadly argues that such representa-
tions are the product of a battle over the symbolic domain in Syria, a
domain that may be dominated by the regime, but where the regime and
others battle over cultural discourse. Nevertheless, the Syrian government
not only opted to allow certain forms of dissident expression, but actively
promoted certain types of dissident expression. Why would a government
newspaper in an autocracy publish material that is clearly critical of the
regime?
By allowing dissident material to be published in its newspapers, the
Syrian regime could mold the type of dissident content that is produced.
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This did not only mitigate the risks associated with the spread of material
that is critical of the regime, but allowed the regime to select material that
presented an image that strengthened the perception of the regime’s ability
to maintain power. This point can best be illustrated by briefly examining
a subset of the cartoons examined by Wedeen in her book, Ambiguities of
Domination (Wedeen 1999). The first image, Figure 5.1, depicts two indi-
viduals having a conversation, and an individual with a head as a tape
recorder sitting at the next table. The implications are clear: The govern-
ment’s ears are everywhere. The second image, Figure 5.2, shows the
image of a baby urinating into a sewer, and generals scurrying from
another hole in the sewer while frightened. Here, the generals are pre-
sented not only as lowly, but also cowardly. Figure 5.1 was eventually
approved for publication by a government agent, Figure 5.2 was not.
Figure 5.1 reinforces the idea that the regime is everywhere. It presents
an image of an environment where honest communication and unmoni-
tored discourse are not possible. More importantly, the person sitting at
the next table listening in on the conversation is dressed in a similar outfit
as those conversing. The regime’s informants are hiding in plain clothes,
and others are not to be trusted. This image, while highlighting a potential
grievance attributable to the regime, also presents the security apparatus as
strong and well-informed due to the willingness of people who are indis-
tinguishable from the average citizen to act as its agents. Figure 5.2, on the
other hand, presents the coercive ability of the regime as feeble. Not only
are they morally inferior, convening in sewers, but frightened by a baby’s
urine. Whereas Figure 5.1, perhaps unintentionally, serves to strengthen
the perception of the regime’s strength and dampen the belief that honest
political discourse can take place, Figure 5.2 presents a weak regime
whose dominant military figures would scurry away like rats when con-
fronted by the innocent. Both images implicitly present the regime in a
Figure 5.1 Approved Cartoon
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negative light, but one presents an atmosphere where confronting the
government is possible, while the other presents the regime as essentially
omnipotent due to its agents hiding in plain clothes.
Neither image, however, crossed the line that Farzat leaped over during
the Arab Spring when he decided to draw Assad. While both of these
images were drawn and submitted during Hafez’s reign, Bashar’s pre-
sidency did not provide a large-scale pivot away from the restrictions on
discourse that characterized Syria during Hafez’s reign after successfully
thwarting his brother’s coup attempt. Inevitably, technological advance-
ments and the opening up of the Syrian economy provided avenues of
discourse less tightly controlled by the regime, yet tolerance of dissent that
propagated messages that exceeded boundaries was minimal. Moreover,
the cult of personality that surrounded Hafez did not disappear, but,
rather, mutated into a form amenable to Syria’s new leader. Although a
brief glimmer of hope shined through the fog that had enveloped Damas-
cus under Hafez during the early days of Bashar’s rule, hopes for political
liberalization were dashed when the dissent and open political discourse
that had presented itself during the Damascus Spring, as well as the
newspaper Ali Farzat cofounded, Al Doumari, were put down forcefully
by the regime. It was not until Tunisia and Egypt rose up to remove their
dictators that artists like Ali Farzat were willing to openly and brazenly
criticize the regime directly.
Ali Farzat’s decision to draw Bashar Al Assad was not particularly
shocking, given the political temperature of Syria in the aftermath of the
protests that sprung up in Daraa in March of 2011. Even prior to the
protests in Daraa, many Syrians observed that the fear of speaking out
Figure 5.2 Rejected Cartoon
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about Assad had disappeared and that there was a sudden shift in the
willingness of individuals to blatantly speak candidly about political mat-
ters.3 The nature and scope of Farzat’s artistic attack on the regime mir-
rored that of the Damascene-educated middle class who were avid
followers of his work. As those in Damascus began to criticize the regime
more forcefully, so too did Farzat, culminating in his portrayal of Assad in
a number of cartoons as a president who was on his way out.4 Although
the decision to draw Assad may not have been surprising, it encapsulates
the turn in discourse taken by those critical of the Assad regime during the
spring and summer of 2011.
More important than Farzat’s decision to draw Assad, however, is the
manner in which he chose to depict him. In the summer of 2011, Ali
Farzat chose not to draw Bashar Al Assad as a brutal dictator, but as a
weak despot who was counting down his days in office. His cartoons mir-
rored the waning fear of Assad in Syria, as well as the belief among many
that there was a very real possibility that Assad would be swept out of
power during the Arab Spring. Moreover, he drew parallels between Assad
and other leaders, equivalencies that had scarcely been presented by
Syrian critics of the regime in the past. Whether critical or laudatory, the
vast majority of depictions of the relationship between the Syrian people
and the regime were often presented or viewed as unique to Syria.5 Within
this paradigm, Assad played a preeminent role in defining the uniqueness
of politics and political discourse in Syria. Farzat and other producers of
dissident political content challenged both the presumption of the exis-
tence of an inextricable link between the Assad family and governance in
Syria, and the belief that Assad’s Syria was inherently different from other
Arab states.6
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 represent the type of political criticism that
Farzat produced prior to the Arab Spring. While Figure 5.1 was allowed
to be published and Figure 5.2 was rejected by officials, both present
indirect, though poignant, political criticisms that operate within the
bounds of political discourse that Syrians had grown accustomed to
throughout the Assad regime. Figure 5.3, Figure 5.4, and Figure 5.5, on
the other hand, were drawn in the aftermath of Syria’s entry into the Arab
Spring, and do not operate within the constraints previously abided by
Syrian critics of the regime.7 Beyond Assad being caricatured, Farzat’s
cartoons were revolutionary in their depiction of the regime as one with a
lifespan that is nearing its end. Figure 5.2 was rejected by authorities for
its depiction of a key component of the regime’s coercive apparatus as
corrupt and weak. The three cartoons presented herein that were drawn after
the Arab Spring go beyond Figure 5.2 by directly challenging Assad’s
ability to maintain power.
In Figure 5.3, Bashar Al Assad is depicted as a small, frail man,
standing in front of a mirror and staring at a reflection of himself that
shows him as large, strong, and powerful. Bashar Al Assad’s strength is an
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illusion, and he is delusional to believe that what he sees in the mirror is
true. While the message may be interpreted as one regarding Bashar Al
Assad’s own state of mind, the primary implications of the message relate
to Assad’s ability to coerce.8 Assad’s strength is an illusion, not just to
Assad, but to all who perceive him to be powerful. In reality, Assad is
weak, and not the domineering figure that appears in the mirror. The
image is one of Farzat’s earlier depictions of Assad during the Arab
Spring, and is meant to undermine perceptions of his ability to coerce
submission to his rule in Syria.
While Figure 5.3 presents Bashar Al Assad as weak, Figure 5.4 goes
beyond presenting him as weak, and insinuates that his days are num-
bered. Unlike Figure 5.3, Figure 5.4 does not leave to the reader room to
interpret what Assad’s weakness means with regard to his fate. Bashar Al
Assad is portrayed covering his eyes, pulling a day off of the calendar,
afraid of what will follow the next day. The day that’s being torn off the
calendar is a Thursday, the day before Friday, when “Days of Rage” took
place in Syria and elsewhere during the Arab Spring. Assad is worried that
his tenure as the leader of Syria may be coming to an end and that his
days are numbered. Moreover, his fear is related to what might occur on
Friday, a day that individuals had organized non-violent protests around.
Figure 5.3 The Illusion of Power
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Implicit in this portrayal is the message that collective action can defeat
Assad, and that the Syrian people have the power to remove Assad. In
Farzat’s cartoon, Assad’s power is not intrinsic, it relies on the compla-
cency of the Syrian citizens. If the individuals unite in protest against
Assad, Assad can be removed from power.
Finally, in Figure 5.5, Assad is shown trying to hitch a ride with
Muammar Al-Qaddafi, clearly linking his fate to the fate of Libya’s auto-
cratic ruler. This cartoon was released in early August, when Qaddafi’s
removal from power was virtually certain, and protests spread throughout
Syria outside of the main population centers of Aleppo and Damascus.
His portrayal of Assad moves beyond insinuations of weakness or the
potential for his removal to a direct statement regarding the inevitability of
his demise. Moreover, much of the cult surrounding both Hafez Al Assad
and, subsequently, Bashar Al Assad revolved around differentiating the
Figure 5.4 Counting Down the Days
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relationship between the Assads and Syria from that between other rulers
and their citizens. This cartoon explicitly draws parallels between the fates
of other dictators in the region and Bashar Al Assad. While it would be
impossible to locate the precise moment at which the frustration of the
regime and its supporters with Farzat reached the boiling point, Ali Farzat
was brutally attacked by regime-affiliated militiamen soon after releasing
this cartoon.9
Ali Farzat’s decision to draw Assad in his cartoons during the Arab
Spring represented a challenge to the regime’s authority, but how he
represents Assad is also relevant. In each of Farzat’s cartoons, including
those not presented in this book, Farzat depicts Assad and his coercive cap-
abilities as weak and ineffectual. Even prior to the Arab Spring, the regime
showed a particular sensitivity to representation of its coercive apparatus as
fragile and inept, as is exemplified by the regime’s rejection of Figure 5.2 in the
1990s. During the Arab Spring, Farzat built upon his previous criticisms of
the regime, and extended them to Assad himself, challenging the cult of per-
sonality surrounding him directly. In seeking to challenge the authority of
Assad, Farzat did not choose to highlight the grievances of citizens living
under Assad’s rule, nor his brutality. Rather, Farzat chose to portray
Assad’s power as an illusion, depicted the people as being capable of
influencing his future in Syria, and shows him fleeing his country with
Qaddafi, drawing parallels between Assad and the former leader of Libya.
In doing so, Farzat hoped to reduce the perception of Assad’s strength,
and the inevitability of his family’s rule over Syria.
As Lisa Wedeen has previously noted, the battle over hegemony in Syria
extends beyond physical political positioning and into the symbolic realm,
Figure 5.5 Hitching a Ride with Qaddafi
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yet the acquiescence of individuals to the existing symbolic order is itself a
form of subservience to the regime. Ali Farzat, alongside other dissident
voices, challenged that symbolic order by defying a number of the limits
set by the regime for approved discourse. He accomplished this not just by
drawing Assad, but by drawing him in a manner that undermined the pil-
lars upon which the cult of personality surrounding Assad stood. He attacked
the perception of Assad’s inherent coercive capabilities and the notion that
to be dominated by Assad is to be Syrian. Through these cartoons, Farzat
attempted to foster the belief that removing Assad from power was a
genuine possibility, and that such an action could be made possible
through endogenous channels by Syrians. While each of these cartoons
challenges Assad’s authority, the final cartoon shown, Figure 5.5, chal-
lenged the relationship between Assad and Syria most directly by likening
Assad to Qaddafi, and this led agents of the regime to violently attack
Farzat. In resorting to violently attacking Farzat after he released Figure
5.5, the regime revealed its particular sensitivity to both discourse that
influences perceptions of Assad’s ability to remain in control of Syria and
undermines narratives that present Syria as a unique landscape that
cannot be related to political phenomena outside of its borders.
5.2 Caricature of a Neighbor
The regime’s concern with how Assad’s ability to coerce is portrayed and
discussed within Syria may be intuitively appealing, as well as supported
empirically, but what is the relationship between interpersonal trust and
the regime’s strength? Throughout the tenure of the Assad regime, a sys-
tematic attempt to reduce interpersonal trust and cooperative behavior can
be inferred from the behavior of the government. This occurred through
both the dismantling of civil society and non-governmental sub-state
organizations, and the promotion of an extreme form of cult of person-
ality that encouraged, if not required, citizens to frequently and blatantly
lie about their beliefs and opinions related to the Assad family. The Syrian
regime’s manipulation of interpersonal trust operates as a low-cost
mechanism for preventing collective action against the government, and
increasing the regime’s power relative to any potential opponents (Wedeen
1998).
The coercive capacity of any entity can only be assessed in relation to
the ability of the target to resist such coercion. A government that pos-
sesses large reservoirs of power in one environment may be relatively weak
in another due to the strength of the opposition in that environment
(Hirschman 1978). Thus, a state’s relative coercive capacity does not only
increase when its own resources and tools increase, its ability to coerce
also increases when the target’s ability to resist coercion decreases. Since
collective action is inherently a social endeavor, by reducing the capacity
of citizens to create the kind of bonds necessary to successfully collectively
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act, a state can increase its relative coercive capacity. It is for this reason
that the Assad regime dedicated resources to reducing social capital and
interpersonal trust in Syria, particularly in the major urban centers of
Aleppo and Damascus.
The efforts of the Assad regime to suppress the rise of civil society and
non-governmental organizations in Syria have been well documented. While
Hafez and, subsequently, Bashar slowly instituted economic and political
reforms intended to provide a modicum of liberalization to its closed
system, such reforms rarely extended to the domain of civil society
(Hopfinger and Boeckler 1996; Wedeen 2013; Hinnebusch 1993, 1995;
Heydemann and Leenders 2013).10 This aversion to opening up the doors
to autonomous associational life is not merely the product of elite pre-
ferences. While limited economic liberalization allowed for more competi-
tion in the marketplace, the increased privatization of the provision of
social services in Syria would have led to greater levels of cooperation to
occur outside of the immediate control of the regime. This, in turn, would
have led to social network structures that could potentially produce poli-
tical competitors, and increase the belief that others in society are willing
to cooperate to achieve their goals independent of the government. Unlike
in Egypt under Mubarak, where the state’s inability to provide adequate
services led to the increased tolerance of a robust and autonomous civil
society (Berman 2003), the Syrian regime did not provide avenues for the
formation of autonomous associations capable of delivering social ser-
vices. Where associations that brought people together in Syria were
allowed to take hold, such associations were either directly or indirectly
under the control of the Ba’ath Party, government institutions or officials,
or members of the political elite who were the primary beneficiaries of the
political paradigm in Syria. Not only did these associations reinforce cli-
entelistic and authoritarian norms, they further highlighted the inability of
individuals to cooperate without the assistance of the regime. Thus, the
Syrian regime allowed for limited privatization of the economic domain
since this did not represent a significant long-term threat to the regime
without privatization extending to associational life as well.11
The Assad regime’s efforts to reduce social capital were not just rele-
gated to its suffocation of associational life in Syria. The cult of personality
and culture surrounding acceptable discourse in Syria fostered an atmo-
sphere of mistrust (Wedeen 1999). As has been noted, the cult of person-
ality created in Syria went beyond the realm of forcing individuals to
repeat believable lies regarding the regime and the Assads, and well into
the territory of the absurd (Wedeen 1998). Through the promotion of
rhetoric that contains blatant lies, the Syrian regime was able to coerce
citizens into actively signaling their unwillingness to bear the costs of
challenging the regime, as well as their willingness to lie to protect them-
selves from the regime (Wedeen 1998). While such lies accentuated the
perception that other citizens were not willing to contribute to any
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resistance, the mere decision to operate within the boundaries of accep-
table critical discourse within Syria signaled an individual’s unwillingness
to risk challenging the regime.
Moreover, through the government’s ability to shape discourse through-
out Syria, they were able to control the type of criticisms of the regime
that proliferated, and tie those criticisms to the social dimensions of life in
Syria. Through their manipulation of critical representations of the
regime, Assad and his allies were able to use such representations to their
advantage by deflecting much of the blame for the political paradigm in
Syria on the unwillingness of Syrians themselves to bear the costs of
bringing about positive change. Thus, even discourse that was critical of
the Assad regime often served to foster a paradigm that was favorable for
political elites. Such discourse did not only present the regime as strong,
but also often presented a regime that relied on the cowardice and
untrustworthiness of citizens to maintain dominion over Syria.
There is no paucity of critical political discourse in Syria. For a state
that has been characterized by rigid restrictions on speech, absolute
authoritarian rule, and a capable security apparatus, throughout the reigns
of both Hafez and Bashar Al Assad, Syria has produced a wide array of
artistic material that presents criticisms of the regime and the social order
in Syria, much of which has been tacitly or expressly authorized by gov-
ernment agents. While such discourse rarely directly referred to Assad or
specific individuals within the regime prior to the Arab Spring, their
intended target was often made clear to those familiar with the political
terrain in Syria. On television, a heavily regulated and controlled broad-
cast medium in Syria both before and after the regime began to tacitly
allow satellite television to proliferate throughout the country; Syrians are
often presented with depictions of their government and its relationship to
the ordinary citizen in an unfavorable light.
The various works of Duraid Lahham, the collaborative effort that
produced the satirical sketch comedy show Spotlight (Buqa’t Al Daw), and
Yasser Al Athma’s groundbreaking comedy series Maraya, have all been
held up as examples of the poignant, yet cryptic, sarcastic, and often dark,
commentary on political and social relations that can be found in Syria.12
Such works often provide metaphorical, or at least fictional, representa-
tions of the political and social dynamics in Syria, and the logic and tone
of such representations abound in every day discourse throughout Syria.13
These works and discussions touch upon the relationship between the
citizenry and the regime, and seldom present either in a particularly
favorable light. While this analysis could have suitably chosen any one of a
number of different artistic representations relating the Syrian political
system to society, it will focus on a particular episode of Maraya to illus-
trate the relationship between interpersonal trust and the regime’s relative
coercive capacity as viewed through the eyes of those critical of the
regime.14 Moreover, given the scarcity of data from Syria on interpersonal
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trust and social capital, such representations may help shed light on Syrian
perceptions of the trustworthiness of individuals in their country, and the
relationship that this shares with the strength of the Assad regime.
The relevant episode of Maraya aired in 2004 and depicts an intelli-
gence agent searching for information about an individual in what appears
to be a neighborhood of Damascus.15 It begins with an intelligence agent
being called into his manager’s office and given an assignment. His
assignment is to go into the field and look into the background of the
Engineer Shakr and his family.16 His manager tells him that the public has
a negative perception of the intelligence apparatus, and for him to go out
and obtain information on the Shakr family without using the old techni-
ques. Rather than using force, he is asked to approach people in a
respectable manner to procure information from them. The agent appears
befuddled by this request, and has trouble initially questioning the first
individual he encounters due to his inexperience with conducting his job in
a respectful manner.
The first person the agent questions is a store owner who appears to sell
goods at questionable prices.17 After purchasing a box of milk at an exor-
bitant rate while struggling to restrain himself from losing his temper, the
intelligence agent politely and calmly reveals to the store owner that he is
an intelligence agent. This revelation immediately strikes fear in the store
owner, who subsequently begins to apologize for a joke that was told in his
store. He soon begins to name the person who told the joke, and states
adamantly that he did not laugh when it was told. The intelligence agent
cuts off the store owner, telling him that they can return to the subject of
the joke at another time, and that he wanted to inquire about another
subject. After asking the store owner about the Engineer Shakr’s family,
the store owner proceeds to tell the agent about the family in excruciating
detail while also claiming to have not known the family very well. These
details are tinged with the store owner’s nationalistic tone, but are all see-
mingly innocuous and minor. Nevertheless, the intelligence agent pays
close attention to all of the remarkably unremarkable observations the
store owner has remembered about Shakr and his family, who had moved to
the neighborhood two years prior to this investigation. Among the obser-
vations the store owner makes are: 1) Shakr shops at another store; 2) His
daughter only eats large bars of foreign chocolate, and claims to be allergic
to Syrian chocolate; 3) His son prefers physics to chemistry despite the fact
they pay a physics tutor a significant amount to tutor him; 4) Neither Shakr
nor his son have a particularly strong command of the Arabic language; and
5) The family both lives an extravagant lifestyle and is cheap. After
unloading a long list of details about the family, the store owner points the
agent to the Shakr family’s former neighbor, Haifa, who he claims can
provide the agent with more information than him. This scene ends with
the intelligence agent leaving the store, and the store owner frustrated that
he forgot to mention that the Shakr family only buys skim milk.
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Haifa, who also claims to not know the family very well, picks up where
the store owner left off by discussing the family’s preferred variety of milk.
After providing a long list of details of her own regarding the family, she
points him to another neighbor whom she claims knew the family better
than her. Although no one points to any real indiscretion on the part of
Shakr or his family, none of these neighbors of the Shakr family present
them in a positive light, presumably because they believe that the agent is
investigating them due to their suspected involvement in politically unac-
ceptable behavior. All of those questioned both attempt to distance him or
herself from the family, while also providing the agent with minute details
about the family discussed in a manner that conveys general disapproval
with the family’s choices and decisions. The one exception to this is the
trash collector who, while familiar with the details of the family, neither
distances himself from them, nor presents them in a negative light.
The agent himself is unaware of the purpose of his investigation. After
concluding his interviews, the agent returns to his manager to deliver the
product of his work. The manager is astounded by the amount of infor-
mation he has collected, and remarks that the whole agency would not
have been able to gather all of the information he obtained in two days.
The agent then tells him that he believes that they should go take Shakr by
force and bring him in for questioning. At this point the manager realizes
that the agent has no idea why he was conducting the investigation, and
informs the agent that Shakr has been nominated to fill a ministerial post
and that is why the intelligence agency needed to explore his background.
The security apparatus in this episode of Maraya is not presented as
omnipotent, nor even particularly competent. The agent was sent on a
mission to obtain information regarding Shakr and his family, but was not
provided with details of what he was investigating. His manager, while
informed of the purpose of the investigation, does not think to provide this
information to the agent prior to the agent going out into the field. The
only instructions the agent receives is to refrain from utilizing the older,
more strong-handed techniques when questioning people. The agent see-
mingly struggles with this simple task, and does not appear to be trained
in conducting an interrogation without utilizing violence or the threat of
violence. Nevertheless, the agent was able to obtain more information than
the agency expected him to obtain.
Moreover, by the manager’s own admission, the whole agency could not
have obtained the information as efficiently as the agent did. The man-
ager’s surprise at the amount of information the agent obtained indicates
that the manager did not expect the experiment to be so successful. What
the manager had pitched as a way of enhancing the public perception of the
security apparatus turned into a successful strategy for obtaining the necessary
information.18 While the agent refrained from threatening the individuals
he questioned, the threat of coercion existed through the position he held.
The old, violent methods of the regime may not have been necessary for the
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agent to obtain the information, but the previous use of violence con-
tributed to the willingness of the individuals to cooperate with the authorities.
The combination of his affiliation with the security apparatus of the Assad
regime, and the willingness of individuals to divulge that information to
the regime resulted in the agent being able to obtain the information
without resorting to force.
When the agent divulged his position as a member of the intelligence
agency, the store owner did not simply grow fearful and absolve himself of
wrongdoing, he noted a minor incident involving a joke that the agent was
unaware of and immediately attempted to shift the blame on to somebody
else. The store owner, without prompting, states:
You are from security. You are welcome and hello. It is a pleasure
meeting you, brother, but as God is my witness, it was not me who
told the joke. It was Abu Sa’id the butcher who told the joke, and he
said he heard it from his brother-in-law. And believe me, brother,
when the joke was told here in my store, I did not laugh. I did not
laugh at all.
(Maraya 2004)
The immediate reaction of the store owner was to turn on his friend prior
to being asked about the incident or Abu Sa’id. This portrayal of a typical
local convenience store owner goes beyond insinuating that individuals in
Syria are unwilling to bear the costs associated with resisting the govern-
ment. This individual is willing to turn his back on others in order to
prevent any potential harm from occurring to him, however remote the
possibility that any harm will actually be inflicted. Not only can coopera-
tion not be expected from others, they cannot be trusted with private
information regarding political preferences. Assad’s regime and its sup-
porters are not the only threat to those seeking regime change; those who
surround you are accomplices to the regime.
The store owner’s fear-induced testimony quickly turned into an enthu-
siastic and detailed description of the lives of the Shakr family. This
enthusiasm was highlighted by the store owner’s disappointment at
neglecting to note the family’s milk preferences. His zeal, however, was
only surpassed by that of the neighbors who the agent subsequently inter-
viewed. There was no hesitancy on the part of any of the individuals to
immediately cooperate with the agent. While a single store owner’s
untrustworthiness may not send a message about society as a whole, each
of the individuals interviewed showed little concern for the wellbeing of
the Shakr family.19
More striking than the speed with which each of the individuals
divulged the minutiae of the lives of the Shakr family is how each
attempted to distance themselves from the family. Both the store owner
and Haifa did this explicitly by claiming that they did not know the family
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particularly well. The agent reveals near the end of the episode the list of
individuals whom he questioned, and states that each apologized to him
for not having much information for him since they did not know the
family well. Beyond distancing themselves explicitly from them, with the
exception of the trash collector, each person placed space between him or
herself by implying that he or she was not favorably disposed to the Shakr
family. The shop keeper subtly challenges their patriotism by discussing
their daughter’s aversion to Syrian chocolate, Shakr and his son’s gramma-
tical errors when writing or speaking in Arabic, Shakr’s foreign educational
credentials, and the family’s use of English in daily conversations. All of those
interviewed present the family as different from the people in the community.
While the trash collector discusses the family using more positive adjec-
tives to describe them, ostensibly he, himself, would be from outside of the
social and economic orbit of the other members of this community.
The familiarity of the Shakr family’s neighbors with the details of their
lives presents an inherent contradiction to the claim that they do not know
the family very well. The neighbors are either their friends and lying to the
agent, or eavesdropping on the family and taking careful note of all of
their actions and tendencies. The fact that the Shakr family has only lived
at their current address for two years implies that, perhaps, they do not
know the family well relative to their other neighbors. Their apologies for
not knowing more about the Shakr family indicates that they have more
details about other members of their community. Either interpretation
would imply that it is an environment in which others are not to be trus-
ted, particularly considering the context in which this information about
the Shakr family is being revealed.
The agency would not have been able to efficiently collect the informa-
tion about the Shakr family without their neighbors both actively collect-
ing information about the Shakr family and possessing a willingness to
readily disclose this information to the authorities. Yasser Al Athma
frames the government’s tactics as representative of a new strategy that
utilizes softer mechanisms of interrogation that rely on the willing com-
pliance of citizens. Although such a tactical shift may have occurred to
some degree under the rule of Bashar Al Assad, this depiction of others
watching and taking note of the actions of others for the benefit of the
government is not new (Wedeen 2013). Figure 5.1, Ali Farzat’s cartoon
that features a man with the head of a tape recorder listening in on the
conversation of the neighboring table, succinctly makes virtually the same
point and was published under the rule of Hafez. The regime’s exploita-
tion of the social dynamics within Syria, and the perception that a paucity
of trustworthiness exists within the state, is not new, but has developed
into a long-standing tradition.
Also of note is the regime’s analysis of the information that was col-
lected by the agent. The agent had presumed that Shakr was viewed as a
potential enemy of the regime, and recommended that they bring him to
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their department using force. The manager laughs at this recommendation
without having examined the files that the agent presented to him. Pre-
sumably, had Shakr been investigated for more nefarious purposes, the
results of the investigation would have led to the agent’s recommendation
being followed. While the regime utilizes ordinary citizens to collect
information, the application of that information is at their discretion and
not according to any legal or regulatory code. Shakr’s status as a potential
high level official means that the innocuous testimonials of the neighbors
will not pose a threat to him. Citizens contribute to the maintenance of
the regime, but do not sway the decisions of the regime, nor the actions of
government officials.
While this episode of Yasser Al Athma’s Maraya provides an insightful
glimpse into domestic perceptions of the intersection between social
dynamics and the coercive capacity of the state within Syria, it is hardly
unique in its portrayal of Syrians as untrustworthy. In a remarkably apt
exemplification of the collective action problem, a 2011 episode of Maraya
presents the story of a village anticipating the visit of an important gov-
ernment official to their village. The villagers decided to each pour a cup
of their own honey into a large crock, and present it to the official. Each
villager, preferring to cut their own costs and assuming that others will
pour honey into the crock, decides to pour a cup of water into the crock
instead. In the end, the official is presented with a large crock of water that
the villagers present as honey. Each villager preferred to free ride on the
contributions of others, and thus no honey was contributed to the gift.
5.3 Off the Equilibrium Path: Protesting Without Trust
The mistrust and fear that had been actively fostered by the regime under
both Hafez and Bashar Al Assad paid dividends in Damascus and Aleppo
in the aftermath of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. While Syria
was a late entrant into the Arab Spring, the March protests that hit Daraa
in 2011 produced a revolutionary fervor in Syria that many had believed
could topple the regime. In a sense, the protests that grew from the arrest
and torture of a group of young boys in Daraa were a necessary second
spark needed to bring about a larger movement. While protesters in
Damascus had been inspired by what they had observed in Egypt, Tunisia,
and elsewhere, they recognized that Syria presented challenges unique to
their situation.20 When Daraa’s protests gained steam, sympathetic rum-
blings spread throughout the country, but never managed to approach the
critical threshold in Damascus necessary to challenge the regime in the
capital.
While the relationship between the grievances being addressed by pro-
testers likely varied considerably by region, they also varied by age, and
whether a person had experienced the regime of Hafez Al Assad, or had
primarily awakened politically during the reign of Bashar Al Assad. A
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young protester who was in college during the time of the protests notes
that prior to the Arab Spring, he had largely held a positive opinion of
Bashar Al Assad while simultaneously holding a negative opinion of the
regime (Interview #1, 2016). A slightly older protester who had gone through
adolescence under Hafez Al Assad did not bear the same positive senti-
ment toward Bashar as the younger protester (Interview #2, 2016). Both
individuals cite corruption and the state’s repressive security apparatus for
opposing the regime, but the older protester had significantly more direct
experiences with the state security apparatus during his adolescence than
the younger protester despite not having been involved in any political
movement in his youth.21 For the younger protester, his primary grie-
vances related to corruption, and its seeming omnipresence throughout
society.22 Moreover, for the younger protester, the Tunisian revolution
sparked an interest in reexamining the history of the regime, and led him
to anticipate future grievances. Thus, while the younger protester had
experienced a fraction of the repression that the older protester had
experienced, the past behavior of the regime led the younger protester to
anticipate that the behavior of the regime would cause himself and others
to fall victim to the repressive security apparatus of the regime. This did
not dampen the enthusiasm of younger protesters, however, as both the
prospect of regime brutality and the corruption they had been exposed to
provided them with sufficient motivation to join the protests.23
Throughout my interactions with individuals who were involved in the
non-violent protests in Damascus, what stood out the most was the
extreme level of prudence and judiciousness exhibited by them during their
participation in the protests. At one point during the protests, commu-
nications between myself and protesters were relegated to empty virtual
poker rooms on Zynga’s Facebook poker application due to a function
that allows you to see when somebody enters the room, and the belief that
communications on the app were less easily tracked by the government
and its agents.24 While open Facebook pages and groups did exist to
communicate information about the uprising, and often tried to announce
calls to action on specific days, most of the protesters in Damascus orga-
nized through secret Facebook groups that were limited in terms of reach
and participation. Of the participants in the group whom I knew, each had
joined the group with a Facebook account that used a nickname that
would only be familiar to those close to the individual.25 Such care was
the product of an overriding fear of the security apparatus and the reach it
has throughout Syria.
This fear, while seemingly universal, did not appear to grip younger
protesters to the same degree that it had touched protesters who were
adolescents during Hafez Al Assad’s reign. An anecdote relayed to me by
the “older protester” noted above provides a glimpse into the fear that
touched those who had grown up with Hafez Al Assad as their president.
He traveled to Midan from a northern suburb of Damascus on a Friday
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during the early stages of the uprising, and waited outside of a mosque for
the protest to begin. When the Friday prayer had finished, individuals
exited the mosque and began to shout a number of different slogans typi-
cal during that period of the protests. The “older protester” marched with
them and tried to shout, but found himself unable to speak initially.
Eventually, he was able to shout along with the other protesters during the
short march, but he was taken aback by his inability to shout slogans
against the regime. Later, he reached out to other protesters whom he had
long-standing relationships with and told them about his experience. These
protesters, who were approximately the same age as him, reassured him
when they told him that they had also experienced the same phenomenon
when they first attempted to shout at a protest.26 The “younger protester”
experienced no such paralysis when he joined his first protest that began in
the Umayyad Mosque, but did note that he was afraid at the time. More-
over, both note that many of these initial protests shied away from speci-
fically mentioning Assad, which represents a tacit form of compliance with
the norms engrained into Syrian society by the regime.27
While fear played a crucial role in shaping the behavior of protesters,
much of this fear was not simply the product of the belief that the security
apparatus possessed significant technological advantages over them, but a
belief that the security apparatus had covert agents in every corner. Pro-
testers communicated to me during the protests, as well as in interviews
afterwards, that they had not exchanged their real names with others
during any protest. Generally speaking, cooperation between protesters ran
almost exclusively through preexisting networks, and protesters did not
generate new connections with other protesters. On the rare occasions
where new connections were made, they were made only on the basis of a
recommendation presented by a close and trusted friend. None of those
who discussed their protest activity noted ever meeting a stranger without
a referral during the course of their participation in the uprising.
Furthermore, the protesters themselves did not expect that strangers
would trust them enough to reveal their true identities to them.28 One
individual noted that he had attempted to reach out to another protester
regarding organizing together. They began discussions, but neither could
trust the other enough to collaborate effectively, and no cooperation took
place. While protests grew in the aftermath of the incidents in Daraa in
areas where the preexisting social order allowed for greater collaboration,
those in Damascus remained small and heavily decentralized.29 As noted
by the same protester, “Trust was a big problem for us.”
The formal model presented in Chapter 3 was framed as the exploration
of the decision to delegate the duty to punish the government through a
political entrepreneur or navigate more familiar and trustworthy networks,
yet the model is equally applicable to the decision to trust any other self-
proclaimed member of the opposition. By trusting another protester with
her or his own personal information, a network connection is made that
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allows for them to coordinate more efficiently. This increased utility
deriving from developing a new network connection, however, comes at a
cost derived from the risk that the other person will pass along your
information to the regime. Where the risk is too high that the other person
cannot be trusted with your personal information, an individual will turn
to her or his preexisting network of confidants. Where the size of this net-
work is small, should they choose to utilize non-violent protest over other
means, their actions are unlikely to be efficient or produce any meaningful
results. Moreover, where an opposition movement is characterized by
these small networks that have few bonds between them, the movement as
a whole is unlikely to be able to coordinate and collaborate at a level suf-
ficient to bring about their desired results. Thus, interpersonal trust does
not only condition an individual’s belief regarding the likelihood of pro-
tests succeeding, it directly affects the development of broad networks
necessary to mobilize large-scale collective action.
In Damascus, a group of protesters were committed to a specific set of
tools of resistance, namely the use of non-violent methods of protest to
challenge the regime. Small sub-groups of these protesters collaborated
with one another through secretive channels to organize protests, but these
communities were based on pre-existing networks that had developed
organically prior to the Arab Spring. These networks, while seemingly
demographically skewed, did not break down along sectarian divisions.
One protester adamantly noted the non-sectarian nature of his network,
and highlighted that one of his closest compatriots was a member of a
prominent Alawite family in Syria.30 None of the anecdotes or interviews
conducted indicated that individuals tended to split along the lines of kin
networks. Protesters turned only to their pre-existing likeminded friends
for collaboration, if they turned to anybody at all.31 These networks were
small, inefficient, and never managed to produce any tangible results in
Damascus.
The intent of this discussion is not to undermine the importance of
other potential explanations for why the protest movement during the
Arab Spring did not gain steam. Certainly, the security apparatus’s coer-
cive capacity played a role, both directly, through its use of violent
repression to allocate severe costs to protesters, and indirectly, through its
fostering of the belief that anybody could be a covert agent of the regime.
The strength of the broader coercive apparatus, which included non-
governmental and non-native actors, prevented citizens from laying the
foundation for large-scale protests by allowing protests to take place on
streets, but stopping them from taking central squares that could house
large numbers of people. Moreover, a significant portion of the Damascus
population did appear to hold positive opinions of Bashar Al Assad, even
if not the regime as a whole. These factors, along with others, contributed
to stifling of dissent in Damascus, but at the heart of the non-violent
opposition’s difficulties resided the abiding mistrust fostered by the regime
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through its control of speech and use of the security apparatus before and
during the uprising.
5.4 Conclusion
The Assad regime’s restrictions on discourse and cult of personality were
not exercises in vanity. They contributed to the fostering of an environ-
ment that could be more easily manipulated and controlled should a
political spark ignite in Syria. Of fundamental concern to the regime was
that the perception of its relative coercive capacity remain high, both
through the maintenance of the belief in its own strength and the weakness
of the citizenry. By reducing generalized interpersonal trust in its main
population centers where kin, tribal, and ethnic affiliations were less sali-
ent, the regime was able to prevent a credible non-violent opposition from
arising.
The collapse and containment of civil society under the Assad regime
contributed to the reduced levels of generalized trust in Damascus and
elsewhere, but was only one of many ways in which the regime fostered the
belief among citizens that others are generally untrustworthy. The cult of
personality and restrictions on criticisms of the regime that were put in
place in the 1980s, and were modified, but continued, under Bashar’s reign
served to signal the untrustworthiness of the citizens and reinforce the
belief that the state could not be shaken. Portrayals of the regime as cruel,
dictatorial, or capable of seeing inside the minds of its citizens were
tolerated. Portrayals of the regime as weak, or potentially expendable,
were not.
The security apparatus also played a significant role in manufacturing
mistrust among the residents of Damascus. Through its active and notor-
ious use of secret agents, citizens learned to fear one another, and believe
that individuals within society were highly likely to be regime collabora-
tors. Even if they were not, they would likely cooperate with the regime if
called upon to do so. Whether individuals in Syria could be trusted during
the time of the protest or were actually highly likely to cooperate with the
regime is not testable given data limitations. The belief that other indivi-
duals were likely to be covert agents can be observed, however, and it had
a clear and demonstrable effect on the organization of non-violent pro-
tests. Where individuals protested without trust, their movements were
unable to form the type of networks necessary to produce the results they
sought.
Notes
1 Such liberalization efforts often masked a shift of economic and political power
away from the traditional military elites to economic elites more closely tied to
the Assad family. One particularly notable beneficiary of this liberalization was
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Rami Makhlouf, Bashar Al Assad’s cousin, who was said to have had a hand
in up to 50 percent of the Syrian economy. While such estimates may appear
exaggerated, they illustrate the amount of power and wealth that was chan-
neled to the Makhlouf family during Bashar Al Assad’s rule prior to the civil
war. It should also be noted that many of the liberalizing policies came with
caveats that greatly limited who could actively participate. For example, Bashar
Al Assad allowed privatized banks to open, but under institutional and reg-
ulatory constraints that greatly limited access to the Syrian market, and
ensured that the regime and its allies would maintain majority control over
such banks.
2 Lisa Wedeen covers the nuances of Syrian political discourse in sufficient detail
(Wedeen 1998). The focus of this chapter is on how interpersonal trust fits into
the narrative rather than explicating the nuances of political discourse in Syria.
Nevertheless, a brief illustration of the difficulty of interpreting political state-
ments, even relatively benign statements, made by Syrians in Syria, may help
highlight the need to utilize a structured interpretive framework. I observed a
toast that was made “to the health of the President” in a public setting in Old
Damascus (Author Notes, 2010). The individual who began the toast had long
been privately against the Assad regime, and later would become a participant
in the peaceful uprising against Assad. Those who participated in the toast
ranged from holding mildly critical views of the regime to being long-time
opponents of the political order. The tone of the toast was no different from
the tone that would be used by individuals who supported the regime. The
knowledge necessary to understand that the toast was made sarcastically
relates to the individuals making the toast, and not the words, phrasing or tone
used while making the toast. Rather than this being an aberration, it is the norm
in Syria, and, thus, it is necessary to use interpretive methods to locate the
intent, if not the truth, behind any political statements being made.
3 In the semi-structured and unstructured interviews conducted for this project,
many specifically noted that something had drastically changed in Syria, and
that the “fear was gone” after Mubarak was overthrown in Egypt. This senti-
ment echoes the conversations I had with individuals in Syria during the early
periods of the Arab Spring, including conversations that took place prior to the
protests in Daraa. While the willingness of individuals in Damascus to speak
out against the government in a very direct manner increased with each suc-
cessful uprising during the Arab Spring, as well as with rising levels of protest
activity in other parts of Syria, I noted a marked increase in the propensity and
specificity of criticisms targeting the government prior to the Tunisian Revolu-
tion gaining steam. There are no instances of public criticism of Assad noted in
my field notes, but on six different occasions between December 15, 2010 and
January 2, 2011, in public settings, individuals expressed very negative views
regarding the president’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, and the free reign he was
given over private enterprise in Syria. Sharp and direct criticisms of the cor-
ruption and government incompetence were also noted. Moreover, rather than
criticizing the government through symbolic rhetoric and sarcasm, private
conversations were often more dark and to the point than in years past. This
implies that, although the Arab Spring appears to have had a profound impact
on political discourse in Syria, Syrians were already beginning to express their
political beliefs more openly prior to the Arab Spring.
4 It should be noted, however, that while Farzat has significant and strong ties to
Damascus, he was born in, and is from a family associated with, Hama, the
site of the Syrian regime’s most brutal massacre.
5 This inference can be gleaned from Wedeen (1999), but is also backed up by
my own field notes from 2010–2011 in Syria, interviews conducted for this
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project, as well as anecdotal evidence based upon interactions with Syrians in
and outside of Syria. In one particularly striking example of how unique Syr-
ians view their politics and political commentary, an individual remarked to
me, outside of the context of a formal interview, that only a Syrian could fully
understand Syrian political satire.
6 This does not imply that Farzat’s work never targeted other regimes, nor does
it mean that his cartoons never provided criticisms of generic archetypes of
Middle Eastern governments.
7 Although only of tangential relevance to this immediate project, it should be
noted that the crossing of these boundaries did not become commonplace until
after protests in Daraa occurred. While the exogenous shock of protests and
uprisings in other Arab states did lead to increased political activity in Syria,
discourse in Syria surrounding the Syrian regime did not fundamentally change
until a spark from within Syria signaled to individuals that what occurred
elsewhere may also be possible in Syria.
8 As Farzat himself has noted in a number of interviews, his primary objective in
portraying Assad during the Arab Spring was to reduce the fear that paralyzed
political opposition in the past (Samar Media 2012).
9 The regime has denied responsibility for the attack, but reports from Farzat
and witnesses, as well as circumstantial evidence, clearly point in the direction
of the regime (Samar Media 2012; Bakri 2012).
10 It should be noted that Hinnebusch’s 1993 article presumes that along with
increased privatization in Syria, there will be an increase in civil society, but
allows for the possibility that such civil society may be linked thoroughly
enough to the regime to enforce authoritarian norms. Economic liberalization
in Syria, however, did not appear to bring about any significant rise in auton-
omous civil organizations. To some degree, this may be due to which groups
were the primary beneficiaries of efforts to liberalize Syria’s economy, as well as
the strict limitations placed on associational life in Syria. While the rise of
forums for political discourse and associational endeavors that was witnessed
during the Damascus Spring may indeed provide evidence for the notion that
economic liberalization led to an increased demand for civil society, the regime’s
swift dismantling of that civil society evinces its unwillingness to liberalize
along this dimension.
11 Had the regime instituted more robust liberalizing measures, such economic
privatization may have led to alternative sources of power as well. The regime,
however, under both Hafez and Bashar did not allow liberalization to lead to
the rise of elites capable of challenging the regime. The primary beneficiaries of
liberalization were individuals who can be characterized as members of the
regime itself. Moreover, government corruption served to prevent the transition
of small businesses into larger sources of economic power, and brought them
under the control of regime insiders, often directly under the control of mem-
bers of the Makhlouf or Assad families. In addition, the government instituted
formal mechanisms that gave it significant control over the conduct and
operation of private entities.
12 The case of Duraid Lahham provides a particularly cogent example of the
ability that systems of preference falsification have to mask the willingness of
individuals to protest against authoritarian rule (Kuran 1989, 1991). Prior to
the Arab Spring, Duraid Lahham played a fundamental role in any discussion
regarding dissident discourse in Syria. He and Yasser Al Athma were among
the most notable individuals involved in the production of comedies that were
critical of the Syrian regime (Wedeen 1998). This led many to expect that
Duraid Lahham would come out in support of the Syrian protesters during the
Arab Spring. Instead, he vocally and forcefully voiced his support for Bashar
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Al Assad’s regime (Alhakim 2012). Thus, while having played a critical role in
shaping dissident discourse prior to the Arab Spring, the mechanisms in place
in Syria that were meant to prevent individuals from directly communicating
their willingness to support collective action movements against the regime did
create noise with regards to the signals that he sent prior to the Arab Spring.
The signals he and other Syrians sent regarding their political preferences prior
to the Arab Spring were not credible signals of their actual willingness to
oppose the regime.
13 This can be gleaned from both my own anecdotal experiences and fieldwork
notes from Syria, as well as the work of Lisa Wedeen on Syria before and after
the Arab Spring (Wedeen 1998, 2013).
14 While a number of different episodes of various television shows were con-
sidered for inclusion, this particular episode provided the most lucid and direct
portrayal of the relationship between the social dynamics of Syria and the
regime’s ability to maintain control.
15 This inference is not made due simply to the appearance of the locations in
which the episode was filmed. Yasser Al Athma often highlighted the location
of each episode through the use of various regional accents, along with filming
in either rural or urban settings. His use of the Damascene accent for this epi-
sode indicates that this commentary is particularly related to the political and
social atmosphere in Damascus, although it does appear to also serve as his
default. In addition, based upon the architecture and landscape, the location of
the episode is set in the upper middle-class neighborhood of the Dummar
Projects (Mashro’ Dummar) area of Damascus. The neighborhood experienced
an economic uptick prior to the uprising in Syria, and has been considered one
of the most affluent and desirable locations to live in near Damascus. Never-
theless, the Dummar Projects around the time of the release of this episode was
an up-and-coming middle-class neighborhood, primarily known as a neigh-
borhood for the educated members of the middle class who were not a part of
Damascus’ political or economic elite.
16 The title, engineer, is used in Syria and throughout the Arab world for those
who work as engineers or have obtained degrees in engineering. The title is
similar to that afforded to doctors in the United States, as well as in other parts
of the world.
17 We learn this almost immediately, as this scene begins with the agent buying a
personal-sized box of milk at the exorbitant rate of 30 Syrian Pounds, well
above the price for the product at the time that the episode aired. Later, the
store clerk complains about Shakr usually buying goods from a market further
away, despite his store selling products at a reasonable price. He also notes that
Shakr was angry when he discovered that the store owner double-charged him
for a product.
18 The request made by the manager may have, in fact, been due to the nature of
the inquiry, which was a simple background check of a potential minister
rather than an investigation of a potential dissident or threat to the regime.
19 The implication here is not that Syrians are untrustworthy, but, rather, that the
perception in Syria of people generally being untrustworthy is relatively deep-
rooted and widespread. Having noted that, as shown in Chapter 3, when my
conceptualization of trust and inequality aversion is applied to the prisoner’s
dilemma, a lack of trust among trustworthy people may lead them to take
seemingly selfish actions that are often attributed to untrustworthy people.
20 This is reflected in both my author notes from 2011 and 2012, as well as two
semi-structured interviews that took place in 2016 (Author Notes, 2011;
Author Notes, 2012; Interview #1, 2016; Interview #2, 2016). In both inter-
views, the interviewees noted, without prompting, that they recognized that the
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situation in Syria made it more difficult of a terrain for the opposition to
navigate than Tunisia or Egypt. Discussions that took place with future
protesters prior to Daraa also indicate an appreciation for the difficulties
associated with organizing an opposition movement in Syria. Neither my
notes nor the interviews indicate that protesters felt that these difficulties were
due to social conditions. All individuals that I had interacted with had indi-
cated that their fears were largely related to the level of brutality the regime
was willing to engage in.
21 In particular, Interviewee #2 stated, “You know how it was, we would be slapped
walking into the station and slapped walking out of the station.” He goes on
to discuss at length the pervasiveness of the security apparatus and the terrifying
atmosphere in Syria in the 1990s (Interview #2, 2016).
22 Interviewee #1 led off his discussion of grievances with an anecdote about
bribing a police officer and followed it up with discussions related to others
paying for grades at his university (Interview #2, 2016).
23 Interviewee #2 notes that college students and younger individuals were the
most active in the protest movement, and he attributes this to their campus
communities (Interview #1, 2016). The experiences of Interviewee #1 also
reveal a vigor for political activity, but much of that activity appeared to take
place without the active communication and coordination of these activities
with others (Interview #2, 2016). Moreover, as has been noted by other scholars,
youth involvement in the Arab Spring protests may be the product of more
complex underlying reasons than the direct grievances they have experienced
(Hoffman and Jamal 2012).
24 I could not validate whether this mode of communication was, in fact, more
secure than other messaging and chat systems (Author Notes, 2011).
25 I had been invited to and joined three private Facebook groups dedicated to
organizing protests. In each of the groups, I recognized the accounts of a
number of individuals, none of whom utilized their real names or photos of
themselves. These groups, moreover, were not of tangential importance to the
protesters; they were one of the most crucial tools for organizing protests in
2011 and 2012 (Author Notes, 2011; Interview #1; Interview #2).
26 Interviewee #2 went on to note that the protest was short-lived and ended upon
them reaching a central square that had been blocked off by security personal
along with non-government personnel whom he identified as “Shabiha”
(Interview #2, 2016).
27 These protests did eventually turn towards direct attacks against Assad, but in
the initial stages of the uprising, their refraining from mentioning Assad by
name mirrors Ali Farzat’s compliance with this unofficial boundary set by the
regime (Interview #1, 2016; Interview #2, 2016; Author Notes, 2011; Author
Notes, 2012).
28 This was noted directly and indirectly by Interviewee #2, and implicitly by
Interviewee #1(Interview #1, 2016; Interview #2, 2016). Interviewee #2 dis-
cussed how if names were exchanged, he would exchange a fake name, and that
the other person would also exchange a fake name. My notes from discussions with
protesters in 2011 further support the answers that the protesters interviewed
in 2016 provided (Author Notes, 2011).
29 The duration of these protests is also notable. Protesters in Damascus devised
creative ways to signal protest without placing themselves at extraordinary risk
during the initial stages of these protests. The duration of these protests was
generally less than 15 minutes, and protesters would often disperse immediately
before entering a square where security officials and regime supporters would
be awaiting them (Interview #1, 2016; Interview #2, 2016; Author Notes,
2011). The use of “tayyar” protests, which are essentially flash protests, to
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signal disapproval with the regime may have been counterproductive (Interview
#2, 2016). While such protests may signal a desire for the regime to be
removed, they also signaled fear of the regime.
Also of note is Interviewee #2’s discussion of the use of violent coercion by
security officials in Damascus, which he portrays as relatively restrained in the
early days of the uprising. As he describes it, the regime would use significant
levels of brutality outside of Damascus, while simultaneously restraining them-
selves within Damascus. The regime’s considerations regarding the use of
repression and the product of their repressive activities appear to support how
fear and anger were conceptualized by David Siegel in “When Does Repres-
sion Work?” (Siegel 2011). While the regime’s use of violent repression in
Damascus may have been more restrained than in other areas of Syria, it did
utilize violence and torture during the early stages of the protests in Damascus,
and its use of violence in Damascus escalated throughout the uprising.
30 This person also noted that he had known this individual since his days in high
school. Other details related to this individual and related to the individual
who disclosed this information have been redacted in order to protect the
individual’s identity.
31 Interviewee #1 only attended 1 out of the approximately 10 protests he parti-
cipated in with individuals whom he knew. On each of the other occasions, he
would learn of a protest, often through a secret Facebook page, and attended
the protest on his own without communicating with others directly (Interview
#1, 2016). Nevertheless, he would have needed to have been loosely associated
with a subset of individuals involved in the protests in order to be invited to
such a group.
The Syrian Protester’s Dilemma 87
6 Generalized and Particularized Trust
and Support for Terrorism
Evidence from Five Arab States
6.1 Introduction
What factors influence whether an individual supports terrorism or con-
siders terrorist activities to be acceptable tools for political resistance?
While two individuals may possess substantially similar ideological pre-
ferences and goals, those individuals may differ drastically with respect to
their beliefs regarding the appropriateness of certain tools that may be
utilized to further their preferred outcomes. Perhaps the most fundamental
concept underlying this project is that individuals will tend to utilize or
support the use of tools that they deem to be viable. Where an individual
believes that others within society are untrustworthy, that individual will
be more likely to seek out or support movements of resistance that do not
require large-scale support from those within society.
This chapter statistically examines the relationship between generalized
and particularized interpersonal trust and support for terrorism in the
Arab world. Support for terrorism, in this sense, is not necessarily active
support for terrorism in the form of financial assistance or participation in
the operational aspects of terrorism, but, rather, approval of the use of
terrorism as a tool to further political, economic, or social objectives that
align with the preferences of an individual (Bueno de Mesquita and
Dickson 2007). Such support may be active or passive, and is tied to the
perceived legitimacy of the use of terrorism rather than the role any parti-
cular individual serves in directly supporting terrorism. Moreover, while
this project generally focuses on the use of terrorism in a domestic context,
the purpose of this particular chapter is to explore the relationship
between generalized and particularized interpersonal trust and support for
the use of terrorism itself as a tool.
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to empirically test the
relationship between generalized interpersonal trust and support for ter-
rorism. Much of the scholarship on the motivations for supporting or
participating in terrorism has focused on demographic, institutional, psy-
chological, or ideological explanations (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Bueno
de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Crenshaw 1986, 2000; Sageman 2004;
Merari 2004). Chapter 3 of this book extended the literature on partici-
pation in terrorism by developing a theoretical model that integrated the
literature on terrorism with the line of work produced on social capital
and generalized interpersonal trust as explanatory variables (Putnam 1993).
This chapter is devoted to empirically testing one of the implications of
the model on survey data drawn from the Middle East.
6.2 Theoretical Implication: Interpersonal Trust and Support for Terror
While the theoretical model developed in the previous chapter dealt more
directly with participation in terrorism, the implications of the model with
regard to support for terrorism as a tool of resistance flows in a fairly
direct manner from the framework outlined earlier. Just as an individual’s
beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of others affect that individual’s pre-
ferred tool of retribution, that individual’s beliefs regarding the trust-
worthiness of others affect the form of retribution or political resistance
that they believe others who share their beliefs or preferences should take
in order to achieve the outcome that the individual desires.1 In the model
outlined in the previous chapter, reducing generalized interpersonal trust
affected an individual’s likelihood of joining a terrorist organization by
reducing the perceived viability of large-scale collective action. Similarly,
trust will have the same effect on an individual’s perception of the viability
of large-scale collective action that other individuals may participate in. So
long as a movement’s goals are congruent with that of a particular indi-
vidual, that individual will be more likely to adjust their preferences as to
which tools should be utilized by the movement based upon how viable
the available tools are. Thus, individuals possessing low levels of general-
ized interpersonal trust will be more likely to support the use of terrorism
by movements whose objectives they agree with.
H1: On average, when all other variables are held constant, an indivi-
dual possessing low (high) levels of generalized interpersonal trust will be
more (less) likely to support the use of terrorism by others in furtherance
of objectives that the individual prefers.
Although the hypothesis above is not a direct conclusion of the model
presented in the previous chapter, it is a straightforward logical extension
of an implication of the model, and evidence that would support the
hypothesis in this chapter would also, albeit less directly, provide support
for the relevant propositions derived from the formal model in Chapter 3.
Utilizing similar logic, we can extend our analysis to test a second
hypothesis related to particularized interpersonal trust. Those who have
high levels of particularized interpersonal trust should turn to smaller, less
efficient networks to address their own grievances, and prefer that others
utilize similar networks when furthering objectives that they support
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H2: On average, when all other variables are held constant, an individual
possessing high (low) levels of particularized interpersonal trust will be
more (less) likely to support the use of terrorism by others in furtherance
of objectives that the individual prefers.
The section that follows will layout the research design utilized to test the
hypothesis presented in this section, and the results of the analysis produced
through the research design will be presented in Section 6.5.
6.3 Research Design
This chapter will test the hypothesis that generalized interpersonal trust
reduces support for terrorism, and particularized trust increases support
for terrorism, via the specification of an ordered probit regression model
that will be run on survey data from the Middle East and North Africa.
The data utilized for this analysis will be multiply imputed and drawn
from the first wave of the Arab Barometer which collected data from seven
Arab countries/territories: Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Yemen (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Shamaileh 2016). Due to
potential errors regarding the data collection process in Kuwait, and
Yemeni respondents not being asked the question that is utilized as a
proxy for support for terrorism, our analysis excludes both Yemeni and
Kuwaiti respondents. The null hypotheses for our analysis are:
H0a: On average, when all other variables are held constant, an indivi-
dual possessing a higher or lower level of generalized interpersonal trust
does not affect that individual’s likelihood of supporting terrorism.
H0b: On average, when all other variables are held constant, an indivi-
dual possessing a higher or lower level of particularized interpersonal
trust does not affect that individual’s likelihood of supporting terrorism.
It is important to note that this particular chapter is not dedicated to
directly testing whether generalized or particularized interpersonal trust
have an effect on an individual’s participation in terrorism, but whether they
approve of the use of terrorism as a tool for political change.2
The dependent variable for this analysis is Support for Terrorism as a
tool for political resistance, and is operationalized through the use of a
proxy derived from a survey question that asks respondents:
“Do you agree that armed groups are justified in attacking civilians in
Iraq in order to resist the American occupation?”
Opposition to the Iraq War, and the subsequent occupation of Iraq by the
United States, was overwhelming in the Arab world during the period in
which the data for the first wave of the Arab Barometer was collected. In a
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2007 poll conducted in five different Arab countries, negative views of the
United States’ role in Iraq reached as high as 96 percent in Jordan (Zogby
International 2007). This relatively monolithic attitude toward the Iraq
War allows us to utilize this proxy since those who hold favorable opinions
regarding the occupation of Iraq by the United States do not generate an
exceedingly significant amount of noise. The use of this survey question as
a proxy is intended to capture an individual’s approval for the use of ter-
rorism to further political or social objectives (see Tessler and Robbins
2007). Responses to this question were coded as a 0 for Strongly Disagree,
1 for Disagree, 2 for Agree, and 3 for Strongly Agree.
The use of Arab Barometer data, which was funded in part by a United
States government grant, to analyze the sensitive subject of support for
terrorism in order to resist the United States’ occupation of Iraq may be
viewed as problematic. Any such fears, however, should be allayed by the
overwhelming likelihood that any misrepresentation of the beliefs of
respondents due to the sensitivity of the subject matter would likely bias
the results of this analysis in the opposite direction of the relevant
hypothesis being tested. An individual who generally does not trust others
should be less likely to truthfully state in the survey that they agree that
attacking unarmed civilians is justified. Thus, the models are more likely
to underestimate the strength of the relationship between generalized
interpersonal trust and Support for Terrorism.
The first independent variable of interest in this analysis is Generalized
Trust, and it is captured through a survey question that asked respondents:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?”
While there has been some debate regarding this question’s ability to cap-
ture the concept of generalized interpersonal trust, studies have shown it
to be a reliable measure of social capital (Glaeser et al. 2000; Anderson et al.
2004; Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Survey respondents who answered “No”
were coded as a 0, and those that responded “Yes” were coded as a 1. Due
to data limitations, alternative measures for generalized interpersonal trust
are not utilized as robustness checks in any of the regression models spe-
cified. The second independent variable of interest in this analysis is Par-
ticularized Trust, which is operationalized through the use of a question
that asks respondents which affiliation is of greatest importance to them.
Those who responded by saying their family/tribe, the smallest available
unit provided by the survey, were coded as a 1. All others who answered
the question were coded as a 0.
The primary model specified for this analysis will control for Income
and Education. Income is operationalized as a categorical variable that
ranges from 0 to 9, and corresponds to an individual’s decile ranking
within her or his country. Education also takes the form of a categorical
variable and ranges from 0, illiterate, to 6, possessing a graduate
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degree. Due to an interaction that has been observed between Income
and Education in studies on participation in terrorist activity, an inter-
action term between these two variables was also specified (Kavanaugh
2011).3
The analysis in this chapter also controlled for religious identity by
including variables that capture whether an individual identifies as a
Muslim and, among Muslims, an individual’s level of Fundamentalism.
Those who were identified as Muslims were coded as a 1, and non-
Muslims were coded as a 0. The first wave of the Arab Barometer did
not present data on religious identity in Algeria and Morocco. Given
that both countries’ populations are nearly entirely Muslim, the data for
Muslim has been coded as a 1 for all Moroccan and Algerian respondents. In
a model specified and run exclusively on Muslim respondents, a variable for
Fundamentalism was included. This variable is derived from answers to four
questions on the Arab Barometer, and ranges from 0 to 4. The variable
captures four dimensions of Islamic Fundamentalism: 1) whether Islamic
law (sharia) must be the law of the land; 2) whether women in Islam must
wear a headscarf (hijab); 3) whether Islam requires the segregation of the
sexes; and, 4) whether banks may be allowed to charge interest in a
Muslim country. Further information regarding the wording of the survey
questions used to create the variable for Fundamentalism is included in
Appendix B.
Additionally, the primary model specified in this analysis also controls
for whether an individual is a Female, an individual’s Age, whether the
respondent is Married, and the respondent’s country. Any fears or suspi-
cions regarding utilizing fixed effects via the addition of country-level
dummy variables are allayed by the large number of observations present
for each country. Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Palestine are included in
the model, and Lebanon is reserved as the reference category.
The primary regression analysis was run on a multiply-imputed dataset
that was created using the Amelia II program and the EMB algorithm
it implements (Honaker et al. 2011; Rubin 1987). Due to a significant
amount of missing data primarily related to Income, 50 imputations
were run on the dataset. In addition to the variables included in our
analysis, the imputation model includes variables related to Tribalism,
Perceptions of Male Superiority, Internet Use, Economic Conditions, Neigh-
borhood Safety, and signing Petitions. The dependent variable, Support for
Terrorism, was forced to remain ordinal due to the nature of this analysis.
All other imputed variables were left unbounded and allowed to take on the
full range of values utilized by Amelia II, as is the standard protocol (Hon-
aker et al. 2011). A parallel complete case analysis utilizing list-wise dele-
tion is included in Appendix B of this book. Appendix B also contains
diagnostics related to the imputation model and the missing data in the
raw dataset.
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6.4 Analysis
What is the statistical relationship between interpersonal trust and Support
for Terrorism among individuals in the Arab world? The regression ana-
lysis and the analysis of the predicted probabilities and first differences
that spring from the full model show substantial evidence of a negative
correlation between generalized trust and support for terrorism, and a
positive correlation between particularized trust and support for terrorism.
It should be noted that analyses of the confidence intervals of the cut
points and t-tests that were conducted demonstrate that each category of
the dependent variable, Support for Terrorism, is statistically different
from the other categories. Thus, the use of the ordered dependent variables
with four distinct categories is appropriate.4
The results of the primary regression models that were run are presented
in Table 6.1. In each of the models that is in Table 6.1, Generalized Trust is
found to be statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level, and is negatively
correlated with Support for Terrorism. Models run as robustness checks
can be found in Appendix B, and substantially support the results found in
the three models discussed within this section that include Generalized
Trust as a variable. Moreover, Particularized Trust is also significant at
p < 0.01 in each of the models run here and in the appendix. While these
results provide significant support for the hypotheses discussed, they
simply tell us that individuals who generally trust others are less likely to
be found among those who strongly agree, and more likely to be found
among those who strongly disagree, that attacks against civilians are jus-
tified. The same would apply to the results of our analysis with regard to
Particularized Trust, but with the direction of the correlation being
reversed for these categories. These results do not tell us about how gen-
eralized interpersonal trust or particularized trust relate to the likelihood
of observing a response within the middle categories. Nevertheless, these
results provide significant support for the contention that individuals who
generally trust others are less likely to support the use of terrorism.
Among the interesting tangential results of these models are those rela-
ted to Income, Education, and the interaction term for the variables. None
of these models found a significant relationship between Income and Sup-
port for Terrorism at the p < 0.05 level, and this includes the models that
were run as robustness checks and those that did not include the interac-
tion term between Income and Education. In addition, the interaction
term between Income and Education did not appear to be significant at the
p < 0.05 level in any of the models specified, including the robustness
checks in Appendix B. Education, on the other hand, did appear to be
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level in each of the models. While
this analysis indicates that Income does not share a conditional or uncondi-
tional relationshipwith Support for Terrorism, given the non-linearity of the
model, further analysis would need to be undertaken in order to determine
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whether a relationship does in fact exist. This analysis will not be under-
taken within this chapter since it falls outside of the scope of this project.5
Perhaps more interesting than the results observed with regard to
Income and Education are those related to religious identity and funda-
mentalist beliefs. Muslims did not appear to be significantly more likely to
support terrorism than non-Muslims at the p < 0.05 level in any of the
regression models that were specified. Moreover, in each of the models, an
individual identified as Muslim was, if anything, less likely to support ter-
rorism than a non-Muslim. Given the substantially homogenous nature of
the sample, however, this result may be due to the relatively few non-
Muslims in the study. More striking is the fact that Islamic Funda-
mentalism did not appear to significantly affect Support for Terrorism at
the p < 0.05 level in the model run exclusively on the Muslim popula-
tion, and was, if anything, more likely to decrease the likelihood that a
respondent supported terrorism. While this analysis was not specifically
designed to examine the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and
Table 6.1 Support for Terror – Summary Statistics





5674 0.734 0.812 0 3
Attacking Civilians
Dummy*
5674 0.147 0 1
Generalized Trust 5983 0.260 0 1
Particularized Trust 6190 0.245 0 1
Income 4218 4.519 2.78 0 9
Unemployed* 6155 0.535 0 1
Education 6178 2.752 1.748 0 6
Muslim 6190 0.881 0 1
Fundamentalism 5969 2.382 1.099 0 4
Female 6187 0.488 0 1
Age 6174 1.743 1.439 0 6
Married 6140 0.595 0.491 0 1
Algeria 6190 0.210 0 1
Jordan 6190 0.185 0 1
Lebanon 6190 0.194 0 1
Morocco 6190 0.206 0 1
Palestine 6190 0.205 0 1
*Variable only relevant for analysis in Appendix B.
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support for the use of terrorism, and this specific result was not expected,
the results achieved indirectly buttress one of the underlying themes of
this project: Participation in and support for terrorism are more directly
related to the tools of resistance that individuals believe are viable than
ideological extremism.
In order to further examine the relationship between Generalized Trust
and Support for Terrorism, predicted probabilities based on the full model
presented in Table 6.1 were calculated using Stata’s CLARIFY package,
which allowed me to incorporate the uncertainty with regards to the imputa-
tion model into the predictions that are calculated and presented. The results
of my analysis of the predicted probabilities of a Single Jordanian Muslim
between the ages of 25 and 34 andwith a primary education and income in the
5th decile are presented in Table 6.2. In the first scenario, the predicted prob-
ability of a citizen with characteristics noted above was calculated on the
basis that the individual does not trust others, and in the second scenario, the
individual does generally trust others. The first differences presented show
that we can predict with 95 percent confidence that an individual who
generally trusts others, given the characteristics noted, is less likely to agree
or strongly agree that the use of terrorism is justified in order to resist the
American occupation of Iraq, and more likely to strongly disagree with
this statement. On average, generally trusting others under the parameters
noted reduces a person’s likelihood of strongly agreeing or agreeing with
the statement supporting the use of terrorism a total of over 4 percent, and
results in an over 20 percent change in the probability that an individual
will be found to strongly agree that the use of terrorism is justified. The
results achieved for a Jordanian citizen were substantially similar to
results achieved for the predicted probabilities calculated for respondents
from the other countries in my analysis (Table 6.3).
The results achieved are even more pronounced when we analyze parti-
cularized trusters alongside generalized trusters. The predicted probability
that somebody who possesses Particularized Trust is likely to strongly
agree with the use of terror is 13.3 percent when all other variables are
held constant, as opposed to those who are not particularized trusters,
who have a probability of 10.5 percent of strongly agreeing with the use of
terror (Table 6.4). If we divide our sample between generalized trusters –
individuals who generally trust others but are not particularized trusters –
particularized trusters – individuals who do not generally trust others but
have particularized trust – and all other individuals, we can see how these
groups compare with one another. With 95 percent confidence, we can
confirm that particularized trusters are more likely to support terrorism
than generalized trusters. Particularized trusters were over 58 percent more
likely to support the use of terrorism than generalized trusters (Figure 6.1).
When we consider how small the proportion of individuals who strongly
supported the use of terrorism was, these differences are relatively large.




































































































































































































































































































































When my predicted probability analysis is viewed in conjunction with
the regression analysis that it was derived from, substantial support is
provided for the contention that Generalized Trust shares a negative
relationship, and Particularized Trust shares a positive relationship, with
Support for Terrorism. In each of the models presented in this chapter
and Appendix B, Trust appeared to be negatively correlated with Support
for Terrorism. Moreover, the analysis of the first differences of the predicted
probabilities that were calculated showed that an individual generally
trusting others decreased their probability of either agreeing or strongly
agreeing with the justifiability of attacking unarmed civilians in order to
resist the United States’ occupation of Iraq. Although the statistical
relationship observed in this analysis does not necessarily show that
generalized interpersonal trust shares a negative causal relationship with
support for terrorism, nor that particularized interpersonal trust causes
support for terrorism, it provides substantial support for the hypotheses
being tested, and generally corroborates the theoretical framework from
which it was derived.





































(Confidence Interval in parentheses)





Algeria 0.050* −0.017* −0.019* −0.014*
Jordan 0.045* −0.003 −0.020* −0.022*
Lebanon 0.051* −0.027* −0.016* −0.008*
Morocco 0.051* −0.028* −0.015* −0.007*
Palestine 0.049* −0.015* −0.020* −0.015*
* Statistically significant (95% confidence interval)
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6.5 Conclusion
What is the relationship between an individual’s level of generalized
interpersonal trust or particularized interpersonal trust and the probability
that the individual supports terrorism? This chapter provided substantial
support for the contention that individuals with low levels of generalized
interpersonal trust and/or high levels of particularized trust are more likely
to support the use of terrorism. Although the theoretical model presented
in Chapter 3 related more directly to participation in terrorism, the
underlying premises of the model lead to the conclusion that individuals
with low levels of trust will discount the likelihood of large-scale collective
action producing the desired outcome, and will, in turn, increase the
likelihood that they endorse the use of terrorism.
Societal support for terrorism not only increases the supply of potential
terrorists, it creates an environment for terrorist groups to operate and
allows these groups to further engrain themselves in the societies whose
interests they purport to represent (Mishal and Sela 2006; Bueno de Mes-
quita and Dickson 2007; English 2004). Support for the use of terror, even
when passive, increases the threat of terrorist groups sprouting up or
taking hold within a state. The findings presented in this chapter indicate
that increasing generalized interpersonal trust and social capital via genu-
inely autonomous civil associations that bring together individuals from
Figure 6.1 Predicted Probabilities for Generalized and Particularized Trusters
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various sectors of society may reduce support for the use of terrorism as a
tool of resistance (Jamal 2007).
Future work on the relationship between trust and support for, or par-
ticipation in, terrorism may be able to test the causality of the relationship
at the micro-foundational level via an experimental or quasi-experimental
research design (see Coleman and Ostrom 2011). Nevertheless, the study
presented in this chapter presents an important correlational finding,
which, when viewed in light of the theoretical framework presented earlier,
provides significant evidence of a relationship between generalized inter-
personal trust and support for terrorism as an acceptable tool for political
resistance. While this chapter presents evidence of a relationship between
generalized trust and support for attacks on civilians, it does not test
whether or not individuals are more likely to be terrorists when they gen-
erally do not trust others. The following chapter will provide further sup-
port for the key implications of the model by testing whether generalized
interpersonal trust at the country level is negatively correlated with the
number of terrorist incidents a country experiences.
Notes
1 While those surveyed in the empirical analysis that follows may not have
directly suffered any grievance due to the US invasion of Iraq, it is my conten-
tion that the relationship between generalized trust and the acceptance of ter-
rorism as tool of resistance would be similar had they directly suffered such a
grievance.
2 Nevertheless, support for the use of terrorism as tested may be an adequate
proxy for support for terrorism.
3 Appendix B contains models utilized as robustness checks that substitute
Unemployment for Income and regress Unemployment alongside Income.
4 Nevertheless, a logistic regression analysis on a binary variable that collapses
those who “Strongly Agree” with those who “Agree” and those who “Strongly
Disagree” with those who “Disagree” with attacks on civilians is presented in
Appendix B.
5 It should be noted, however, that these results do not undermine in any respect
previous studies which found income to be conditionally related to participation
in terrorism through education (Kavanaugh 2011; Bueno de Mesquita 2005). In
particular, Kavanaugh’s study, which found a conditional relationship between
income and participation in terrorism, was rooted in Bueno de Mesquita’s eco-
nomic market-based theory of terrorist recruitment rather than a theoretical
framework that relies on beliefs regarding the justifiability of the use of terror. If
anything, a negligible result with regards to income’s relationship with support
for the use of terrorism eliminates one potential alternative explanation for the
results achieved by Kavanaugh, and indirectly provides further support for the
theoretical mechanisms outlined by Bueno de Mesquita.
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7 Generalized Interpersonal Trust




Do states with lower levels of generalized interpersonal trust among their
citizens experience greater levels of domestic terrorist activity? Citizens of
any given nation who wish to challenge a government or its policies have
available to them an essentially infinite array of possible activities that they
may undertake in protest, even when they are constrained by dictatorial
rule. Why do the citizens of some nations choose to resist their govern-
ments through terrorism, while others protest utilizing means that avoid
attacking non-combatants?
While there are a number of variables that may influence the prevalence
of terrorism within a society, the central proposition of this book is that
low levels of generalized interpersonal trust lead to higher probabilities
that individuals choose terrorism and that political resistance within
societies is characterized by terrorist activity. Chapter 2 explored the Arab
Spring uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, and presented evidence of the
role that generalized interpersonal trust plays in the decision regarding
which kind of resistance movements individuals join and form in response
to similar political and economic grievances. That analysis, however, does
not present any evidence outside of the Arab world and is provided as a
motivational exploration, while this chapter will empirically analyze the
relationship between generalized interpersonal trust and domestic terror-
ism globally. This chapter will extend the theoretical framework presented
in Chapter 3 in order to provide theoretical clarity, and subsequently, test
the hypothesis that states with lower levels of generalized interpersonal
trust, on average, experience greater levels of domestic terrorist activity
utilizing a two-stage ordinary least-squares regression model.
7.2 Theoretical Extension and Hypothesis
While Chapter 3 presented a theory that related generalized interpersonal
trust to an individual’s decision to participate in terrorism, it did not
directly link generalized interpersonal trust to the prevalence of terrorism
within a state or society. The preeminent theoretical proposition presented
in Chapter 3 stated that the choice of terrorism over large-scale collective
action by an individual is the product of low levels of generalized inter-
personal trust. In other words, on average, individuals with lower levels of
interpersonal trust are more likely to participate in terrorism than indivi-
duals with higher levels of generalized interpersonal trust when all other
variables are held constant.
But how does generalized interpersonal trust affect the amount of domestic
terrorist activity a state or society experiences? If we accept the aforementioned
proposition regarding an individual’s level of generalized interpersonal trust
and their likelihood of participating in terrorism as true, we can utilize it as a
premise. We can then add the following proposition as a premise:
On average, where a condition or characteristic of individuals leads those
individuals to be more likely to participate in terrorism, a state whose
residents are more likely to possess that condition or characteristic will
experience higher levels of terrorism within their states.
If we accept these two premises as true, we can then conclude that, on
average, states whose residents possess lower levels of generalized inter-
personal trust will experience higher levels of domestic terrorism. This
produces the hypothesis that the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to
studying and testing:
Hypothesis: On average, when all other variables are held constant, a
state with higher (lower) levels of generalized interpersonal trust among
its residents will have lower (higher) levels of domestic terrorist activity.
The following section will provide an explanation of the research design
utilized to test the hypothesis above.
7.3 Research Design
The correlation between generalized interpersonal trust and domestic ter-
rorism will be tested using a two-stage least-squares regression model due
to the potentially endogenous relationship between terrorism and trust
(Blomberg et al. 2011; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006).
Studies have shown that terrorist attacks may lead to increased levels of
racial prejudice and mistrust within the attacked society (Echebarria-
Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006). Moreover, a recent cross-country
study that explored the effects of terrorism on economic performance
found that terrorism influences economic growth both directly and indir-
ectly through its effect on trust. Given the relatively intuitive reasons why
terrorist attacks may reduce generalized interpersonal trust within a
society, as well as the empirical support for the claim, the empirical
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analysis in this chapter will center on a two-stage model that attempts to
instrument trust with three variables.
The null hypothesis to be tested is:
H0: On average, when all other variables are held constant, the pro-
portion of a state’s citizenry that generally trusts others (i.e., has gen-
eralized interpersonal trust) is not correlated with the number of
domestic terrorist incidents a state experiences.
The first-stage equation will utilize ordinary least squares to estimate the
level of generalized interpersonal trust in a state. The second-stage equa-
tion will regress the coefficient estimates of interpersonal trust, along with
the other independent and control variables, on the dependent variable,
incidents of domestic terrorism. The unit of analysis is the country, and
108 countries are included in the full model. Summary statistics are
presented in Table 7.1.
7.3.1 First-Stage Equation
7.3.1.1 Instrumented Variable
The dependent variable for the first-stage equation is the level of general-
ized interpersonal Trust exhibited by individuals within a state. This
Table 7.1 Domestic Terror – Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Trust 110 24.3 13.1 3.8 74.2
Grievances 110 5.7 2.2 1 9.9
Ethnic
Fractionalization
109 0.41 0.24 0.002 0.93
Internet Usage 109 0.0075 0.0167 0.00000003 0.1259
Terrorism 110 46.5 127.4 0 877
Economic
Development
108 13491 12764 645 48157
Government
Performance
110 0.23 0.96 −1.67 2.19
Education 110 91.2 9.0 39.2 100
Unemployment 110 9.0 7.4 .9 48
Democracy 110 5.4 5.8 −10 10
Population 109 16.6 1.5 12.6 21.0
Civil War 110 0.027 0.164 0 1
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analysis will utilize data from the Legatum Institute’s Prosperity Index
(2011), where data from the World Values Surveys and the Gallup World
Polls was compiled to measure Trust in 110 countries. Trust is measured
by the normalized percentage of survey respondents in a country who
claimed to trust others. While there are mixed results regarding how well
survey measures that ask respondents whether most people are trustworthy
actually measure trust, it is a reliable measure of social capital when the
data is aggregated at the group or state level due to the relationship that
these measures share with how trustworthy individuals are (Fehr et al.
2003; Glaeser et al. 2000).
7.3.1.2 Instruments
Population Density has been speculated to reduce levels of interpersonal
trust (Rosenthal 1964), and is measured by the number of citizens per
square kilometer in a state. For this variable, I used data from the World
Development Indicators (“WDI”) for the year 2008 (World Bank 2011).
Given the relationship that the use of social networking internet sites
has been shown to have on trust (Valenzuela et al. 2009), this regres-
sion includes a variable to measure Internet usage within each state.
Internet usage per capita is operationalized as the contracted internet
bandwidth capacity of a state in megabytes per second per capita, and is
drawn from the latest WDI dataset. Given that ethno-linguistic divisions
within a state may decrease levels of Trust between people within a state, I
also include a measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Ethnic Frac-
tionalization) by Alesina et al. (2003) in the first-stage regression.
Although it could be argued that ethno-linguistic fractionalization may
lead to an increase in domestic terrorist incidents, numerous regression
models showed no evidence of an independent relationship between
ethno-linguistic fractionalization and terrorist activity, and the claim is
buttressed by other studies regarding the relationship between ethnic
fractionalization and conflict (Fearon et al. 2007). While these variables
may not be the best measures of Trust, they have been chosen since
they appear to have an effect on Trust, while there is little evidence that
they directly affect levels of domestic terrorism, and are suitable instru-
ments relative to other available options.Moreover, the addition and removal
of Ethnic Fractionalization from the first-stage equation did not appear to
significantly affect the results of my two-stage regression analysis.
Variables for age and gender were left out of this regression and the
second stage of the model since they failed to show any evidence of being
significantly related to either Trust or Terrorism. Unemployment and
education did appear to be significantly related to the number of incidents
of Terrorism in various iterations of the model, and are included in the
second stage of the model.
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7.3.2 Second-Stage Regression
7.3.2.1 Dependent Variable
In order to test my theory, I utilized a dataset assembled by Walter
Enders, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibulloev which alters the Global
Terrorism Database by distinguishing between domestic and transnational
terrorism (Enders et al. 2011). For the purposes of this project, I define
Terrorism as the threatened or actual use of force by a non-state actor in
order to induce fear and intimidation while in pursuit of a domestic poli-
tical, social, religious, or economic goal (National Consortium 2011).
Terrorism is measured by the number of domestic terrorist incidents that
occurred in a state from 2000 to 2009. Like all data on terrorist incidents,
there are significant issues with the reporting of incidents. However, the GTD
data, which Enders et al. (2011) rely upon, provides the most comprehensive
listing of domestic terrorist incidents that is publicly available.
7.3.2.2 Control Variables
In addition to the coefficient estimates from the first-stage regression, I
analyzed Economic Development’s effect on Terrorism. Economic develop-
ment is measured as the average Gross Domestic Product per capita (PPP)
from the year 2000 to 2009, and is drawn from the WDI 2011 database
(World Bank 2011). I also analyzedGovernment Performance using theWorld
Bank’s World Governance Indicators from 2009, which measures per-
ceptions of the quality of government institutions based on expert and
population survey data.
I control for the size of the Population by taking the natural log of the
average population of the state from 2000 to 2009 according to the WDI
database (World Bank 2011). The WDI database is also used to collect
data on Education, which is operationalized as the net primary enrollment
in a state in 2008. Democracy is controlled for, and operationalized as a
State’s Polity IV score from 2009 (Marshall et al. 2011). Civil War is
controlled for through the use of a dummy variable to indicate whether a
state experienced a civil war at any point in time between 2000 and 2008,
and I rely upon the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset for my
data (Marshall 2010). Historical Group Grievances are likely to decrease
Trust between citizens since past negative interactions, and the use of
scapegoating of groups viewed as outsiders by the majority population or
the government, condition beliefs about how groups will be treated by
others in the future, and increase Terrorism directly by providing indivi-
duals with a justification for committing terrorist acts. Therefore, a vari-
able for group grievances is added to the model in the second stage, and is
operationalized using the Failed States Index measure for group grievances
which ranges from 1 (lowest) to 10 (Foreign Policy 2010). Since both
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statistical tests and theory point to group grievances having a direct effect
on Terrorism, it is not treated as an exogenous first-stage variable. Finally,
the model controls for Unemployment, which is measured using Gallup
World Poll survey data from 2010 (or the most recent year) and was taken
from the Legatum Institute’s Prosperity Index (2011).
7.4 Analysis
7.4.1 Preliminary Analysis
My analysis begins with an exploration of graphical representations of the
relationship between Trust, Economic Development, Government Perfor-
mance, and Terrorism. This section will analyze data related to Economic
Development and Government Performance due to the substantial amount
of research linking Trust and social capital to these variables (Putnam
1993; Knack and Keefer 1997). My preliminary analysis indicates that
Trust, Economic Development, and Government Performance all share a
statistical relationship with levels of domestic terrorism, yet that these
relationships are vastly different, and not necessarily linear. Moreover, I
ran a simple ordinary least-squares regression that indicates that Trust is
more closely related to levels of domestic terrorism than either Economic
Development or Government Performance.
Figure 7.1 presents a graphical illustration of the relationship between
domestic terrorist incidents and generalized interpersonal trust. States with
lower levels of generalized interpersonal trust appear to have experienced
substantially more domestic terrorist attacks between the years 2000 and
2009. On average, states where less than 25 percent of the population
answered that others could be trusted experienced nearly 40 more terrorist
attacks during the time frame examined (Figure 7.2). While there appears
to be a negative correlation between Trust and Terrorism, a basic exam-
ination of the data suggests that this relationship may not be linear, and
that Trust may not have an effect on Terrorism until it crosses a certain
threshold. Moreover, the relationship between trust and terrorist activity
may be conditional upon some other variable, given the large variation in
terrorist activity between states with similar levels of trust. An examina-
tion of terrorist incidents per capita, however, is slightly more supportive
of a linear relationship between Trust and Terrorism. Testing whether the
relationship is in fact nonlinear will be reserved for future research
projects.
Economic Development also appears to be negatively correlated with
terrorist activity (Figure 7.3). Given the variation in behavior between
states, this relationship may also be conditional. More interesting, how-
ever, is the relationship between domestic terrorist activity and Government
Performance depicted in Figure 7.4. It appears as though governments
that perform either very poorly or very well experience fewer terrorist
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Figure 7.1 Generalized Trust and Domestic Terrorism
Figure 7.2 Trust Above/Below 25% and Domestic Terrorism
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attacks than those in the middle of the spectrum. While such a relationship
could be the result of Government Performance’s relationship to democracy,
and stem from dynamics explained by the “more murder in the middle”
theory, democracy appears to share a positive correlation with terrorist activ-
ity (Fein 1995).1 Although this relationship is interesting, a more nuanced
analysis of Government Performance’s relationship to Terrorism is outside
of the scope of this project’s analysis. It should also be noted that other
analyses were run that do provide some evidence of a correlation between
Trust and Economic Development that has been noted by other scholars
(Putnam 1993; Knack and Keefer 1997).More specifically, a bivariate ordin-
ary least-squares regression of Trust on Economic Development revealed
that the variables are positively correlated (p < 0.001), with an R^2 = 0.19.
The results of the ordinary least-squares regression analyses run with
the primary independent variables indicate that domestic terrorism shares
a stronger relationship with Trust than Economic Development or Govern-
ment Performance (Table 7.2). While the negative correlation between
Trust and Terrorism is statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level when
regressed alone, Economic Development is only significant at the p < 0.1
level and Government Performance does not appear to be significant. More-
over, the R2 when Trust is regressed alone against domestic terrorist inci-
dents is higher than when either Economic Development or Government
Performance is regressed alone against Terrorism. In addition, when Trust
is regressed with either Economic Development, Government Performance
or both, the coefficient remains negative and significant at the p < 0.05
level, while neither Economic Development nor Government Performance
are ever significant when regressed along with Trust. Similar results are
achieved when regressions, which are not shown in the book, were run
on terrorist incidents per capita, or when regressions were run that
controlled for population size.
Although these results are promising, the negative correlation observed
between Trust and Terrorism may be due to the effect Terrorism may have
on Trust (Blomberg et al. 2011). Statistical tests did reveal evidence of
endogeneity between Trust and Terrorism, and thus, I utilized a two-stage
least-squares model to test the hypotheses presented in this chapter.
Nevertheless, these preliminary results, when viewed in light of the evi-
dence others have shown regarding the relationship between Trust and
Economic Development, do indicate that past relationships observed between
participation in Terrorism or terrorist activity and Economic Development
may, in part, be due to Trust’s relationship with Economic Development.
7.4.2 Two-Stage Regression Results and Analysis
The results of the two-stage regression model largely provide evidence to
support the hypotheses presented earlier in the chapter. Table 7.3 shows
that Trust is negatively correlated with incidents of domestic terrorism,
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Figure 7.4 Government Performance and Domestic Terrorism
Figure 7.3 Economic Development and Domestic Terrorism


























































































































































































































































































and the result is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. Moreover,
Economic Development is not significant at the p < 0.1 level, and does not
appear to share a significant relationship with domestic terrorist activity.
While I cannot argue that Economic Development has no effect on Ter-
rorism, the results do find that it is far from significant in most models. In
addition, Economic Development does not appear to share a relationship
with Trust, indicating that Economic Development may not indirectly
affect terrorist activity through Trust. When these results are taken in
conjunction with previous work on the relationship between Trust and
Economic Development, and Economic Development’s relationship with
participation in terrorism, they would suggest that previous work tying
Economic Development to terrorist activity may, in part, be due to the
relationship Trust shares with Economic Development. It should be noted,
however, that various model specifications that excluded Trust as an
explanatory variable failed to show that Economic Development has a sig-
nificant effect on terrorist incidents, but that other studies have shown that
development broadly construed may increase domestic terrorism (Piazza
2015) and italics{Unemployment} is negatively correlated with italics
{Terrorism} in this analysis.. The analysis in this chapter was, however,
limited by the scope of the statistical exploration. The results related to
economic development should be tempered by these limitations. It is also
important to note that Ethnic Fractionalization does not appear to be sig-
nificantly correlated with Trust in the first-stage model, yet appeared
significant in other specifications. Its removal from or addition to the
model, however, does not significantly affect the results achieved.
Domestic terrorism appears to share a far more complicated relation-
ship with Government Performance than Economic Development. Govern-
ment Performance is positively correlated with Trust and is statistically
significant at the p < 0.05 level. While it is overwhelmingly likely that
Trust increases Government Performance, it is also likely that the causal
arrow runs both ways. Those who run governments are likely strangers to
most who reside within a state, and thus when they perform their duties
well, Trust in strangers is likely to increase. If Government Performance
does increase Trust, it would have an indirect negative relationship with
Terrorism. Government Performance, however, also may directly increase
Terrorism, given that it is positively correlated with domestic terrorist
incidents and this result is significant at the p < 0.1 level. Although this
result may appear surprising at first glance, this relationship may be due to
a strong government’s ability to provide subsidies to its citizens while
refusing to respond to their other domestic and foreign policy needs.
Nevertheless, the relationship betweenGovernment Performance andTerrorism
is not significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
The results of this analysis indicate that many of the variables that are
commonly associated with increasing or decreasing terrorism may share
much more complicated relationships with terrorism than previously
110 Generalized Trust and Domestic Terror
noted. Absent any indirect effect that democracy may have on terrorism
via government performance, may democracy actually increase the like-
lihood of domestic terrorism being adopted as a tool of resistence? Does a
higher level of education within a state directly decrease, or potentially
increase, the likelihood that a state experiences domestic terrorist activity,
or does an educated population pose a greater risk due to its effects on social
dynamics within a state. What exactly is the relationship between eco-
nomic performance and domestic terrorism? While the research design
presented in this chapter was not meant to analyze these issues directly,
the results presented herein suggest that these subjects will likely require
further inquiry and the development of more nuanced theoretical expla-
nations and empirical tests of the specific ways in which these variables
relate to participation in terrorism and the prevalence of domestic terrorist
activity within a state.
Nevertheless, the results above indicate that Trust shares a closer rela-
tionship with domestic terrorist activity than Economic Development or
Table 7.3 Domestic Terror – Two-Stage Least-Squares Regression (Second-Stage
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Government Performance. Neither Government Performance, nor Economic
Development, appear to share a direct negative correlation with terrorist
activity, while Trust does appear to be negatively correlated with Terror-
ism in the two-stage model. Moreover, if Government Performance does
have a negative effect on the number of domestic terrorist incidents a state
experiences, that effect appears to be indirect and tied to its relationship
with generalized interpersonal trust and social capital.
7.5 Conclusion
While the previous chapters of this book focused on the relationship
between generalized interpersonal trust and participation in or support for
Table 7.4 Domestic Terror – Two-Stage Least-Squares Regression (First-Stage
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terrorism at the individual or group level, this chapter extended the theo-
retical framework presented in Chapter 3 in order to relate it to levels of
domestic terrorism experienced by a state. This chapter builds upon my
previous exploration of three Arab Spring uprisings and presents evidence
to support the contention that levels of interpersonal trust within a state
affect the likelihood that political dissidents will utilize violence or terror-
ism. Where a state is characterized by low levels of generalized inter-
personal trust, individuals will turn to smaller insular groups to participate
in political activity and retribution, which, in turn, will lead to higher
levels of domestic terrorism within the state. The results of my quantitative
analysis largely support the hypothesis presented in this chapter, and show
a significant negative correlation between generalized interpersonal trust and
domestic terrorist activity. Although the relationship between generalized
interpersonal trust and domestic terrorism is more nuanced than the
quantitative test presented in this chapter might imply, the results of this
analysis suggest that further exploration of the relationship between
interpersonal trust and terrorism may help shed light on when and where
terrorism might arise..
Note
1 Such an argument could contend that since extremely politically free and
repressive governments utilize violent repression less often, groups will feel less
compelled to commit retributive terrorist acts. Another argument could be made
that the costs of terrorism are too high when governments are extremely
oppressive, and that democratic outlets make terrorism less appealing than
operating alternative political channels.
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8 Conclusion
The legacy left by the Arab Spring has yet to be determined, but what has
become clear in recent years is that the product of the uprisings will be far
more complicated than most anticipated when they witnessed the awe-
inspiring protests in Tahrir Square come on the heels of a successful and
peaceful revolution in Tunisia. The stagnant authoritarianism, corruption,
and brutal use of repression that characterized the politics of the Arab
world left many who were most familiar with the states relieved that
hypotheses related to the inevitability of dictatorial stability in many states
within the Middle East and North Africa had been challenged (Bellin
2004). What was lost in the excitement of the early stages of the Arab
Spring was that authoritarians are not the only, or even the fundamental,
obstacle to democracy. It is the conditions that allowed such authoritar-
ians to take root within a state that largely impede the democratic progress
of a state or society. Moreover, while there were similarities between many
of the Arab states structurally, as well as socially, each had a unique
combination of institutions, colonial and historical trajectories of devel-
opment, relationships between and among the governed and the govern-
ing, and social dynamics that exerted influence over political phenomena
(Walt 2011a; Walt 2011b).
Despite the similarities between Egypt, Libya, and Syria, they experi-
enced the Arab Spring in vastly different ways, and their subsequent
experiences after the initial moments of the uprisings also varied dramati-
cally. While Egypt enjoyed a brief, yet tumultuous, period with seemingly
democratic institutions put into place, a counterrevolution placed the
country back in the full control of the military under the leadership of
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi who subsequently took over as president.1 The elec-
tion of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi occurred in an undemocratic and repressive
environment that has seemingly continued to deteriorate with time. Egypt’s
post-Arab Spring experiences may not have produced particularly inspir-
ing results, yet it has experienced significantly greater levels of stability
than Libya or Syria.
In Libya, the loose coalition that managed to wrestle power away from
the Qaddafi regime with the assistance of the international community
never managed to coalesce to the degree required to maintain order and
establish functioning institutions within the state. The armed militias that
beat Qaddafi remained armed, challenged attempts to form a central
authority, and helped plunge the nation back into civil war as Libya’s
elected government faced an armed challenge from militias supporting the
rival General National Congress. While reconciliation efforts have had
some success, the central government remains weak and unable to exert its
authority throughout much of the country.
The situation in Syria has proven to be particularly grim, as its bloody
civil war has not enjoyed even a brief respite over the course of the last five
years. The war has cost Syria over 400,000 lives, destroyed its economy,
seen large swaths of the relatively moderate population swallowed up by
the Islamic State, and has left millions displaced.2 As both the regime and
the various elements of the fractured opposition continue to find bene-
factors and other sources of income, the situation has persisted to a
dynamic stalemate. Moreover, while international discussions have taken
place regarding finding a solution, little hope of a negotiated settlement
appears to be on the horizon. While a resolution is conceivable, both the
opposition and the regime’s armed support is fractured and likely incap-
able of disarming groups that are not invited to participate in settlements.
Even if it were conceivable that the major players in the Syrian Civil War
could all be invited to participate in negotiations, the conflict has pro-
duced a new breed of war lords throughout Syria on both sides of the
conflict, and these local powerful figures are unlikely to abide by the terms
of any negotiated settlement that strips them of power.
This project did not concern itself with stability, but the theoretical
underpinnings of the theory presented herein would support the argument
that regime stability is influenced by interpersonal trust. In addition, con-
flict duration may also share a relationship with the interpersonal trust
dynamics of the state, and such avenues of inquiry should be explored.
Similarly, death tolls would likely also be related to interpersonal trust,
and an analysis that is capable of addressing endogeneity between these
variables sufficiently would also likely be of interest to many scholars.
Beyond it being possible to derive these hypotheses through extensions of
the model, these propositions appear to be corroborated anecdotally by
the post-Tahrir Square experiences of Egypt, Libya, and Syria.
As has been noted, this project was designed to provide a preliminary
exploration of the relationship between interpersonal trust and support for
terrorism. The empirical analysis, due primarily to data limitations, does
not provide a robust quantitative causal test of the theoretical model.
Future work should be conducted to ensure that the causal mechanisms
outlined in Chapter 3 are producing the results found in Chapters 6 and 7.
More importantly, the theoretical analysis should be further refined in the
future to provide a more nuanced analysis. In particular, a model that
accounts for network structure and the decision to delegate retribution
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should be explored within the framework of a computational or agent-
based model (Siegel 2009, 2011).
The model developed in this book can also be applied to a range of
phenomena that deal with collective action and retribution. For example,
the model can be adapted to explore an individual’s reliance on tribal or
familial networks over institutional alternatives. The role that trust plays
in the formation of gangs can also be examined through this general frame-
work. Moreover, the generality of the model allows for it to be readily
extended and explored in the laboratory. Such studies could help provide
us with broad insights into how an individual seeks retribution, and the
role of indirect reciprocity in fostering cooperation.
Finally, the overarching goal of the model is to provide a framework
through which analysts and scholars may be able to predict whom indivi-
duals will turn to when deciding to collectively act, and what tools they will
ultimately use; and this model can be applied broadly to other revolutionary
and non-revolutionary settings.
This book provided a humble attempt at exploring the role that social
capital and interpersonal trust play in shaping collective action. While it
focused on the Arab Spring uprisings, its implications stretch beyond the
Arab world. Where interpersonal trust and social capital are low, the result
of collective endeavors necessarily suffers. In Egypt, Libya, and Syria, we
witnessed collective action in pursuit of regime change utilizing drastically
different means to achieve these goals. While other variables certainly
played a role, the interpersonal trust dynamics within each state also
shaped the product of these attempts at collective action. Terrorism is not
simply produced by evil men doing evil things. It is, to a certain extent, the
end result of strategic decisions made by individuals who perceive a lim-
ited set of viable or efficient options necessary to achieve their goals and
satisfy their preferences, whatever those goals and preferences may be.
Notes
1 There is a reasonable argument to be made that the initial revolution was, in
fact, a military coup that took place on the heels of a revolution (Stein 2012).
2 While casualty figures are difficult to estimate, these estimates have been based
on numbers provided by the United Nations special envoy for Syria and the
United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (Al Jazeera 2016).
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Appendix A: Ancillary Analyses for
Chapter 3
Proofs of Propositions
Proof of PROPOSITION 1.
Since B is selfish, she receives a payoff of 1 – x when choosing not to seek
retribution, and 1 – x – c when choosing to seek retribution through a
terrorist group or delegating retribution to the political entrepreneur. In
order for retribution through the terrorist group or the political entrepreneur
to be the optimal strategy, the following must be true:
1 x c  1 x $ c  0
Given that c is by definition greater than 0, choosing a strategy that
requires a selfish player B to allocate some amount c towards retribution is
never optimal.
Proof of PROPOSITION 2.
An unselfish citizen receives a utility of 1 – x – | 1 – x – (1 + x)| when
choosing to maintain the status quo after suffering a grievance. The
unselfish citizen receives a payoff of 1 – x – c – | 1 – x – c – (1 + x – aBc)|
when choosing to seek retribution through the terrorist group. In order for
the unselfish citizen to prefer maintaining the status quo to seeking
retribution, the following inequality must be satisfied:
1 x j1 x ð1þ xÞj  1 x c j1 x c
ð1þ x acÞj $ 1 3x  1 x c j  2x cþ acj
In order for this inequality to be true, aBc ≤ 2c, and therefore, a must be
less than or equal to 2. Thus, in order for maintaining the status quo to be
the optimal strategy for an unselfish citizen, the ability of the terrorist to
punish must be equal to or less than 2. The unselfish citizen will never choose
to maintain the status quo in equilibrium when aB is greater than 2.
In order for an unselfish citizen to seek retribution of any kind, a must
be greater than 2. If we were to presume that the probability that an
individual is trustworthy is 1, the inequality above would hold when a
citizen is choosing between delegating punishment and maintaining the
status quo. Therefore, an unselfish citizen’s optimal strategy is to maintain
the status quo when aE is less than 2, the probability that the entrepreneur
is trustworthy is 1, and when options are limited to delegating punishment
and maintaining the status quo. Given that the utility of delegating pun-
ishment decreases in p, this result holds for all values of p. In addition,
since aB < aE, an unselfish citizen will always choose to maintain the
status quo when aE is less than 2.
Proof of PROPOSITION 3.
a In order for a selfish entrepreneur to prefer punishing the government,
he must prefer a payoff of 1 to a payoff of 1 + c. Since c is by defini-
tion greater than 0, a selfish entrepreneur will always prefer receiving
a payoff of 1 + c, and thus, choose not to punish.
In order for an unselfish entrepreneur to prefer not punishing the
government, he must prefer a payoff of 1 + c – |1 – x – c – (1 + x)| to
a payoff of 1 – |1 – x – c – (1 + x – aEc)|. This reduces to:
c j  2x cj  j  2xþ ac cj
This condition never holds when aE is greater than 2.
b Assume that Propositions 2 and 4 (proven below) are true. Since aB ≤
2, b = 1 is never an optimal strategy (Proposition 2). Since aE > 2, in
order for the citizen to be indifferent to each strategy, the following
condition must hold:
pð1 x c j1 x c ð1þ x aEcjÞ þ ð1 pÞ
ð1 x c j1 x c ð1þ xÞjÞ ¼ 1 3x
p ¼ 2=aE
Therefore, where p > 2/aE, the citizen will prefer b = D, and
where p ≤ 2/aE, the citizen prefers strategy b = 0. Any deviation from
these strategies would be suboptimal.
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c Assume that Propositions 2 and 4 (proven below) are true. Also assume
that c ≤ 2x/(aE – 1), and that aE > aB > 2. An unselfish citizen is indifferent
between seeking retribution through a terrorist group and delegating
retribution to a political entrepreneur when the following condition holds:
pð1 x c j1 x c ð1þ x ¼ aEcÞ þ ð1 pÞð1 x c
j1 x c ð1þ xÞjÞ ¼ 1 x c j1 x c ð1þ x aBcÞ
pðj  2x cþ aEcÞj þ ð1 pÞðj  2x cjÞ
 j  2x cþ aBcj
paEc ¼ aBc
p ¼ aBc=aEc
Given that Propositions 2 and 4 are true, an unselfish citizen is
indifferent between seeking retribution through a terrorist group or
delegating to an entrepreneur when p = aB/aE.
Proof of PROPOSITION 4.
a Assume a > 2. An unselfish citizen’s payoff when punishing the gov-
ernment is 1 – x – c – |– 2x – c + ac)|. So long as – 2x – c + ac is less
than 0, the citizen is indifferent between the amount allocated for
punishment when ac = 2c, and prefers to increase c when ac > 2c.
Since a is by definition greater than 2, an unselfish citizen always
prefers to increase c until – 2x – c + ac = 0. The unselfish citizen never
prefers to increase the c so that the inequality component of the
equation is greater than 0 since the citizen’s payoff is decreasing in
both the inequality term and the self-interested component of the
payoff. Thus, so long as a > 2, the citizen prefers to allocate:
c ¼ 2x
a 1
Since a citizen cannot punish more than she possesses, the amount
she can punish by is capped at 1 – x. Therefore, an unselfish citizen
will choose to allocate 2x/(a – 1) to punish the government when this
amount is less than 1 – x, and will allocate 1 – x when she cannot
reduce inequality to 0.
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b Assume that Proposition 4(a) holds true. Where 2xa1 > 1 – x, given that
aE > aB, when b = 1 or b = D, the unselfish citizen will always choose
to allocate c = 1 – x, and therefore allocates the same cost to punish-
ing the government. Since aE > aB, cE > cB where cB > 1 – x, cE ≥ cB
under all circumstances.
Proof of PROPOSITION 5.
a Presume Proposition 4 is true. UE(1, Selfish) = q(1 + c – c) – (1 – q)(1
+ c – c) = 1. UE(0, Selfish) = 1 + c. So long as c > 0, 1 + c > 1. Since
c ≥ 0, UE(1, Selfish) ≥ UE(0, Selfish). When b = D, c > 0. Therefore,
1 + c > 1, and UE(1, Selfish) > UE(0, Selfish).
b An unselfish player E will choose strategy e = 1 when q > 2xþ2caEc and
will choose strategy e = 0 when q  2xþ2caEc in equilibrium. Absent the
presumption that a player will prefer the strategy that utilizes less c
when indifferent between strategies, an unselfish player E will be
indifferent between e = 1 and e = 0 when the following inequality is
satisfied:
1þ c j1þ x ð1 xÞj ¼ qð1 j1þ x aEc ð1 x cÞ
þð1 qÞð1 j1þ x ð1 x cÞj
q ¼ 2xþ 2c
aEc
Anunselfish playerEwill always prefer for punishment to be successful
rather than unsuccessful when e = 1 if c > 0, and c > 0 when b = D. Thus,
e(D, E=Unselfish) = 1 when q > 2xþ2caEc and e(D, E=Unselfish) = 0
when q  2xþ2caEc .
Proof of PROPOSITION 6.
a Assume Proposition 1 is true. Selfish player B’s payoff under all values
of q, p, and aE is 1 – x – c for b = 1 and b = D. Selfish player B’s
payoff is 1 – x for b = 0. Since c > 0 when b = 1 or b = D are played,
1 – x > 1 – x – c. Thus, a selfish player B will always prefer b = 0 over
all other options.
b Assume Proposition 3 and Proposition 5 are true. In order for player
B to choose to delegate the duty to punish, an unselfish entrepreneur
must prefer e = 1, which is both always and only true when q > 2xþ2caEc .
Thus, q > 2xþ2caEc is a necessary condition for an unselfish player B to
choose b = D. In addition, the expected utility of delegating the duty
to punish must be greater than the expected utility of punishing
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through the terrorist organization. In order for this to hold true,
qpaEc ≥ aEc, and, therefore, p  aBqaE.
c Assume Proposition 2, Proposition 3, and Proposition 5 are true.
According to Proposition 2, player B will never prefer b = 1 over b = 0
when 2 ≥ aB. In order for an unselfish player B to prefer b = D
over b = 0, qpaE > 2 or >
aB
qaE
. In order for player B to choose to
delegate the duty to punish, an unselfish entrepreneur must also prefer
e = 1, which is both always and only true when q > 2xþ2caEc . Thus,
q > 2xþ2caEc is a necessary condition for an unselfish player B to choose
b = D. An unselfish player B will only prefer b = D over b = 0 when




d Assume Proposition 2 is true. Since q ≤ 1 and aB > 0, qpaE can never
be greater than 2 when aE ≤ 2. Thus, player B will always prefer b = 0
over b = D when aE ≤ 2. Since aE > aB > 0, player B will also always
prefer b = 0 over b = 1 when aE ≤ 2.
Proof of PROPOSITION 7.
In order for a selfish player E to prefer e = 1 over e = 0, 1 + q(1) > 1 + c
when successful punishment will result in achieving power. Therefore, q > c
must hold true in order for player E to choose e = 1. In order for suc-
cessful punishment to result in player E achieving power 1 + x – aEc < 1,
which is only true when x < aEc. If x ≥ aEc, player E cannot take power,
and therefore will be assured of earning 1, which is always less than 1 + c
since c > 0.
Proof of PROPOSITION 8.
a Assume Proposition 1 is true. Selfish player B’s payoff under all values
of q, p, and aE is 1 – x – c for b = 1 and b = D. Selfish player B’s
payoff is 1 – x for b = 0. Since c > 0 when b = 1 or b = D are played,
1 – x > 1 – x – c. Thus, a selfish player B will always prefer b = 0 over
all other options.
b Assume Proposition 2 and Proposition 7 are true. In order for an
unselfish player B to delegate the duty to punish to player E, player E
must prefer e = 1, which is only true when the conditions listed in
Proposition 7 are satisfied. When those conditions are satisfied, the
efficiency of delegating retribution with regards to reducing retribution
must be greater or equal to the efficiency of retribution through the
terrorist group, which is true when qaEc ≥ aBc or q  aBaE if player E
chooses e = 1.
c Assume Proposition 2 and Proposition 7 are true. According to Pro-
position 2, player B will never prefer b = 1 over b = 0 when 2 ≥ aB. In
order for an unselfish player B to prefer b = D over b = 0, qaE > 2 or
q > 2aE when player E will choose e = 1. In order for an unselfish
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player B to delegate the duty to punish to player E, player Emust prefer
e = 1, which is only true when the conditions listed in Proposition 7
are satisfied.
d Assume Proposition 2 is true. Since q ≤ 1 and aB > 0, qpaE can never
be greater than 2 when aE ≤ 2. Thus, player B will always prefer b = 0
over b = D when aE ≤ 2. Since aE > aB > 0, player B will also always
prefer b = 0 over b = 1 when aE ≤ 2.
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria for the Primary Model
1 Where 2 ≥ aE > aB: b(B = Selfish) = b(B = Unselfish) = 0, e(0) = e(1)
= e(D) = 0, 1
2 Where aE > 2 > aB and p > 2/aE: b(B = Selfish) = 0, b(B = Unselfish)
= D, e(0) = 0, 1, e(1) = 0, 1, e(D, E = Unselfish) = 1, e(D, E = Selfish)
= 0
3 Where aE > 2 > aB and p ≤ 2/aE: b(B = Selfish) = b(B =Unselfish) = 0; e
(0) = e(1) = 0, 1; e(D, E = Unselfish) = 0, 1; e(D, E = Selfish) = 0
4 Where aE > aB > 2 and p > aB/aE: b(B = Selfish) = 0; b(B = Unselfish)
= D; e(0) = 0, 1; e(1) = 0, 1; e(D, E = Unselfish) = 1; e(D, E = Selfish)
= 0
5 Where aE> aB> 2 and p≤ aB/aE: b(B= Selfish) = 0; b(B=Unselfish) = 1;
e(0) = 0, 1; e(1) = 0, 1; e(D, E = Unselfish) = 1; e(D, E = Selfish) = 0
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Appendix B: Ancillary Analyses for
Chapter 6
Table A.1 Arab Barometer Key Survey Questions
Perception of Superiority
The following questions are your personal
opinions about the principles that should
determine the behavior and situation of
women in our society. For each of the
statements listed below, please indicate
whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or
disagree strongly.
“On the whole, men make better political
leaders than women do.”
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly
disagree
36.51% 35.88% 20.03% 7.58%
Internet
















9.56% 11.74% 7.04% 5.08% 66.58%
Fundamentalism
In your opinion, how important is each of
the following principles as a guide for making
the laws of our country?
“The government should implement only
the laws of sharia.”
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly
disagree
35.88% 34.65% 16.93% 12.54%
Today as in the past, Muslim scholars and
jurists sometimes disagree about the proper
interpretation of Islam in response to present-
day issues. For each of the statements listed
below, please indicate whether you agree
strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly
with the interpretation that is presented.
“Banks in Muslim countries must be for-
bidden from charging even modest interest
on loans because that is forbidden by
Islam.”
49.44% 32.98% 11.78% 5.8%
“It is acceptable in Islam for male and
female university students to attend classes
together.”
23.04% 37.94% 25.39% 13.62%
“In Islam awoman should dress modestly, but
Islam does not require that she wear a hijab.”
22.27% 34.46% 23.17% 20.20%
Trust
Generally speaking, would you say that




How would you rate the current overall
economic condition of [respondent’s country]
today?
Very Good Good Bad Very Bad
3.24% 30.14% 34.82% 31.78%
Imputation Diagnostics
Figure A.1 Missingness Map
Figure A.2 Overdispersion
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Additional Robustness Checks




















































































N 6190 6190 6190
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
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Complete Case Analysis
Table A.3 Ordered Logit Regression Dependent Variable: Support for Terrorism
Independent Variable Only Trust Muslims Full Model
Trust −0.213 (0.058)** −0.173 (0.081)* −0.264 (0.072)**
Income 0.027 (0.026) 0.013 (0.023)
Education −0.055 (0.048) −0.076 (0.403)
Income * Education −0.006 (0.008) −0.002 (0.006)
Muslim −0.076 (0.114)
Fundamentalism −0.029 (0.036)
Female −0.168 (0.077)* −0.156 (0.066)*
Age −0.080 (0.029)** −0.056 (0.026)*
Married −0.028 (0.084) −0.061 (0.072)
Algeria 0.417 (0.083)** 0.477 (0.146)** 0.436 (0.125)**
Jordan 1.051 (0.080)** 1.118 (0.133)** 1.062 (0.117)**
Morocco −0.038 (0.087) −0.153 (0.133) −0.204 (0.118)
Palestine 0.602 (0.076)** 0.537 (0.122)** 0.516 (0.107)**
N 5513 2858 3856
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01





































(Confidence Interval in parentheses)
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Appendix C: Ancillary Analyses for
Chapter 7
Diagnostic Tests
Woolridge Test for Endogeneity
Robust score chi2(1) = 2.82977 (p = 0.0925)
Robust regression F(1,96) = 2.25252 (p = 0.1367)
F-Statistic: 5.9
Woolridge Test for Overidentification
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